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ABSTRACT 
The Influence of CEO Decision-Making and Corporate Strategy 
on Corporate Social Performance 
Author: Jingoo Kang 
Supervisor: Ian C. MacMillan 
 
In this dissertation, I examine the role of CEOs and corporate diversification on corporate 
social performance (CSP).  
In the first essay of the dissertation, I evaluate the financial implications of 
corporate social performance and assess the validity of a widely used measure of social 
performance, the KLD social ratings. In the first part of this essay, I examine the 
relationship between CSP and financial performance. The results show that CSP has a 
negative relationship with short-term financial performance, but a positive relationship 
with long-term financial performance. In addition, I examine whether introducing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act had a substantial impact on the relationship between CSP and 
financial performance. The results show that enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may 
have caused changes in social perceptions about the importance of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). In the second part of this essay, I examine the validity of the KLD 
social ratings. The analysis shows that the KLD social ratings effectively summarize the 
past CSP information of firms, but they predict future CSP less effectively.  
In the second essay of the dissertation, I examine how CEO retirement may 
influence CSP. I propose that CEOs reduce investment in social issues when they are 
approaching retirement, resulting in a negative relationship between CEO retirement and 
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CSP. To understand why CEOs close to retirement reduces CSR investment, I compare 
two possible CEO motivations. The results suggest that CEOs may reduce investment in 
CSR in order to improve profit figures, which will eventually improve their post-
retirement career continuation chances. In further support of this finding, the results show 
that CEOs who remain on the board of directors after retirement are less likely to reduce 
investment in CSR than CEOs who do not. 
In the third essay of the dissertation, I examine the influence of corporate 
diversification strategy on CSP. Previous work in this topic has ignored the important 
difference between firms pursuing unrelated and related diversification: the range of 
stakeholders and transferability of a brand. In this work, I note that unrelated diversifiers 
are likely to face much more diverse stakeholder demands than related diversifiers; 
moreover, they are likely to face bigger challenges in transferring the brand across 
subsidiaries. I propose that such differences will influence a firm’s investment in social 
issues, and eventually will result in varying levels of CSP.  
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Essay One. In the eyes of the stakeholder? Role of stakeholder perceptions in the 
relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Investment in social issues is emerging as an important strategic investment of firms 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Zadek, 2004). Proponents of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) argue that strong corporate social performance 
(CSP) can contribute to the financial performance (FP) of a firm, particularly in the long 
run (Kacperczyk, 2009; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003). 
In the short run, firms may have to make some sacrifices by diverting limited 
organizational resources to social issues. However, in the long run, investment in social 
issues can improve the financial performance of a firm by improving its relationship with 
stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001; McGuire, Sundgren, and Schneeweis, 1988). 
Unfortunately, empirical studies on this topic have failed to reach a consensus on 
the CSP-FP relationship. Margolis and Walsh (2003) reviewed 109 empirical studies on 
this subject, published between 1972 and 2002, and found that 54 studies reported a 
positive CSP-FP relationship, 7 studies had a negative relationship, and 48 studies had an 
inconclusive relationship. In this essay, I provide a sharper test of the CSP-FP 
relationship by comparing the CSP-FP relationship in the short and long term. In addition, 
I examine how the CSP-FP relationship may change, depending on stakeholders’ 
perceptions toward CSR by comparing the CSP-FP relationship before and after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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If CSP contributes to the financial performance by improving a firm’s relationship 
with stakeholders, then stakeholder perceptions toward CSP make a logical context of the 
CSP-FP relationship. If stakeholders highly appreciate CSR, a firm’s strong CSP will 
create financial value. However, if stakeholders do not value CSR, a firm’s strong CSP 
may not have a meaningful impact on financial performance. Therefore, consideration of 
stakeholder perceptions toward CSR will allow us to observe a more precise CSP-FP 
relationship. Nonetheless, it is empirically challenging to measure stakeholder 
perceptions toward CSR. Not only are there a large number of relevant stakeholders (e.g., 
customers, community, government, employees, etc.), but it is also unclear as to which 
instruments can be used to measure stakeholder perceptions toward CSR.  
An alternative approach to measuring stakeholder perceptions toward CSR is to 
identify a high-profile event with a far-reaching influence on a wide range of 
stakeholders. If we assume that such an event is associated with meaningful change in 
stakeholder perceptions toward CSR, its timing of occurrence could be used as a 
moderating variable that proxies changes in stakeholder perceptions toward CSR. In this 
essay, I suggest that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a good example of such an event. 
Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a high-profile event, which accompanied 
large-scale corporate scandals and drew extensive media attention. I expect that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the series of events surrounding the Act have changed social 
perceptions toward CSR in a manner that people become more sensitive to and 
appreciative of CSR.    
In the first part of this essay, I examine several issues surrounding the CSP-FP 
relationship. First, I examine the relationship between CSP and short- and long-term 
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financial performance. Second, assuming that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a milestone 
event associated with a change in stakeholder perceptions toward CSR, I compare the 
CSP-FP relationship before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the second part of this 
essay, I critically evaluate the CSP measure used in this dissertation, the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) social ratings. The KLD social ratings are the CSP 
measure most extensively used in the literature (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2009; 
Waddock, 2003). However, despite extensive reliance on the KLD social ratings in the 
literature, very little work has been done to evaluate this measure critically (Chatterji et 
al., 2009; Sharfman, 1996). Therefore, an evaluation of the KLD social ratings not only 
provides a foundation to this dissertation, but also to the entire empirical CSP literature.  
The analysis of the first part of the essay shows that the CSP-FP relationship is 
negative in the short term, but positive in the long term. Further consideration of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the CSP-FP relationship shows that the positive relationship 
between CSP and long-term financial performance is more pronounced after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, suggesting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have improved social 
perceptions toward the value of CSR. In further support of the positive impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on social perceptions toward CSR, the negative relationship between 
CSP and short-term financial performance is partially and positively moderated after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The analysis of the second part of the essay shows that the KLD 
social ratings do an effective job of summarizing the past CSP of the firm. This result 
lends some underpinnings to using the KLD social ratings in this dissertation and other 
empirical studies.  
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Part I 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1. Corporate social performance and financial performance  
MacMillan (1978) argued that firms and their managers must understand and properly 
respond to the demand of “symbionts” such as employee groups, labor unions, and 
suppliers in order to achieve superior performance. Symbionts were defined as “elements 
of the environment on which the organization is dependent for inputs” (MacMillan, 1978: 
66). The idea of symbionts and firms as interdependent systems has laid a foundation to 
the stakeholder view of the firm (Asher, Mahoney, and Mahoney, 2005; Clarkson, 1995; 
Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984), which has 
received much attention as an alternative paradigm to the shareholder view of the firm 
(Kacperczyk, 2009; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The central argument of the 
stakeholder view is that firm performance and survival depend on how properly firms 
respond to stakeholder demands and social issues (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar, 
2004; Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Therefore, the stakeholder view of the firm suggests 
that socially responsible firms will do better than socially irresponsible firms.  
The positive relationship between CSR and firm performance is expected to be 
more pronounced in the long term versus the short term because the positive CSP-FP 
relationship is an outcome of improvement in the firm-stakeholder relationship 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Kacperczyk, 2009; McGuire et al., 1988; 
Ogden and Watson, 1999). When firms invest in social issues that stakeholders care 
about, firms earn trust, build a better brand image, and improve their relationship with 
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stakeholders (Barnett, 2007; Barney and Hansen, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001). 
However, trust-earning, brand-building, and improvement of the firm-stakeholder 
relationship take time (Currall and Epstein, 2003; Freeman, 1984; Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Uzzi, 1996). Therefore, 
investment in CSR will have a lagged positive effect on a firm’s financial performance.  
In contrast, in the short run, firms may have to endure some financial sacrifices 
when they invest in social issues. Spending resources on social issues such as 
philanthropy, diversity, environment, and human rights does not guarantee immediate 
profit generation (Deckop, Merriman, and Gupta, 2006; Short, 2004). Rather, it is more 
likely that investment in CSR will have a negative impact on short-term profit by 
diverting limited firm resources from other more practical uses such as manufacturing 
and sales (Holstein, 2008; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Thomas 
and Ely, 1996; Zadek, 2004). Therefore, investment in CSR will have an immediate 
negative effect on firm performance.  
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between CSP and financial performance will be 
negative in the short term, but positive in the long term. 
2.2. Role of stakeholder perceptions in the CSP-FP relationship 
An obvious, yet overlooked point in examining the CSP-FP relationship is that it depends 
on how stakeholders perceive CSR. If stakeholders value the idea of CSR, firms that 
demonstrate strong CSP will be able to earn trust, build a good brand image, and improve 
stakeholder relationships in a more effective manner. In turn, those intangible resources 
will generate larger financial value for the firm. In contrast, if stakeholders do not 
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appreciate CSR, strong CSP of the firm may not generate a substantial financial outcome 
for the firm.  
This idea is closely related to the idea of organizational legitimacy and how it 
benefits a firm. Stakeholders have opinions about what are socially acceptable or 
legitimate corporate goals and the means to achieve them (Oliver, 1992), but those 
opinions are subject to change. If stakeholders change their opinion about what are 
socially acceptable corporate goals and actions, organizational legitimacy associated with 
those goals and actions will change, as well (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Davis, 
Diekmann, and Tinsley, 1994; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996). For example, in the logging 
industry, clear-cutting forests was once a socially acceptable (legitimate) business 
practice, whereas today, forestry firms are judged by the extent to which their timber 
holdings are sustainably managed (Rowley and Berman, 2000). This attitudinal change 
suggests that firm actions (e.g., forest conservation), which were previously regarded as 
irrelevant and unnecessary, have become indispensable to success.  
In the United States, the concept of socially responsible corporation and CSR has 
been given only lukewarm support (Economist, 2008; Friedman, 1970; Holstein, 2008).  
Milton Friedman even argued that the only social responsibility of business is to 
maximize profits, and that CSR is an example of agency problems (Friedman, 1970). 
However, highly publicized scandals of Adelphia, Enron, Tyco, Worldcom et al. in the 
early 2000s have triggered a society-wide discussion about social responsibility of 
business (Robertson, 2007). Newspapers and magazines churned out articles on what 
went wrong with American corporate ethics (Romano, 2005). Academic attention to CSR 
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has significantly increased, as well. A record number of studies on corporate ethics were 
published in prominent scholarly journals during this period (Robertson, 2007).  
In this aftermath, the US Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002, 
also known as the “Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act.” The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is considered to be “the most far-reaching reforms of American 
business practice since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt” (Bumiller, 2002). The passing 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which is an outcome of a society-wide consensus on the 
importance of ethical business practice, suggests that there have been substantive changes 
in American perceptions toward the importance of CSR during this period (Holstein, 
2008; Robertson, 2007). Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was devised with a specific 
purpose of overhauling securities and accounting law and punishing corrupt auditors. 
However, the extensive media coverage on ethical problems of American business 
surrounding it has brought public attention to much broader ethical issues related with 
business (Bumiller, 2002; Romano, 2005). US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) also explains that “The (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act mandated a number of reforms to 
enhance corporate responsibility, enhance financial disclosures and combat corporate 
and accounting fraud…”1, clearly indicating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s ultimate goal 
is to promote more responsible business practice.   
Assuming that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased American stakeholders’ 
perception about the importance of ethical business practices and corporate responsibility 
to some extent, I expect that the positive relationship between CSP and the long-term 
financial performance will be stronger after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, the 
                                                            
1 http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml 
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suggested positive relationship between CSP and long-term financial performance in 
Hypothesis 1 will be more pronounced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act than it was 
beforehand. If the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a milestone event for changes in social 
perceptions toward CSR, I expect that the financial performance implications of CSR 
investment have become stronger after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act than before, thereby 
strengthening the positive relationship between CSP and long-term financial performance.   
Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between CSP and long-term financial 
performance will be more pronounced after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s positive impact on the CSP-FP relationship may not be 
limited to long-term financial performance. Although the nature of CSR (e.g., 
environmental protection, corporate philanthropy, governance transparency) suggests that 
the negative relationship between CSP and short-term financial performance is more 
likely, if stakeholder perceptions toward the importance of CSR have improved after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the negative relationship between CSP and short-term financial 
performance may be positively moderated by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Therefore, I propose that the negative relationship between CSP and short-term financial 
performance will become weaker after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Hypothesis 3. The negative relationship between CSP and short-term financial 
performance will be positively moderated by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. 
Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is expected to have a substantial impact on 
social perceptions toward CSR, it may have a particularly strong impact on social 
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perceptions on the importance of corporate governance-related issues. Above all, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was specifically aimed at overhauling corporate governance-related 
issues such as auditor independence, internal control assessment, and enhanced financial 
disclosure (Bumiller, 2002; Ribstein, 2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s emphasis on 
improving corporate governance is clearly expressed on its description: “(the Sarbanes-
Oxley) Act is the most sweeping federal law concerning corporate governance since the 
adoption of the initial federal securities laws”, with its primary focus on specifically 
improving “the monitoring by independent directors, auditors, and regulators” (Ribstein, 
2002: 5-6).  
A number of prominent politicians’ statements on the urgent need to improve 
corporate governance surrounding the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act clearly 
delivered a message to the American public that the Act is a serious attempt to address 
the problems in corporate governance (Bumillier, 2002; Romano, 2005). Therefore, it is 
likely that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has particularly increased the American stakeholder’s 
appreciation of the corporate efforts to improve governance-related issues. For example, 
investors and the financial market may respond more favorably to a firm’s attempt to 
improve its governance and transparency (e.g., increasing outsider representation in the 
board, avoiding excessive CEO compensation) after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Such 
favorable response by investors and the financial market will improve a firm’s financial 
performance by increasing its stock price and lowering borrowing rates. Therefore, the 
proposed positive moderation effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in hypothesis 2 and 3can 
be more pronounced on the relationship between corporate governance-related CSP and 
financial performance. 
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Hypothesis 4. The positive moderation effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the 
CSP-FP relationship will be more pronounced between the corporate 
governance−specific CSP and financial performance measures. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model and Summary of Hypotheses 
3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data Sources 
The social performance data for the sample firms were collected from the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) Social Ratings database, which is the most trusted source of 
CSP measure in academic research (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2008a; Waddock, 2003; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). The KLD Social Ratings database is published by KLD 
Research & Analytics, Inc. an independent Boston-based rating service that specializes in 
measuring corporate social performance across a range of dimensions related to 
stakeholder concerns. The KLD Social Ratings data are the most influential measure of 
CSP in the academic literature, and many investment managers refer to KLD’s 
recommendations when it comes to social performance screening. For example, TIAA-
CREF, the largest US retirement fund, announced that it divested its 1.25 million shares 
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of Coca-Cola stock, estimated at $52.4 million, following a periodic review of the Broad 
Market Social Index by KLD Research & Analytic Inc. on July 18, 2006. KLD saw 
shortcomings on the part of Coca-Cola in several areas, including labor and human rights 
in Colombia, environmental issues in India and the marketing of high-calorie drinks to 
children in the United States (Moon, 2007).                                                        
KLD’s CSP ratings have several advantages over other rating schemes (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997). First, all companies in the S&P 500 are rated. Second, each company 
is rated on multiple attributes considered relevant to CSP. In each of these areas, KLD 
investigates a range of sources to determine, for example, whether the company has paid 
fines or penalties in an area or whether it has a major strength in the area. Third, a single 
group of researchers, working independently from the related companies or any particular 
brokerage house, applies the same set of criteria to related companies. Fourth, the criteria 
are applied consistently across a wide range of companies, with data gathered from a 
range of sources, both internal and external to the firm. KLD uses a variety of sources to 
capture social performance data about each company. Each company’s investor relations 
office is sent a yearly questionnaire about CSP practices, and KLD maintains continuing 
relations with the investor relations office to assure accuracy of the data. KLD maintains 
the independence and integrity of its ratings, but the firm is willing to respond to 
company concerns where accuracy is at issue. Corporate data sources include annual 
reports, 10K forms, proxy statements, and quarterly reports, as well as reports issued for 
specific CSP arenas, such as the environment and the community. External data sources 
include articles about a company in the general business press (e.g., Fortune, Business 
Week, the Wall Street Journal), trade magazines, and in the general media. KLD staffers 
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also draw on relevant articles about companies from periodicals such as the Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, regional Environmental Protection Agency newsletters, academic journals, 
and, for legal or regulatory issues such as fines and penalties, the National Law Journal. 
External surveys and ratings are also used, where appropriate; for instance, Working 
Mother’s listing of the 100 best companies for women to work (Waddock and Graves, 
1997).  
KLD data cover approximately 80 indicators in seven major Qualitative Issue 
Areas, including community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, the 
environment, human rights, and products. In addition, KLD data provide information for 
involvement in the following “Controversial Business Issues”: Alcohol, Gambling, 
Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and Tobacco, where business involvement results in a 
negative indicator. It does not include ratings explicitly related to animal rights or 
biotechnology issues as of 2006. Each area has a number of strength and concern items, 
where a binary measure indicates the presence or absence of that particular 
strength/concern. For example, the Community category contains seven strength items 
(Charitable Giving, Innovative Giving, Non-US Charitable Giving, Support for Housing, 
Support for Education, Volunteer Programs, and Other Strength) and four concern items 
(Investment Controversies, Negative Economic Impact, Tax Disputes, and Other 
Concerns). Each year, KLD evaluates the companies in the database on each item 
through various sources, such as public records and media reports, monitoring of 
corporate advertising, surveys, and on-site evaluations.  
To test the external validity of the KLD index, I looked at the correlation of the 
index with Fortune’s reputation score (Moon, 2007; Sharfman, 1996). For the 207 
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companies listed in Fortune Magazine’s 2005 list of America’s Most Respected 
Companies, the correlation between the KLD index in 2005 and the Fortune Score in 
2005 is positive and highly significant. The correlation coefficient is 0.2481 and is 
significant at the 0.1% level. The KLD Social Ratings will be used as a measure of CSP 
in all three essays in this dissertation. As I rely on the KLD Social Ratings extensively in 
this dissertation, I conduct a thorough evaluation of this measure in the second part of this 
essay.  
To construct other explanatory and control variables used in essay 1, I collected 
financial data from the Compustat North America database. Since I do not have clear ex 
ante criteria to include or exclude certain firms in my analysis, I include all available 
firms in the KLD Social Ratings and the Compustat North America database.  
To reduce the endogeneity problem arising from firm-level time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, I adopt firm-fixed effects estimation (Kacperczyk, 2009; Khaled and Paton, 
2005; Moon, 2007). The majority of previous studies have relied on cross-sectional or 
pooled data sets. It is well known that inferences based on cross-sectional analysis are 
likely to be invalid in the presence of significant firm heterogeneity. Random effects 
estimation yield consistent estimates only if we impose the strong assumption that firm 
effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. In case of CSP, there are good reasons for 
suspecting that this assumption is invalid. Omission of firm-fixed effects overlooks the 
unobserved heterogeneity issue and may incorrectly generate a positive coefficient of 
CSP on financial performance. Also controlling for firm-fixed effects is required in 
comparing samples of different periods. Due to the unbalanced panel data structure in the 
KLD database, samples of different periods do not contain the same firms. Therefore, by 
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controlling for firm-fixed effects, I can control for firm-level time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneities that may account for differential impacts of CSP on the financial 
performance in the samples of different time periods.   
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variables 
Financial performance. Three measures of financial performance are used to examine the 
impact of CSP on short-term and long-term financial performance. The three measures 
are Tobin’s Q, market value (in $ millions), and Return-on-Asset (ROA). I used three 
measures of corporate financial performance, ROA, market value, and Tobin’s Q. Those 
three measures were chosen based on their differential focus on measuring financial 
performance. First, ROA is an accounting-based measure of profitability. Second, market 
value is a market-based measure of firm performance. Third, Tobin’s Q is a measure that 
combines advantages of both accounting-based measures and market-based measures of 
firm performance. Advocates of accounting-based measures argue that market-based 
performance measures are influenced by a range of factors unrelated to the activity of the 
individual firm (Shane and Spicer, 1983). Advocates of market-based performance 
measures question the objectivity and informational value of accounting data (Benson, 
1982) and maintain that market performance is the dimension of financial performance 
most relevant to investors and shareholders. Therefore, I considered different measures of 
financial performance to deal with weakness of each performance measure. Probably the 
most popular market-based firm performance measure used in the management literature 
is the abnormal return (e.g., Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986). However, abnormal return 
cannot be used as a market-based firm performance measure in this study because the 
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goal of abnormal return approach is to assess the impact of an event on market value of 
the firm. In essay 1, I do not examine influence of events on firm performance. In 
addition, I used absolute value of the three financial performance measures rather than 
change in values of those measures because I employed firm-fixed effects estimation. 
Therefore, in essence, my empirical models in the first essay examined how changes in 
CSP (t to t+1) affect changes in ROA, market value, and Tobin’s Q (t to t+1). This 
approach allowed me to examine how improvement/deterioration in CSP may influence 
ROA, market value, and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, my models are consistent with the 
approaches of previous studies that used changes in stock values as their dependent 
variable of market-based firm performance (e.g., Brammer and Millington, 2008). 
Following a previous study (Kacperczyk, 2009), for each measure, short-term financial 
performance is measured at one year into the future (t+1), and long-term financial 
performance is measured at two and three years into the future (t+2, t+3). 
Explanatory variables 
Corporate social performance (CSP). Following the common practice in the literature 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel, 2008b; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Griffin and Mahon, 
1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I define the CSP of the 
firm as the sum of all strength items minus the sum of all concern items (80 indicators in 
seven major social issue categories, including community, corporate governance, 
diversity, employee relations, the environment, human rights, and products). Considering 
all dimensions of CSP reported in the KLD database improves the construct validity of 
the social performance measure, since CSP is a multidimensional concept (Brammer, 
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Pavelin, and Porter, 2006; Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 
2001; Rowley and Berman, 2000).  
Control variables 
I included several control variables. To control for the possibility that the availability of 
financial slack resources affects CSP, I include controls for the debt ratio and free cash 
flow (in $ millions) (McKendall, Sanchez, and Sicilian, 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000). Previous studies report that firm size may affect CSP (McGuire, Dow, and 
Argheyd, 2003; McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of the dollar value of the total 
assets (in $ millions). All remaining inter-temporal trends and interfirm heterogeneity are 
controlled for with firm-fixed effects and year-dummy indicators. I estimate the 
following model to obtain the regression results in Table 2: 
Financial performanceit+1,2,3= β1CSPit + γ Zit + δ Dit + εit 
Where Zit is the vector of firm-level characteristics that affect CSP, Dit is the vector of the 
firm and year dummies, and εit is the error term. Zit includes debt ratio, free cash flow, 
and firm size.  
4. Results  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables used in the 
regression analysis. Correlations among the market value, firm size, and cash flow are 
fairly high and statistically significant at p<0.05. However, high correlations among those 
variables are predictable and easily explainable because large firms usually have a high 
market value and generate more cash flow.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations for Sampled Firms2 
 
Variable N Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Tobin’s Q 5059 2.1080 1.4246       
2. Market value  5059 10808 31278 0.1929*      
3. ROA  5059 0.0147 0.1340 0.1760* 0.0793*     
4. CSP 5059 -0.4466 2.4253 0.1448* 0.0853* 0.0595*    
5. Firm size  5059 7.8279 1.6429 -0.2160* 0.4963* -0.0410* -0.0477*   
6. Free cash flow   5059 745.84 2439.1 0.0075 0.7580* 0.1193* 0.0104 0.5022*  
7. Debt ratio  5059 0.2249 0.1945 -0.1450* 0.0001 -0.1963* -0.0960* 0.2831* 0.0693* 
                   
            Significance level: * p < .05 
                                                            
2 The sample data covers observations from 1992 to 2006. 
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Figure 2. Histogram of CSP scores (All years) 
 
Figure 2 shows the histogram of CSP scores (the KLD Social Ratings) over all 
years. The histogram is overlaid with a normal distribution line. The histogram of CSP 
scores shows no skewness, but it is leptokurtic, with an acute peak and thicker tails than a 
normal distribution.  
To examine the CSP-FP relationship in the short and long term (Hypothesis 1), I 
regressed three financial performance variables (Tobin’s Q, market value, and ROA) on 
CSP and the control variables. Table 2 summarizes the results of this test. The results 
show that for Tobin’s Q and the Market value, the CSP-FP relationship changes from 
negative to positive as the time lag between CSP and the financial performance variable 
increases. This result suggests that the CSP-FP relationship is negative in the short term, 
but positive in the long term, thus lending support to Hypothesis 1. However, the 
predicted change in the CSP-FP relationship is not observed when the dependent variable 
was ROA.  
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the test results for Hypothesis 2. In Hypothesis 2, I 
proposed that the positive impact of CSP on long-term financial performance would be 
more pronounced after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 shows 
that the positive CSP-FP relationship in the long term (t+3) is more pronounced during 
the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Table 4, market value model) than during the 
period before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Table 3, market value model), thereby lending 
some support to the prediction of Hypothesis 2. However, a comparison of Tables 3 and 4 
also reveals that the short-term CSP-FP relationship was only significantly negative after 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act period, which contradicts the prediction of Hypothesis 3. To 
further study the short-term CSP-FP relationship surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I 
checked the interaction effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CSP on short-term financial 
performance (Tables 5 and 6).  
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimation Results of the CSP-FP Relationship (1992-2006) 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
  
Dependent Variable Tobin’s 
qt+1 
Tobin’s 
qt+2 
Tobin’s 
qt+3 
Market 
Valuet+1 
Market 
Valuet+2 
Market 
Valuet+3 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
Intercept  5.3693***
(0.3601) 
 3.5769***
(0.4844) 
 5.1191***
(0.7794) 
-7231.9* 
(3404.0) 
 5912.8 
(4891.5) 
 9760.2 
(7789.9) 
 0.4544*** 
(0.0408) 
 0.5611*** 
(0.0609) 
 0.2394*
(0.1062) 
Firm size t -0.3795***
(0.0490) 
-0.1759** 
(0.0656) 
-0.4683***
(0.1055) 
 1899.6*** 
(454.54) 
 216.87 
(652.63) 
 52.058 
(1043.4) 
-0.0578*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0760***
(0.0081) 
-0.0239† 
(0.0142) 
Free cash flow t  0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 2.9972*** 
(0.1422) 
 2.8094***
(0.2209) 
 0.9294* 
(0.3811) 
 0.0000† 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000† 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t -1.9803***
(0.1245) 
-0.6286***
(0.1458) 
 1.9694***
(0.2447) 
-2145.9* 
(1095.8) 
-1239.3 
(1449.8) 
-2384.1 
(2413.1) 
 0.1431*** 
(0.0131) 
 0.2887***
(0.0180) 
 0.0130 
(0.0328) 
CSP t -0.0313***
(0.0081) 
-0.0218* 
(0.0099) 
 0.0289† 
(0.0166) 
-151.41* 
(75.154) 
-125.13 
(100.60) 
 419.03** 
(161.86) 
-0.0010 
(0.0009) 
-0.0004 
(0.0012) 
-0.0012 
(0.0022) 
Firm-Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 5059 3680 2356 5705 4158 2660 5715 4166 2667 
N Firms 1483 1393 1280 1631 1543 1434 1634 1544 1436 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8295 0.8418 0.8472 0.9593 0.9603 0.9696 0.6346 0.5851 0.4859 
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Estimation Results of the CSP-FP Relationship (Before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 1992-2002) 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
  
Dependent Variable Tobin’s 
qt+1 
Tobin’s 
qt+2 
Tobin’s 
qt+3 
Market 
Valuet+1 
Market 
Valuet+2 
Market 
Valuet+3 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
Intercept  16.734***
(1.0261) 
 7.9953***
(1.0783) 
 4.1890***
(1.1006) 
 32861† 
(16941) 
 20194 
(16222) 
 37629* 
(14883) 
 0.8530*** 
(0.0551) 
 0.4690*** 
(0.0555) 
 0.1960***
(0.0537) 
Firm size t -1.2294***
(0.0957) 
-0.8724***
(0.0977) 
-0.6783***
(0.0989) 
 2875.3† 
(1581.2) 
 2162.5 
(1513.4) 
-1691.1 
(1387.6) 
-0.0626*** 
(0.0049) 
-0.0504***
(0.0051) 
-0.0195*** 
(0.0050) 
Free cash flow t -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002***
(0.0000) 
 7.9018*** 
(0.5714) 
-0.4786 
(0.5463) 
-4.1341***
(0.4990) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t  0.4752† 
(0.2495) 
 0.6305* 
(0.2582) 
 0.7140** 
(0.2579) 
-2538.7 
(4116.8) 
-560.41 
(3943.9) 
 1264.2 
(3629.9) 
 0.0334* 
(0.0129) 
 0.0042
(0.0135) 
 0.0200 
(0.0131) 
CSP t  0.0346† 
(0.0176) 
 0.0235 
(0.0181) 
 0.0087 
(0.0183) 
-56.383 
(289.24) 
-74.841 
(277.20) 
-115.69 
(254.58) 
-0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0017† 
(0.0009) 
Firm-Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 2360 2339 2333 2654 2641 2627 2655 2642 2627 
N Firms 481 480 483 519 518 517 519 519 517 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7601 0.7386 0.7078 0.8592 0.8844 0.9081 0.5475 0.5670 0.5470 
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Estimation Results of the CSP-FP Relationship (After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 2003-2006) 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s 
qt+1 
Tobin’s 
qt+2 
Tobin’s 
qt+3 
Market 
Valuet+1 
Market 
Valuet+2 
Market 
Valuet+3 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
Intercept  9.6995***
(0.8582) 
 2.8071* 
(1.1070) 
-0.2772 
(1.8901) 
 30522* 
(13676) 
 40820* 
(19423) 
-7598.7 
(35480) 
 0.9471*** 
(0.0846) 
 0.3200** 
(0.1182) 
-0.2835†
(0.1715) 
Firm size t -0.6173***
(0.0753) 
-0.1661 
(0.1017) 
 0.3005 
(0.1879) 
 1404.1 
(1188.4) 
-2422.2 
(1764.3) 
 4612.7 
(3360.0) 
-0.0556*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.0266*
(0.0107) 
 0.0376* 
(0.0161) 
Free cash flow t  0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 3.5227*** 
(0.2447) 
 4.5671***
(0.3568) 
 0.9107* 
(0.6690) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t -0.1249 
(0.1522) 
-0.0024 
(0.1858) 
-0.5917† 
(0.3288) 
-1874.0 
(2058.1) 
-2946.1 
(3174.4) 
-5864.3 
(5981.3) 
 0.0206 
(0.0127) 
 0.0654**
(0.0193) 
 0.0110 
(0.0288) 
CSP t -0.0250** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0304** 
(0.0106) 
 0.0007 
(0.0187) 
-497.21** 
(149.32) 
-471.81* 
(198.03) 
 1038.9** 
(374.33) 
 0.0000 
(0.0009) 
-0.0009 
(0.0012) 
-0.0004 
(0.0018) 
Firm-Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 1787 1314 844 2005 1485 962 2008 1488 965 
N Firms 491 464 428 531 506 472 531 506 1436 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8869 0.8963 0.9057 0.9687 0.9690 0.9700 0.6207 0.6297 0.7414 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Moderation Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the CSP-FP Relationship 
(1992-2006) 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s 
qt+1 
Market 
Valuet+1 
ROAt+1 
Intercept  19.425*** 
(0.5923) 
 69698*** 
(8928.5) 
 0.7854*** 
(0.0344) 
Firm size t -1.3027*** 
(0.0495) 
 118.92 
(753.57) 
-0.0539*** 
(0.0029) 
Free cash flow t -0.0000† 
(0.0000) 
 5.2302*** 
(0.2339) 
 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t  0.1850 
(0.1425) 
224.26 
(2094.2) 
 0.0024 
(0.0080) 
After SOX (2003-) t  0.0317 
(0.0347) 
-1663.3***
(530.17) 
 0.0189*** 
(0.0020) 
CSP t  0.0086 
(0.0115) 
187.47 
(175.83) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
After SOX x CSP t -0.0528*** 
(0.0111) 
-531.14** 
(165.51) 
-0.0002 
(0.0006) 
Firm-Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 4147 4659 4663 
N Firms 547 571 571 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7403 0.8936 0.4921 
 
                              Significance levels: † p< .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
The results of Table 5 again confirm the previous interpretation of Tables 3 and 4: 
the negative relationship between CSP and short-term financial performance is stronger 
during the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In Table 5, the interaction term of CSP 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is negative and statistically significant for Tobin’s Q (β=-
0.0528, p<0.0001) and the market value (β=-531.14, p<0.001), suggesting that the short-
term CSP-FP relationship for Tobin’s Q and the market value becomes more strongly 
negative after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act than before it. Therefore, the findings from Tables 
3, 4, and 5 do not support Hypothesis 3.  
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I conducted an additional analysis to examine the relationship between CSP and 
short-term financial performance surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In hypothesis 4, I 
predicted that the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be more pronounced in 
corporate governance specific CSP. In order to examine this idea, I focused on a subset of 
the KLD Social Ratings on corporate governance. I regressed financial performance 
measures on corporate governance ratings only (Table 6). The result of this additional 
analysis is reported in Table 6, which shows that the interaction effect of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and corporate governance rating is only statistically significant for Tobin’s Q 
at t+1. Therefore, hypothesis 4 has a very weak support, if any. 
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Table 6. Moderation Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Corporate Governance-specific CSP-FP Relationship (1992-2006) 
 
Dependent Variable Tobin’s 
qt+1 
Tobin’s 
qt+2 
Tobin’s 
qt+3 
Market 
Valuet+1 
Market 
Valuet+2 
Market 
Valuet+3 
ROAt+1 ROAt+2 ROAt+3 
Intercept  9.5865***
(0.3536) 
 10.540***
(0.3856) 
 9.7738***
(0.4362) 
-24694*** 
(5086.0) 
 7346.8 
(5653.9) 
 37100*** 
(6110.4) 
 0.4366*** 
(0.0251) 
 0.3815*** 
(0.0275) 
 0.2632*** 
(0.0287) 
Firm size t -0.8802***
(0.0439) 
-1.0037***
(0.0480) 
-0.9150***
(0.0544) 
 4441.6*** 
(632.13) 
 939.85 
(704.73) 
-2171.6** 
(763.82) 
-0.0468*** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0402*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0250*** 
(0.0035) 
Free cash flow t  0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
 4.9251*** 
(0.2115) 
 2.4176***
(0.2553) 
-0.6607* 
(0.2999) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t -0.5571***
(0.1355) 
-0.0171 
(0.1436) 
 0.3472 
(0.1625) 
-3792.3* 
(1811.8) 
-3139.3 
(2066.5) 
-2598.3 
(2304.2) 
-0.0249** 
(0.0089) 
 0.0073 
(0.0100) 
 0.0106 
(0.0108) 
After SOX (2003-) t  0.1794***
(0.0380) 
 0.1793***
(0.0404) 
 0.1524** 
(0.0480) 
-664.02 
(559.26) 
 1286.2* 
(616.02) 
 2797.3***
(700.02) 
 0.0319*** 
(0.0027) 
 0.0274*** 
(0.0029) 
 0.0159*** 
(0.0032) 
Corporate Governance rating t -0.1645***
(0.0369) 
-0.0816* 
(0.0378) 
 0.1062* 
(0.0414) 
-1097.4* 
(537.60) 
-1177.5* 
(567.61) 
 694.55 
(593.60) 
-0.0024 
(0.0026) 
 0.0020 
(0.0027) 
 0.0003 
(0.0027) 
After SOX  x Corporate Governance 
rating t 
 0.1631***
(0.0444) 
 0.0615 
(0.0480) 
 0.0038 
(0.0582) 
 315.27 
(645.73) 
 29.977 
(721.89) 
-1412.9† 
(831.12) 
 0.0031 
(0.0031) 
-0.0064† 
(0.0035) 
-0.0040 
(0.0039) 
Firm-Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 4185 3682 3219 4744 4216 3691 4749 4220 3694 
N Firms 555 544 532 576 568 559 576 569 560 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6954 0.7051 0.6847 0.8874 0.8930 0.9035 0.4511 0.4402 0.4526 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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4.1. Additional analysis on the CSP-FP relationship 
I ran several sets of additional regressions using seven individual categories of the KLD 
Social Ratings (community, governance, diversity, employee relations, the environment, 
human rights, and products). More specifically, all of the tests performed in Table 2-6 
were replicated by substituting the (overall) CSP score with seven individual categories 
of the KLD Social Ratings. The rationale behind this additional test was to see whether 
the relationships between (overall) CSP and financial performance would be similarly 
replicated across individual categories of the KLD Social Ratings. The results of this 
additional analysis did not reveal a similar pattern of relationship between the KLD 
individual categories and financial performance. I report the results of the additional 
analysis in Appendix 5-7. 
A lack of significant findings in this additional analysis may speak to the 
multidimensional nature of CSP and individual firm difference in priority given to 
different social issue categories (Brammer et al., 2006; Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 
1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Rowley and Berman, 2000). For example, a firm with a 
strong overall CSP may have weakness in environmental protection, while another firm 
with a similarly strong overall CSP may have strength in environmental protection. Let us 
assume that both firms show similarly strong financial performance. In this example, if 
we regress financial performance on environmental performance (an individual social 
issue category), we will not find a clear relationship. However, we will find a clear 
positive relationship between overall CSP and financial performance. Most likely, firms 
in the real world may have different priorities and may perform differently in different 
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social issues. Therefore, it is not very strange that we do not find a clear relationship 
between individual social issue categories and financial performance.   
Indeed, a number of previous studies that used the KLD Social Ratings database 
urge researchers to use an aggregate measure of CSP rather than individual social issue 
categories. For example, Rowley and Berman (2000) criticize the validity and reliability 
of studies that used single or selective dimension(s) of the KLD ratings and urge 
simultaneous consideration of various dimensions of CSP. Griffin and Mahon (1997: 25) 
also claim that studies using selective dimensions of CSP ratings do not capture firms’ 
social performance, as they “inadequately reflect the breadth of the construct.” The 
multidimensional nature of CSP emphasized by previous studies suggests that the CSP-
FP relationship will be more accurately examined when an aggregate CSP measure is 
used.  
5. Conclusion and Discussion  
In the first part of this essay, I compared the relationships between CSP and financial 
performance in short-term and long-term. The results showed that CSP has a negative 
relationship with short-term financial performance, but a positive relationship with long-
term financial performance. This finding supports the view that the benefit from CSR 
investment comes from improvement in the firm-stakeholder relationship. In addition, I 
examined whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had a meaningful influence on the 
relationship between CSP and financial performance. The results showed that enactment 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may have caused changes in social perceptions toward CSR. 
 The findings of this essay provide some answers to questions concerning CSR. 
First, many have questioned whether spending limited firm resources on CSR can be 
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justified (See Margolis and Walsh, 2003 for a review). Given that the ultimate goal of the 
firm is to maximize shareholder wealth, the justification of CSR-related investment often 
depends on whether the CSR investment can improve financial performance. The 
findings of this essay suggest that justification of investment in CSR may depend on the 
investor’s time horizon. The positive CSP-FP relationship in the long term suggests that 
investment in CSR can create financial value, but it takes time and patience. Therefore, 
for the investors with a long time horizon, spending firm resources in CSR can be a 
justifiable firm action. However, the negative CSP-FP relationship in the short term 
suggests that investment in CSR may not be justifiable from the perspective of the 
investors with a short time horizon. This idea suggests that there may be possible 
differences in the level of CSR-related investment depending on the ownership structure 
of the firm. For example, ownership by the short-term profit oriented institutional 
investors, such as mutual fund, may be negatively related with CSP of the firm.  
 Second, investment in CSR may create financial value, but it may depend on 
stakeholder perceptions toward CSR. Possible differences in social perceptions toward 
CSR before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggest that different times call for 
different values. Nowadays, the idea of CSR is considered more important than it was 
before. When stakeholders appreciate CSR, firms may benefit more by investing in CSR. 
Considering that stakeholders are becoming more sensitive to and appreciative of CSR 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Zadek, 2004), CSR as a strategic 
investment is becoming more important. A closely related implication is that firms should 
understand differences in stakeholder perceptions toward CSR across different countries 
and regions. This implication may be particularly relevant to multinational firms. The 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggests that there are temporal differences in stakeholder 
perceptions toward CSR. However, such differences exist across countries and regions, as 
well.  
 This study suggests that consideration of finer-grained relationship between CSP 
and financial performance will help us understand the CSP-FP relationship better. More 
specifically, this study introduced the need to consider temporal difference (short-term vs. 
long-term financial performance) and moderating contexts (the Sarbane-Oxley Act) in the 
CSP-FP relationship. While this study’s findings are interesting, there are several 
limitations. First, the measurement of CSP in this paper relied on an index measure, 
which may not be the most ideal measure of a firm’s investment/performance level in 
CSP. If we can quantitatively measure a firm’s actual spending on various social issues, it 
may provide a more accurate measure of a firm’s investment in CSP. Alternatively, if we 
can quantitatively measure the level of improvement in social condition as a result of a 
firm’s investment in CSP (e.g., financial value created for the society), it may also serve 
as a better measure of CSP and help us further clarify the CSP-FP relationship. Second, I 
used t+1, t+2, and t+3 time lags to operationalize short-term and long-term financial 
performance. However, how far along in the future should be considered as “long term” 
may be debatable. While some previous studies used similar approach to operationalize 
short-term and long-term performance (e.g., Kacperczyk, 2009), three years in the future 
may not appropriately capture long-term performance. However, as my data covers 
period only up to 2006, I was not able to use time lags longer than t+3 to test the CSP-FP 
relationship. Lastly, to capture the possible moderation effect of stakeholder perception 
on the CSP-FP relationship, this study relied on interaction with year dummies and split-
30 
 
sample test. If we can directly measure changes in the level of stakeholder 
perception/appreciation of CSR, more accurate test of the moderation effect will be 
possible. Consideration and improvement of those limitations will allow future studies to 
provide a better understanding of how CSP can contribute to financial performance of the 
firm. I encourage future researchers to consider those issues in their investigation of the 
subject.   
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Part II 
6. Literature and Hypotheses 
6.1. Measurement issues in corporate social performance  
Scholarly attention to corporate social performance (CSP) has greatly increased recently. 
Relevant research subjects include the impact of CSP on corporate financial performance 
(Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997), the 
impact of CEO characteristics on CSP (Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thron, 2006; 
McGuire et al., 2003), the impact of firm characteristics on CSP (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000), and so on. In short, CSP is receiving increasing attention as both an antecedent 
and a consequence of corporate actions. However, as all burgeoning fields of research do, 
CSP-related research suffers from a number of limitations (Rowley and Berman, 2000).  
One of the largest concerns shared by critics and researchers alike is whether 
currently used measures of CSP are accurately measuring the intended construct. 
Currently, the most popular measure of CSP among academics and practitioners is CSP 
ratings provided by the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) 
database (Chatterji et al., 2009; Waddock, 2003). Many influential socially responsible 
investment (SRI) funds (e.g., TIAA-CREF) have relied on the KLD social ratings to 
construct their investment portfolio of socially responsible firms. Also top-tier 
management journals have accepted research papers, which used the KLD social ratings 
to measure CSP. For example, the Strategic Management Journal has accepted at least 10 
papers since 1999, and the Academy of Management Journal has accepted at least 5 
papers since 1994.  
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Although a number of studies commented on possible problems with the KLD 
social ratings (Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Entine, 2003; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Porter 
and Kramer, 2006; Rowley and Berman, 2000), only a few attempts have been made to 
examine the KLD social ratings in a rigorous manner. In one of the first studies on this 
issue, Sharfman (1996) examined convergent validity of the KLD social ratings by 
examining correlation between the KLD ratings and Fortune’s corporate reputation scores. 
He found that the correlation between the KLD ratings and Fortune’s reputation score 
was as high as 0.55, which is considerably high. However, the correlation analysis alone 
may not provide enough evidence to support validity of the KLD ratings as an 
appropriate measure of CSP, especially if Fortune’s reputation score does not represent a 
proper measure of CSP (Brown and Perry, 1994; Fryxell and Wang, 1994). Recently, 
Chatterji et al. (2009) conducted a more rigorous validation of KLD’s environment rating 
items. In this study, Chatterji et al. (2009) analyzed validity of KLD’s environmental 
ratings by introducing an analytical model of environmental performance ratings and 
testing it using detailed quantitative data for environmental performance. Other attempts 
to examine measurement validity of the KLD data merely remain at comparison of 
correlation sizes of the KLD data with other data (Sharfman, 1996). 
 Despite Chatterji et al.’s (2009) validation effort on environmental performance 
category in KLD ratings, other categories of the KLD ratings remain largely unexamined. 
In addition to environmental performance, the KLD social ratings cover six major social 
performance categories, including Diversity, Governance, Employee Relations, 
Community, Human Rights, and Product, each of which may provide equally important 
information to stakeholders (KLD, 2006). In this paper, I attempt to evaluate accuracy of 
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the KLD social rating items in Diversity and Governance categories by comparing those 
ratings with information from other sources. I focus on the Diversity and Governance 
categories because of the practical significance of these two categories to stakeholders 
and availability of the alternative data sources on those categories. 
An ideal measure of social performance should have both backward-looking 
ability (that is, summing up historical social performance) and forward-looking ability 
(that is, predicting future social performance) of relevant social performance categories 
(Chatterji et al., 2009). In this paper, I intend to examine these backward-looking and 
forward-looking abilities of KLD’s rating items in Diversity and Governance categories.  
6.2. Social performance in diversity and governance 
Workforce diversity and corporate governance are important social performance areas 
that constitute overall CSP of the firm. Diversity in workforce can affect firms in several 
ways and thus provides useful information to stakeholders. First, workforce diversity 
lowers employee turnover rate and absenteeism from dissatisfied employees (Robinson 
and Dechant, 1997; Thomas and Ely, 1996). Also diversity enhances the ability of a firm 
to attract the most talented applicants from a larger labor pool, regardless of ethnicity or 
gender (Robinson and Dechant, 1997; Thomas and Ely, 1996). Lastly, it has also been 
argued that workforce diversity improves the ability of a firm to appeal to a broader 
customer base and compete more effectively in the global marketplace (Robinson and 
Dechant, 1997; Thomas and Ely, 1996). In sum, a diverse workforce may benefit a firm 
by creating cost savings for a firm, enhancing its workforce productivity, and expanding 
its customer base.  
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Strong corporate governance and a high level of transparency may contribute to 
the firm and its shareholders. Strong governance and transparency may enable 
shareholders to earn superior risk-adjusted returns, make better decisions about 
monitoring managers, and lower the company’s cost of capital (Brown and Caylor, 2006; 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The opposite is also true: companies weak in 
governance and transparency represent increased investment risks, result in a higher cost 
of capital, have greater agency problems, and show weaker financial performance (Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999). Considering that workforce diversity and corporate 
governance constitute important parts of social performance of the firm, stakeholders 
would like to understand a firm’s performance in those areas. However, given that both 
social performance categories consist of multiple dimensions, stakeholders who do not 
have enough resources to examine multiple dimensions of social performance often rely 
on readily available CSP ratings. Therefore, stakeholders would be interested in the true 
ability of the CSP rating that claims to measure the level of workforce diversity and 
corporate governance of the firm.  
First, stakeholders would be interested in how well the CSP rating can summarize 
past social performance (backward-looking ability). Rosen, Sandler, & Shani (1991) 
explained that some stakeholders care about past social performance of the firm because 
they want to ensure that the firm’s good present financial performance is not attributable 
to unethical or socially dubious behavior from the past. Chatterji et al. (2009) named 
stakeholders with such a motive as “deontological”. Another group of stakeholders, 
“consequentialist” would also be interested in the ability of the CSP rating to summarize 
past social performance. Consequentialist stakeholders intend their investment and 
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purchases to promote socially responsible behavior and punish irresponsible behavior of 
the firm (Chatterji et al., 2009), and eventually “change the world”.3  For example, 
TIAA-CREF, the largest US retirement fund, claims that by carefully evaluating previous 
CSP records of firms, it can effectively choose socially responsible firms and influence 
the future ESG (environmental, social, governance) policies of the firms in which it 
invests.4  
Also, even purely financial profit-oriented stakeholders would be interested in the 
backward-looking ability of the CSP rating, if strong past CSP means a better future 
financial performance. A recent view on CSP emphasizes the importance of CSP as an 
“insurance” mechanism (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey, Merrill, 
and Hansen, 2009; McGuire et al., 1988). This view suggests that strong past corporate 
social performance creates a form of goodwill or moral capital for the firm that works as 
insurance-like protection against possible negative events and therefore lowers the overall 
amount of risk in the firm financial performance. Therefore, if the CSP rating can 
effectively summarize past social performance and thus the level of moral capital 
accumulated by the firm, stakeholders with a pure financial profit orientation would be 
also interested in the backward-looking ability of the CSP rating. 
Scholars conducting empirical research using CSP ratings would be interested in 
the backward-looking ability of the CSP ratings as well. Most, if not all, empirical 
research on CSP uses CSP ratings as measures that capture the level of CSP in the 
preceding time period (e.g., Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999; Graves and 
                                                            
3, 2  TIAA-CREF, “About TIAA-CREF” (http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/socially-responsible-investing/index.html, accessed April 25, 
2009). 
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Waddock, 1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001; McGuire et al., 2003; Waddock and Graves, 
1997). Therefore, unless the CSP ratings effectively summarize the past social 
performance of firms, many empirical studies that relied on the CSP ratings may lose 
their validity. 
Second, stakeholders would be also interested in how well the CSP rating can 
predict the future firm social performance (forward-looking ability). If a high CSP rating 
means a better social performance in the future, both deontological and consequentialist 
stakeholders would find the information from the CSP rating instrumental in guiding their 
decisions: High CSP ratings imply that a firm will continue to do business in a 
responsible manner in the future. Therefore both deontological and consequentialist 
investors may feel safe in investing in a firm with high CSP ratings. Also, purely 
financial profit-oriented stakeholders would be interested in the predictability of the CSP 
rating, if better future social performance means superior future financial performance 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997). Lastly, scholars conducting empirical research have used 
CSP ratings as measures that reflect both the level of past and future social performance 
(e.g., Godfrey et al., 2009; Kacperczyk, 2009). Therefore, empirical scholars would be 
interested in the future-predicting ability of CSP ratings as well, particularly if they are 
considering the CSP ratings as variables that capture the level of firms’ commitment to 
social issues in the future. 
7. Data and Method 
7.1. KLD diversity and governance ratings 
I focus on the Diversity and Governance categories because of the practical significance 
of these social issues to stakeholders and availability of the alternative data sources on 
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those categories. As explained earlier, diversity and governance are important social 
issues to both stakeholders and shareholders. More importantly, I needed alternative 
sources of objective information about firm performance on social issues to examine 
validity of the KLD ratings. Among the seven social issues covered by the KLD database, 
diversity and governance were categories which I could obtain information from other 
objective data sources. Diversity and Governance categories consist of five and seven 
sub-ratings, respectively (See Appendix 1). I was able to obtain alternative information 
for four ratings among the twelve sub-ratings.    
First, from the Diversity category, I chose CEO Diversity and Board of Directors 
(BOD) Diversity, for which alternative sources of data are available. According to KLD’s 
ratings definition document (KLD, 2006: 6), CEO Diversity is a dichotomous rating 
which denotes “if the company’s chief executive officer is a woman or a member of 
minority group”. Similarly, BOD Diversity is a dichotomous rating that measure if 
“women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double counting) 
on the board of directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board numbers 
less than 12” (KLD, 2006: 6). KLD provides only the “strength item” for these two 
Diversity rating items. That is, KLD only evaluates if a company is doing particularly 
well in those areas. If a company does well in each item, it assigns 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Second, from the Governance category, I picked Top Management Team (TMT) 
Compensation and Reporting Transparency also because alternative sources of data are 
available for those items. KLD (2006: 5) explains that TMT Compensation (strength, 
concern) is a dichotomous rating which indicates if “the company has recently awarded 
notably low (strength)/high (concern) levels of compensation to its top management or its 
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board members”. The Reporting Transparency item is also a dichotomous rating which 
measures if “the company is particularly effective in reporting on a wide range of social 
and environmental performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular 
measure” (KLD, 2006: 5). In contrast to the two Diversity items, where only strength is 
rated, KLD provides both strength and concern for the TMT Compensation and Reporting 
Transparency items. That is, KLD measures whether a firm is particularly strong or 
particularly weak in these areas. Therefore I used three separate measures for the TMT 
Compensation category: Net TMT Compensation (concern minus strength), TMT 
Compensation Concern (1/0), and TMT Compensation Strength (1/0). 5  While KLD 
reports both strength and concern for Reporting Transparency as well, I chose not to use 
the Reporting Transparency Concern item, which is available only from 2006. In contrast, 
KLD rated Reporting Transparency Strength from as early as 1996. Because combining 
both strength and concern for the Reporting Transparency item will result in loss of 
information before 2006, I decided to use Reporting Transparency strength only 
(henceforth, Reporting Transparency). 
7.2. Diversity and governance performance information from other sources 
Data on diversity and governance performance were obtained from several independent 
databases. First, CEO diversity information was obtained from the Compustat’s 
Executive Compensation (Execucomp) database. However, the Execucomp database 
provides information only about CEO gender and not about CEO ethnicity. Therefore, 
CEO diversity performance is measured as a dichotomous variable indicating if the CEO 
                                                            
5 TMT Compensation Concern indicates if a firm rewards notably high compensation, whereas TMT Compensation 
Strength indicates if a firm rewards notably low compensation. Therefore, a large value in Net TMT Compensation 
(concern minus strength) means a firm is awarding notably high compensation to its TMT. 
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is a female. The number of observations is 10436. The period included is 1992 to 2008. 
The number of firms included is 1928. 
Second, BOD diversity information was obtained from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC) database, which provides detailed information about individual 
board members. The IRRC database provides both gender and ethnicity information for 
the board members. However, the IRRC database does not provide information about 
whether a director is disabled or not. Using the IRRC database, I calculated the ratio of 
female and minority directors on the board. Specifically, I calculated four measures of the 
board diversity using the IRRC database. First, I calculated a binary diversity measure 
that reflects female and minority director composition, exactly following KLD’s 
approach except for the director’s disabled status (Assigning 1, if four or more directors 
are either female or minority, or 1/3 of directors are either female or minority when the 
total board member is less than 12, and assigning 0 otherwise). Second, I calculated a 
continuous measure of BOD diversity, which is the percentage of female and minority 
members (without double counting) on the board. Third, I calculated the percentage of 
females on the board. Lastly, I calculated the percentage of minorities on the board. The 
number of observations is 11810. The period included is 1996 to 2007. The number of 
firms included is 3939.  
Third, TMT compensation information was collected from the Execucomp 
database. The Execucomp database provides total compensation (bonus, salary, stock-
based compensation, retirement plans and etc.) information for each senior executive of a 
firm. Using this data, I calculated the annual sum of the TMT total compensation and 
divided it by 1,000, because of the very large value of this item. As a result, the order of 
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this variable is millions of dollars. The number of observations is 12780. The period 
included is 1992 to 2008. The number of firms included is 1946. This is a continuous 
variable.  
Lastly, information on reporting transparency was collected from 
CorporateRegister.com (www.corporateregister.com). KLD’s Reporting Transparency 
rating measures if a firm is “effective in reporting on a wide range of social and 
environmental performance measures” (KLD, 2006: 5). I assumed that the firms that 
publish stand-alone annual reports on corporate social responsibility/performance 
(CSR/CSP) can be counted as effectively reporting on social and environmental issues. 
Therefore, I tracked whether a firm published annual CSR/CSP reports in a given year. 
CorporateRegister.com provides this CSR/CSP report publishing information for 524 US 
firms as of February, 2009. Using this information, I constructed a yearly binary variable 
“CSR reporting”, which indicates if a firm published a CSR/CSP report in that year. The 
information provided by CorporateRegister.com was verified by the author using all 524 
companies’ websites. The number of observations is 6053. The period included is 1996 to 
2008. The number of firms included is 524. 
Control variables 
Following Chatterji et al. (2009) I controlled for industry (using 2-digit SIC code), log 
total assets, and log total sales. All control variables are collected from the Compustat 
Fundamental Annual database.   
7.3. Backward-looking (past-summarizing) ability of the KLD ratings 
A good rating of corporate diversity and governance should sum up relevant past 
corporate performance in corresponding areas. I assessed the extent to which four of the 
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KLD Diversity and Governance ratings effectively summarize firms’ past diversity- and 
governance-related performance by estimating the following equation: 
KLD Ratingit+1= β1 Diversity/Governance performance measureit + Zit γ + εit   (1)  
The control variables Zit included year dummies and two measures of corporate 
size: log of assets and log of sales. I ran models both with and without industry dummies. 
I used logistic models to estimate the dichotomous CEO diversity, BOD diversity, TMT 
Compensation (strength, concern), and Reporting Transparency ratings and an OLS 
model to estimate the Net TMT Compensation (concern minus strength) rating.  
7.4. Forward-looking (future-predicting) ability of the KLD ratings 
I next assessed the extent to which the KLD ratings predict corporate performance in 
corresponding areas. To understand this ability, I estimated the following equation that 
predicts diversity/governance performance based on corresponding KLD ratings for one-
year earlier: 
Diversity/Governance performance measureit+1= β1 KLD Ratingit + Zit γ + εit   (2)  
The functional forms I estimated (OLS, logistic, tobit) depended on the 
characteristics of diversity/governance performance measures I used (continuous, binary, 
ratio). Again, the control variables Zit included year dummies and two measures of 
corporate size. 
I was also interested in assessing whether the KLD ratings have incremental 
predictive power beyond the autocorrelation of past diversity/governance performance 
measures. To the extent that the KLD ratings are measuring management quality that has 
not yet affected diversity/governance performance, the KLD ratings should be able to 
predict future diversity/governance performance conditioned on historical performance. 
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To test this possibility, I estimated the same models as in equation (2), but included as an 
additional control variable the dependent variable (diversity/governance performance 
measures) lagged one year (Chatterji et al., 2009; Keele and Kelly, 2006).  
Diversity/Governance performance measureit+1= β1 KLD Ratingit + β2 
Diversity/Governance performance measureit + Zit γ + εit   (3)  
Significant coefficients on the KLD rating (β1) in this equation would suggest that 
KLD’s ratings are assessing the effects of current diversity and governance management 
plans and investments on future diversity and governance performance beyond any 
autocorrelation in social performance.   
8. Results 
8.1. Correlation between the KLD ratings and data from other sources 
For preliminary examination of the KLD ratings, I performed correlation analysis for all 
four KLD items. First, I compared CEO gender information from the Execucomp 
database with KLD’s CEO Diversity item. KLD’s CEO diversity measures whether a 
CEO is a woman or a minority. Unfortunately, the Execucomp database does not provide 
CEO ethnicity information. The correlation between the Execucomp’s CEO gender 
information and KLD’s CEO Diversity item was 0.4695 and highly statistically 
significant at p<0.01. 
Second, I calculated four measures of the board diversity from the IRRC database 
and compared them with KLD’s BOD Diversity item. First, I calculated a binary diversity 
measure that reflects female and minority director composition, exactly following KLD’s 
approach (Assign 1, if four or more directors are either female or minority, or 1/3 of 
directors are either female or minority when the total board member is less than 12, and 
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assign 0 otherwise). Second, I calculated a continuous measure of diversity, which is the 
percentage of female and minority members on the board. Third, I calculated the female 
percentage and the minority percentage on the board separately. The correlation between 
the first diversity measure (binary measure) and the KLD BOD Diversity item was 0.5737 
and significant at p<0.01. The correlation between the second measure of diversity 
(continuous measure) and KLD BOD Diversity was 0.4940 and significant at p<0.01. The 
correlation between the female percentage on the board and KLD BOD Diversity was 
0.4356 and significant at p<0.01 level. Lastly, the correlation between the minority 
percentage on the board and KLD BOD Diversity was 0.3450 and significant at p<0.01.  
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Table 7. Summary Statistics 
 
Execucomp CEO diversity data and KLD’s CEO Diversity rating 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
CEO gender (Execucomp) 10436 0.0247221 0.1552844 0 1 
CEO diversity (KLD) 10436 0.0417785 0.2000921 0 1 
 
 
IRRC director diversity data and KLD’s BOD Diversity rating 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
IRRC diversity measure 1 
(binary) 
11810 0.1479255 0.3550411 0 1 
IRRC diversity measure 2 (%) 11810 0.1542385 0.1363457 0 1 
IRRC female director % 11810 0.1028167 0.0916477 0 0.625 
IRRC minority director % 11810 0.052436 0.0814283 0 1 
Board diversity (KLD) 11810 0.111939 0.3153048 0 1 
 
 
Execucomp TMT compensation data and KLD’s TMT Compensation rating 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
TMT compensation 
(Execucomp) 
12780 14.90297 23.98166 0 1101.419 
TMT compensation strength 
(KLD) 
12780 0.0766823 0.2660971 0 1 
TMT compensation concern 
(KLD) 
12780 0.3812207 0.4857056 0 1 
TMT compensation net (KLD) 12780 -0.3045383 0.5918782 -1 1 
 
 
CSR reporting practice data and KLD’s Reporting Transparency rating 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
CSR reporting  6053 0.2648274 0.4412777 0 1 
Transparency strength (KLD) 6053 0.0736825 0.2612750 0 1 
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Third, the correlation between TMT compensation value from the Execucomp 
database and the KLD TMT Compensation concern (high compensation) item was 0.2910 
and significant at p<0.01. The correlation between Execucomp’s TMT compensation 
value and the KLD Net TMT Compensation (concern minus strength) item was 0.2811 
and significant at p<0.01.  
Lastly, KLD’s Reporting Transparency rating indicates if the company is 
particularly effective in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental 
performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular measure. I 
checked the correlation between this item and a firm’s annual CSR/CSP report 
publication status. The correlation between the annual CSR/CSP report publication status 
and KLD’s Reporting Transparency item was 0.4112 and significant at p<0.01. The 
number of observations is 6053.  
The correlation analysis of four Diversity and Governance rating items shows that 
there are substantial and highly statistically significant contemporaneous correlations 
between the KLD social ratings and corresponding social performance variables collected 
from other databases.  
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Table 8. Summarizing Ability of Past Performance (KLD Diversity Category) 
 
 
KLD  
CEO diversity t+1 
 
Logistic 
KLD  
BOD diversity t+1 
 
Logistic 
Execucomp CEO gender (binary) t 4.2067*** 
(0.1774) 
4.6869*** 
(0.2307) 
        
IRRC BOD diversity 1 (binary) t   3.0914*** 
(0.0878) 
3.0396*** 
(0.0936) 
      
IRRC BOD diversity 2 (%) t     12.882*** 
(0.4136) 
13.025*** 
(0.4443) 
    
IRRC BOD  female % t       17.673*** 
(0.5775) 
18.046*** 
(0.6307) 
  
IRRC BOD  minority % t         8.4480*** 
(0.4131) 
8.3706*** 
(0.4449) 
Log assets  t 0.3172*** 
(0.0586) 
0.5979*** 
(0.1187) 
0.0021 
(0.0410) 
0.0877 
(0.0890) 
0.1022* 
(0.0414) 
0.1122 
(0.0891) 
0.2600*** 
(0.0400) 
0.2767*** 
(0.0862) 
0.0512 
(0.0367) 
0.1181 
(0.0790) 
Log sales t -0.3259*** 
(0.0678) 
-0.6135*** 
(0.1187) 
0.4521*** 
(0.0501) 
0.4583*** 
(0.0939) 
0.3106*** 
(0.0514) 
0.3827*** 
(0.0941) 
0.3865*** 
(0.0492) 
0.4620*** 
(0.0909) 
0.4790*** 
(0.0448) 
0.4836*** 
(0.0835) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummies   Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 6599 6599 8358 8358 8358 8358 8358 8358 8358 8358 
Firms 1440 1440 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 1507 
Adjusted  R2 0.2235 0.2332 0.3415 0.3611 0.2803 0.3015 0.2450 0.2686 0.1653 0.2044 
 
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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8.2. Evidence of backward-looking (past-summarizing) ability of the KLD ratings 
Table 8 shows that KLD’s CEO Diversity rating is strongly predicted by Execucomp’s 
CEO gender information and that KLD’s BOD Diversity rating is also strongly predicted 
by four BOD diversity performance measures constructed based on the IRRC database. 
Also, Table 10 shows that the KLD Reporting Transparency and TMT Compensation 
ratings are each strongly predicted by annual CSR/CSP report publication status 
information and the TMT compensation measures constructed based on data collected 
from Execucomp. The significant coefficients of diversity and governance performance 
measures suggest that KLD’s four Diversity and Governance ratings effectively 
summarize past corporate diversity and governance performance (Chatterji et al., 2009).  
8.3. Evidence of forward-looking (future-predicting) ability of the KLD ratings 
I ran a number of models to assess the extent to which the KLD ratings effectively predict 
social performance in corresponding areas. I first regressed each diversity and 
governance performance metric on four KLD Diversity and Governance ratings while 
controlling for industry, year, and company size (equation 2). I then repeated the models, 
conditioning as well on the lagged dependent variable (equation 3).  
The KLD CEO Diversity (strength) item is highly statistically significant (p<0.01) 
and of the expected sign (positive) in predicting CEO gender data provided by the 
Execucomp database. The coefficient of logistic regression (Table 9) suggests that when 
KLD rates a firm as diverse in the CEO position (having a female or minority CEO), it is 
68 times (=exp(4.2182)) more likely that the firm will have a female CEO than a male 
CEO in the future. KLD’s BOD Diversity (strength) item is also highly significant 
(p<0.01) and of the expected sign (positive) in predicting the board of director diversity 
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information from the IRRC database. The coefficient of the logistic model (Table 9) 
shows that when KLD rates a firm as having a diverse board, it is 15 times (=exp(2.6894)) 
more likely that the firm will have a diverse board in terms of gender or ethnicity. KLD’s 
Reporting Transparency and TMT Compensation have a similar strong predictability in 
future corporate social performance. The coefficient of the logistic model (Table 8) for 
Reporting Transparency suggests that when KLD rates a firm as transparent in reporting 
social and environmental issues, the firm is 10 times (=exp(2.3327)) more likely to 
publish a CSR/CSP report in the next year. The coefficient of the OLS model (Table 8) 
for TMT Compensation (concern) shows that when KLD rates a firm as awarding its 
TMT too much compensation, the firm will award approximately $8,084,200 more to its 
top executives as a group in the following year. However the result shows that KLD’s 
TMT Compensation (strength) item does not predict the TMT compensation information 
from the Execucomp database in a statistically significant manner.   
 My next question regarding the predictability of the KLD social ratings is whether 
the KLD ratings can predict future corporate social performance beyond what is predicted 
by past corporate social performance. To understand this, I added lagged dependent 
variables of corporate social performance measures collected from other data sources 
(equation 3). The results indicate that although the magnitude of the predictability of 
KLD Diversity and Governance ratings decline substantially in the models that include 
the lagged dependent variables, they remain statistically significant and of the expected 
sign for BOD Diversity and TMT Compensation (Table 9 and 11). The decline in the 
coefficients suggests that a substantial portion of the estimated effect size in the base 
models is due to autocorrelation. For BOD Diversity, the proportion of the effect size in 
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the base models in table 9 due to autocorrelation ranges from 51% (IRRC BOD diversity 
1 model) to 88% (IRRC BOD female % model). For TMT Compensation, the proportion 
of the effect size attributable to autocorrelation ranges from 34% (KLD Compensation, 
concern minus strength) to 35% (KLD Compensation, concern). In sum, I concluded that 
KLD Diversity and Governance ratings are only modestly effective in predicting future 
social performance. 
Unfortunately, for CEO Diversity and Reporting Transparency, inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable resulted in drop of observations due to high overlap between 
the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable. For CEO Diversity the lagged 
variable perfectly predicted the dependent variable and dropped out of the estimation. 
That is, for CEO Diversity, the dependent variable and the lagged dependent variables 
have the same values across all 4913 observations. Actually, this is not very surprising 
considering that the length of the time-series of the data is not very long (average 4.5 
years for a firm). This suggests that either transitions between female and male CEOs did 
not occur during the observation period, or even if CEO transitions did occur, the 
transitions must have been between the same gender CEOs.  
For Reporting Transparency, among the 4527 observations used, only 165 
observations have different values for the dependent variable and the lagged dependent 
variable. This suggests that during the period of observation, 165 firms started/ceased to 
publish CSR/CSP reports. Still, the number of observations with different values was too 
small to estimate the effect of the lagged dependent variable.  
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Table 9. Predicting Ability of Future Performance (KLD Diversity Category) 
 
 Execucomp  
CEO gender (binary) t+1 
 
Logistic 
IRRC  
BOD diversity 1 
(binary) t+1 
 
Logistic 
IRRC  
BOD diversity 2  
(%) t+1 
 
Tobit 
IRRC  
BOD female % t+1  
 
 
Tobit 
IRRC  
BOD minority % t+1 
 
 
Tobit 
KLD CEO diversity t 
(strength) 
4.2182*** 
(0.2211) 
n/a         
KLD BOD diversity t 
(strength) 
  2.6894*** 
(0.0926) 
1.3010*** 
(0.1168) 
0.1615*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0952*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0681*** 
(0.0026) 
0.0203*** 
(0.0019) 
Log assets  t -0.1406 
(0.1958) 
n/a 0.1735* 
(0.0743) 
0.1134 
(0.0881) 
0.0047* 
(0.0023) 
0.0002 
(0.0015) 
-0.0029† 
(0.0016) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
0.0074*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0020† 
(0.0011) 
Log sales t 0.1144 
(0.1998) 
n/a 0.2709*** 
(0.0781) 
0.2310* 
(0.0925) 
0.0223*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0080*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0147*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0042*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0082*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0036** 
(0.0011) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Lagged dependent variable  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 4913 0 8251 8251 8380 8380 8380 8380 8380 8380 
Firms 1440 0 1570 1570 1597 1597 1597 1597 1597 1597 
Adjusted R2 0.2232 n/a 0.3276 0.5056 0.3797 0.7185 0.2822 0.7299 0.2614 0.6123 
 
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 10. Summarizing Ability of Past Performance (KLD Governance Category) 
 
 
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
  
 KLD  
transparency t+1 
(strength) 
Logistic 
KLD  
compensation t+1 
(concern-strength)  
OLS 
KLD  
compensation t+1 
(concern) 
Logistic 
KLD  
compensation t+1  
(strength) 
Logistic 
CSR reporting (binary) t 2.9162*** 
(0.1810) 
2.4824*** 
(0.1961) 
      
Execucomp  TMT 
compensation/1000 (continuous) t 
  0.0029*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0390*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0310*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.0149*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0053 
(0.0036) 
Log assets  t -0.2121** 
(0.0818) 
0.7052*** 
(0.1916) 
0.0048 
(0.0053) 
0.1019*** 
(0.0093) 
0.0324 
(0.0233) 
0.4727*** 
(0.0448) 
0.0640† 
(0.0377) 
-0.3401*** 
(0.0702) 
Log sales t  0.6405*** 
(0.1044) 
0.0765*** 
(0.2003) 
0.1306*** 
(0.0059) 
0.0683*** 
(0.0095) 
0.3587*** 
(0.0264) 
0.1134* 
(0.0447) 
-0.6472*** 
(0.0432) 
-0.4790*** 
(0.0708) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummies   Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 4039 4039 11595 11595 11595 11595 11595 11595 
Firms 402 402 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 
Adjusted  R2 0.2025 0.2362 0.1828 0.2467 0.1818 0.2406 0.0582 0.0918 
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Table 11. Predicting Ability of Future Performance (KLD Governance Category) 
 
 CSR reporting (Binary) 
t+1 
Logistic 
Execucomp  
TMT compensation/1000 (Continuous)t+1 
OLS 
KLD transparency t 
(strength) 
2.3327*** 
(0.2299) 
n/a       
KLD compensation t 
(concern – strength) 
  5.5625*** 
(0.5408) 
3.6518*** 
(0.5029) 
    
KLD compensation t 
(concern) 
    8.0842*** 
(0.6512) 
5.2472*** 
(0.6076) 
  
KLD compensation t 
(strength) 
      -0.1033 
(1.0863) 
-0.3442 
(1.0028) 
Log assets  t 0.7098*** 
(0.1065) 
n/a 2.6310*** 
(0.5475) 
1.5950** 
(0.5077) 
2.4687*** 
(0.5466) 
1.5033** 
(0.5074) 
3.1726*** 
(0.5368) 
1.9217*** 
(0.4963) 
Log sales t 0.7053*** 
(0.1113) 
n/a 4.2992*** 
(0.5625) 
2.7143*** 
(0.5224) 
4.3795*** 
(0.5604) 
2.7823*** 
(0.5211) 
4.7605*** 
(0.5549) 
2.9806*** 
(0.5139) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Lagged dependent variable  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Observations 4527 0 10882 10882 10882 10882 11248 11248 
Firms 461 0 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876 1876 
Adjusted R2 0.3578 n/a 0.1878 0.3032 0.1914 0.3046 0.1819 0.3029 
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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8.4. Additional explanatory power of the KLD ratings 
If the KLD ratings can measure the management and firm quality and characteristics that 
will influence future social performance, adding the KLD ratings to the lagged dependent 
variable model should substantially enhance the explanatory power. To understand if this 
is so, I examined if adding the KLD ratings would substantially increase the model fit 
statistics— adjusted R2 (Table 12). The baseline model predicts social performance in 
diversity and governance categories based on control variables—firm size (sales, assets), 
year, and industry. The upper left boxed cells in Table 12 represent the fit statistics of the 
baseline models, to which I compared a “KLD model” that adds the KLD rating variable 
in each category (upper right cells in Table 12), a “Lag model” that adds the 1-year lag of 
the dependent variable (social performance) to the baseline model (lower left cells in 
Table 6), and a “Full model” that adds both the KLD rating variables and the 1-year 
lagged dependent variable (lower right cells in Table 12). I was not able to compare fit 
statistics among the four models for CEO diversity and reporting transparency because 
the lagged dependent variable models and full models were not estimated.  
In predicting social performance in BOD diversity, adding the KLD rating to the 
baseline model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.1757, while adding the lagged BOD 
diversity variable to the baseline model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.3352. Although 
both increments are statistically significant, adding the KLD rating only increased 
explanatory power 52.41% as much as adding the lagged social performance variable. In 
predicting TMT compensation, the additional explanatory power of the KLD rating is 
even lower. For TMT compensation models, adding the KLD rating to the baseline model 
increased the adjusted R2 by 0.0115, while adding the lagged BOD diversity variable 
54 
 
increased the adjusted R2 by 0.1200. Again, both increments are statistically significant. 
However, adding the KLD rating increased explanatory power only 9.58% as much as 
adding the lagged social performance variable.  
Comparison of the KLD model and the lag model with the full model reveals a 
similar difference in incremental explanatory power of the KLD rating and the lagged 
social performance variable. For BOD diversity models, adding the KLD rating to the lag 
model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.0174, whereas adding the lagged social 
performance variable to the KLD model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.1769. Adding the 
KLD rating increased explanatory power only 9.83% as much as adding the lagged social 
performance variable. Similarly, For TMT compensation models, adding the KLD rating 
to the lag model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.0047, whereas adding the lagged social 
performance variable to the KLD model increased the adjusted R2 by 0.1132. Again, the 
KLD rating has a much lower incremental explanatory power than the lagged social 
performance variable: The KLD rating increased explanatory power only 4.15% as much 
as adding the lagged social performance variable.  
However, the KLD ratings have statistically significant incremental explanatory 
power. This suggests that the KLD ratings do identify a small but statistically significant 
difference in the quality and characteristics of management and firm that will influence 
future social performance. 
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Table 12. Comparison of Model Fit Statistics 
 
 
CEO Diversity 
Logistic model
   BOD Diversity 1 
Logistic model
 
 
 
  Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
    Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
 
 
Baseline 
0.0687 
KLD 
0.2232 
 
0.1545 
424.45*** 
  Baseline 
0.1519 
KLD 
0.3276 
 
 
0.1757 
962.58*** 
 
 
Lag 
n/a 
Full 
n/a 
   Lag 
0.4871 
Full 
0.5045 
 
0.0174 
121.35***
     Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
0.3352 
1988.03*** 
 
0.1769 
1146.80*** 
 
 
 
        
 
 
Reporting Transparency 
Logistic model 
  TMT Compensation (concern) 
OLS model
 
 
  Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
    Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
 
 
Baseline 
0.3204 
KLD 
0.3578 
 
 
0.0374 
142.09*** 
  Baseline 
0.1799 
KLD 
0.1914 
 
0.0115 
154.18*** 
 
 
Lag 
n/a 
Full 
n/a 
 
   Lag 
0.2999 
Full 
0.3046 
 
0.0047 
74.88*** 
 
 
    Difference 
Significance of 
difference 
0.1200 
1721.80*** 
 
0.1132 
1642.50*** 
 
Table cells present a fit statistics for nested models. The baseline model includes log assets, log sales, and industry dummies (2-digit SIC codes). The KLD model adds the KLD 
rating to the baseline model. The Lag model adds 1-year lag of the dependent variable to the baseline model. The full model adds both sets of variables to the baseline model. The 
cells contain adjusted-R2 values and the surrounding figures display the difference in these values and the LR chi-squared test statistic indicating whether these differences are 
statistically significant with * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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8.5. Robustness check 
First, I used clustered standard error by firm id for all models. Second, I re-estimated all 
empirical models using two to five year lagged explanatory variables. Third, I re-
estimated all tobit models using (1) OLS estimation after logit transforming the ratio 
variables and (2) generalized linear model (GLM) (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Fourth, 
I re-estimated all logit models using probit estimation. Lastly, I included additional 
controls of return on assets. The result remained the same after all five additional 
robustness checks. 
9. Conclusion and Discussion 
Comparison of KLD’s Diversity and Governance ratings with data from other sources 
shows that KLD Diversity and Governance ratings do a reasonable job of aggregating 
past social performance in the four areas of CEO diversity, BOD diversity, reporting 
transparency, and TMT compensation. This result is consistent with Chatterji et al. (2009) 
who found that KLD’s environmental ratings effectively summarize past environmental 
performance. Also, the KLD ratings in Diversity and Governance categories strongly 
predict all four social performance variables. However, the explanatory power of KLD’s 
ratings in predicting future social performance substantially decreases when lagged social 
performance variables are included. This finding is also consistent with Chatterji et al. 
(2009) who concluded that the KLD ratings do a less satisfactory job of predicting future 
social performance.  
 However, the KLD ratings’ somewhat weak ability to predict future social 
performance does not seem to pose a serious threat to the current empirical literature that 
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relies on the KLD ratings, because most of the current empirical literature, if not all, uses 
the KLD social ratings as a measure that summarizes past CSP of the firm rather than a 
measure that predicts the future CSP (e.g., Berman et al., 1999; Graves and Waddock, 
1994; Hillman and Keim, 2001; McGuire et al., 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
Perhaps, the weak future predictability of the KLD ratings may pose a more serious 
problem to investors and financial analysts who have relied on the KLD ratings to 
forecast future social performance of the firm. My results show that there are strong 
autocorrelations in social performance in Diversity and Governance categories. Also past 
social performance variables have a greater explanatory power than the KLD ratings in 
predicting future social performance. Therefore, investors who are interested in specific 
areas of social performance may be better off in predicting future social performance of 
firms by relying on more direct measures of past social performance than on the KLD 
ratings.  
However, considering that many SRI funds and investors often intend to 
understand overall CSP of the firm rather than CSP of the firm in specific areas6, it may 
still be difficult for those investors to find a good alternative to the KLD social ratings, 
which cover quite a broad range of social issues (Deckop et al., 2006; KLD, 2006). Also, 
the KLD social ratings show a limited future predictability only when social performance 
in the past is controlled for. Therefore, when past social performance data is not available, 
the KLD social ratings may still serve as a reasonable alternative to predict the future 
social performance. Furthermore, even when autocorrelation is accounted for, the KLD 
                                                            
6 TIAA-CREF, “About TIAA-CREF” (http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/socially-responsible-investing/index.html, 
accessed April 25, 2009). 
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ratings still predicted BOD diversity and TMT compensation in a statistically significant 
manner. In fact, considering that simple autocorrelations often have substantially high 
predictive power compared to subjective judgment (e.g., ratings) (Dawes, Faust, and 
Meehl, 1989; Grove and Meehl, 1996), the finding that KLD’s BOD Diversity and TMT 
Compensation rating remained statistically significant even after autocorrelation is 
accounted for is quite remarkable.  
This paper, to my knowledge, is one of the earliest attempts to examine the 
validity of the KLD social performance ratings. Only recently, Chatterji et al. (2009) first 
attempted to validate KLD’s environmental ratings by comparing them with 
environmental performance data in a rigorous manner. Despite the absence of attempts to 
validate the KLD social ratings, the empirical literature on CSP has relied on the KLD 
ratings without much concern. Fortunately, both Chatterji et al. (2009) and the current 
study found that the KLD ratings are doing a reasonable job of aggregating past CSP, 
lending some support to the reliance on the KLD ratings as a measure of CSP. However, 
the KLD ratings aspire to measure a much broader range of social issues (Deckop et al., 
2006) than what have been examined so far. Therefore, it may be still too early to 
confirm the validity of the KLD social ratings as an appropriate measure of CSP. I invite 
future studies that examine other areas of the KLD ratings such as human rights, 
employee relations, and community. Also, more comprehensive data on workforce 
diversity and corporate governance will allow future studies to conduct more thorough 
validations of the KLD ratings than what has been conducted in the current study.  
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Essay Two. Corporate social responsibility? None of my business any more: The 
CEO horizon problem in corporate social performance 
 
1. Introduction 
Scholars from diverse disciplines commonly note that CEO departure may have a 
negative effect on the competitive advantage of the firm (Allen, Panian, and Lotz, 1979a; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Butler and Newman, 1989; Carroll, 1984; Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Grusky, 1963; Haveman, 1993). While there could be several possible reasons, 
discontinuity of investment in strategic resources is one of the most frequently discussed 
suspects (Cheng, 2004; Conyon and Florou, 2006; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1982). Considering that new CEOs may have a 
different opinion on the priority of investment, certain discontinuities in strategic 
investment are inevitable. However, an avoidable and therefore more frustrating problem 
is an intentional negligence of departing CEOs in long-term investment programs.  
It has been observed that retiring CEOs tend to reduce investment in long-term 
oriented strategic resources, the benefit of which is unlikely to be realized before their 
retirement (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Sabac, 2008; Smith and Watts, 1982). Instead, 
retiring CEOs often focus on short-term oriented items that can boost accounting-based 
profit figures. The extant literature maintains that this “horizon problem” arises mostly as 
a result of the compensation maximization motivation of retiring CEOs (Cheng, 2004; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Smith and Watts, 1982). When CEOs are receiving a substantial amount of profit-based 
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compensation (e.g., bonus), they can maximize their compensation at retirement by 
improving accounting-based firm performance figures. Based on this assumption, 
shareholders have been advised that they may grant stock-based long-term compensations 
to a CEO, which connects the CEO’s compensation to long-term firm performance, to 
solve the horizon problem.  
  While the compensation maximization motivation argument makes sense, the 
validity of this behavioral assumption has not been directly examined. The problem is 
that if CEOs are reducing long-term investment not to maximize their compensation at 
retirement but to achieve some other purpose, the suggested solution of granting stock-
based compensation simply may not work and shareholder wealth will be wasted. 
Therefore, it is critical to understand the exact motivation behind this opportunistic CEO 
behavior. In this paper, I evaluate the validity of the compensation maximization 
hypothesis by comparing it with the post-retirement career concern hypothesis, which 
proposes that retiring CEOs focus on accounting-based performance measures to improve 
their chances of continuing to work after retirement.  
 The significance of the horizon problem in strategic management is that 
compromise in the competitive advantage of the firm is inevitable when the retiring CEO 
scales down investment in long-term strategic resources. Therefore, the horizon problem 
should be considered a critical issue in the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. 
However, despite the importance of the subject, scholarly interest has been limited almost 
exclusively to R&D and advertising investments (Cheng, 2004; Conyon and Florou, 2006; 
Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1982). Only recently have other areas of 
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long-term investment started to receive scholarly attention (e.g., Matta & Beamish, 2008). 
Such limited scholarly attention may inadvertently lead shareholders to a limited, and 
thus insufficient, vigilance in those areas only. However, if the horizon problem is rooted 
in a generalizable behavioral motivation, it should be more prevalent than we currently 
realize. Therefore, examination of the horizon problem in other areas can increase the 
alertness of shareholders on this issue and promote a more thorough protection of 
shareholder wealth. The present study seeks to address the limitations of prior research by 
evaluating the untested behavioral assumption and to provide an additional step toward 
understanding the horizon problem by introducing a new context of corporate social 
performance (CSP).  
A firm’s reputation as socially responsible has recently emerged as a valuable 
firm resource (Fombrun, 1996; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; 
McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Zadek, 2004). Reputation as a socially responsible firm is formed slowly through a 
long, consistent investment in positive corporate social performance and is difficult to 
imitate in the short term (Deckop et al., 2006; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Short, 2004). 
Therefore, to build a reputation as a socially responsible firm, the firm should make a 
consistent expenditure in social responsibility–related areas. However, as expenditure in 
social responsibility tends not to have an immediate impact on accounting-based profit 
measures (Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Deckop et al., 2006; Ogden and Watson, 1999), it 
is likely that retiring CEOs reduce expenditure in social responsibility–related areas. 
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Therefore, investment in corporate social performance provides an excellent context in 
which to examine the CEO horizon problem.  
In the context of CSP, I raise the following three questions. First, how does the 
retirement of a CEO affect a firm’s CSP? Second, what is the motivation behind this 
opportunistic CEO behavior? Finally, how can the negative impact of CEO retirement on 
CSP be mitigated? Using a panel data set of 583 large US firms during the period 
between 1992 and 2006, I find that the retirement of a CEO negatively impacts CSP. The 
result suggests that the negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP can be attributed to 
the post-retirement career continuation concern of the CEO rather than the compensation 
maximization motivation. In further support of this, it is found that the negative impact is 
mitigated when the retiring CEO is provided a post-retirement career as a board member. 
However, granting stock-based long-term compensation to CEOs does not have a 
statistically significant moderating effect. The finding suggests some practical 
implications for shareholders. Manipulation of the CEO compensation mechanism may 
not always be an effective solution to prevent opportunistic behavior of retiring CEOs. 
Instead, retaining a retiring CEO as a board member can be an effective solution to curb 
the horizon problem in the context of CSP.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Corporate social performance as a source of competitive advantage  
Corporate social performance (CSP) has recently emerged as an important long-term 
investment that leads to competitive advantage (Fombrun, 1996; Hillman and Keim, 2001; 
Holstein, 2008; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Zadek, 2004). 
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Chatterji and Levine (2006: 31) argue that firms that invest in social performance are 
“building valuable long-term relationships and assets.” The United Nation’s 2007 Global 
Compact report states that “companies that proactively manage ESG (environment, social, 
government) issues are better placed vis-à-vis their competitors to generate long-term 
tangible and intangible results” (UN, 2007: 48).  
Indeed, aligning strategy to address responsible business practices can give a firm 
a leg up on the competition and contribute to the organization’s long-term success in 
many ways (Zadek, 2004). First, a socially responsible company can build a strong 
reputation, an important resource that will improve the company’s image and strengthen 
its brand. Also, a firm that has a good reputation on labor issues face relatively few labor 
problems in the future, and customers are favorably disposed toward its products (Creyer 
and Ross, 1997; McGuire et al., 1988; Schuler and Cording, 2006). Nowadays consumers 
deeply care about the social performance of the companies from which they buy. In a 
recent study, 60% of consumers surveyed answered that they would switch brands if 
more socially responsible alternatives were available (Holstein, 2008). Furthermore, 
diversity in a workforce can enhance the ability of a firm to attract the best talent from 
the labor pool, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender (Robinson and Dechant, 1997; 
Thomas and Ely, 1996). In addition, being proactive on environmental issues can lower 
the costs of complying with present and future environmental regulations, and 
environmental responsiveness can enhance firm efficiencies and drive down operating 
costs (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997a; Shrivastava, 1995). Similarly, good social 
performance can also decrease a firm’s financial costs. Investors may consider less 
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socially responsible firms to be riskier because of potential problems with regulating 
bodies and with customers. For example, the government may levy fines, and bring 
lawsuits against socially irresponsible firms, such as those filed against pharmaceutical, 
chemical, and asbestos firms, that could threaten a firm’s very existence (McGuire et al., 
1988).  
2.2. Impact of breaks in the resource accumulation process on competitive 
advantage 
The resource-based view and evolutionary economics agree that breaks in the resource 
accumulation process may seriously damage the long-term competitive advantage of the 
firm. The resource-based view scholars maintain that, to achieve long-term competitive 
advantage, managers must carefully plan and execute the resource accumulation process 
by controlling the timing of and level of expenditure in strategic resources (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Dierickx and Cool (1989: 
1504) note that “a key dimension of strategy formulation may be identified as the task of 
making appropriate choices about strategic expenditures with a view to accumulating 
required resources and skills.” This view suggests that unexpected discontinuities in the 
flow of strategic investment may disrupt the delicate resource accumulation process.  
Evolutionary economics’ idea of organizational routine also explains why 
interruptions in strategic expenditure can damage the building of long-term competitive 
advantage. Organizational routine requires constant investment and maintenance to avoid 
obsolescence and achieve effectiveness (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1995). If a 
proper expenditure is not allocated for the continuance of an organizational routine, 
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smooth operation of the routine will be interrupted and the routine will become rusty. 
Nelson and Winter (1982: 99) maintain that “organizations remember by doing,” and 
infrequent use of routines increases rustiness and lowers effectiveness of operation. For 
firms, socially responsible operation also requires continuous maintenance and utilization 
of relevant organizational routines. Maintaining good employee relationships and 
diversity in the workforce requires well-maintained organizational routines in human 
resources. Timely and adequate response to heterogeneous demands of employees and 
effective resolution of conflicts in a diverse workforce can be daunting tasks without 
proper organizational routines. Being environmentally responsible requires consistent 
monitoring of regulatory changes and public opinions about environment.  
As suggested by the resource-based view and evolutionary economics, consistent 
attention and careful investment are required to build a sustainable competitive advantage 
through CSP. If we understand the goal of CSP as building trusted relationships with key 
stakeholders (Barnett, 2007; Freeman, 1984; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Jones, 1995; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997), it becomes clearer why consistency in the investment in 
CSP is important. Establishing a good and trustworthy relationship with other parties 
requires consistency in behavior (Mayer et al., 1995; Uzzi, 1996) because trust is built 
slowly but destroyed quickly (Currall and Epstein, 2003). Inconsistency in CSP can 
easily destroy any trust or reputation gained from previous good CSP and seriously 
degrade the firm’s stakeholder relations (Barnett, 2007).  
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2.3. The horizon problem in corporate social performance  
The horizon problem hypothesis proposes that retiring CEOs may reduce expenditure in 
long-term investment programs if the return on investment is not likely to be realized 
while they remain in the firm (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Smith and Watts, 1982). The funds withheld from the long-term investment may then be 
used toward other short-term needs of the firm. As a result, the accounting-based profit of 
the firm will improve. Investment in CSP provides one probable context where the 
horizon problem may occur, since the reduction of expenditures in areas such as 
environmental protection, transparent financial management, employee safety, and 
product safety is unlikely to be caught immediately (Deckop et al., 2006; Short, 2004).  
Scholars who observe this opportunistic CEO behavior suggest that retiring CEOs 
can maximize their personal wealth at the expense of shareholder wealth by boosting 
accounting-based profit (Cheng, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 
1992; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1982). Specifically, when 
retiring CEOs’ compensation package includes a profit-based bonus plan, CEOs can 
maximize their compensation by improving the accounting-based profit figures. Smith 
and Watts (1982: 146), who first proposed the existence of the horizon problem, explain 
that profit-based compensation “gives managers incentives to turn down positive NPV 
projects with long pay back and to take negative value projects that impose expenses only 
after the manager retires.” In support of this, Dechow and Sloan (1991) find that retiring 
CEOs who receive profit-based bonus plans reduce expenditure in R&D investment 
during their final years in office. 
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The possible occurrence of the CEO horizon problem in the context of corporate 
social performance is predicated on two assumptions. First, the size of firm expenditure 
in CSP is substantial enough to motivate CEOs to manipulate it. Second, CEOs have a 
great influence in determining the social responsibility–related expenditure. Regarding 
the first assumption, if the size of the firm expenditure in social responsibility–related 
areas is trivial, withholding the expenditure in CSP may not make much difference in the 
bottom line. However, according to company annual reports, corporate expenditure in 
social responsibility is quite substantial. For example, Sony spent $40 million in social 
contribution activities in 2007 (Sony, 2008). Nike spent $100 million in product and cash 
donations in 2005 and 2006 each and sets a minimum donation target of $315 million by 
the end of 2011 (Nike, 2006). Starbucks donated $26.2 million to diverse causes in 2007, 
reportedly a small part of its total social responsibility expenditure (Starbucks, 2007). 
Regarding the second assumption, it seems that CEOs have a significant influence in 
deciding the magnitude of social responsibility–related firm expenditure. While some 
firms have dedicated personnel or committees in charge of CSP (Porter and Kramer, 
2006), many CEOs have extensive decision-making power and ability to significantly 
influence their firm’s expenditure in CSP (Embley, 1993; Kochan, 2002; Orlitzky and 
Swanson, 2002). For example, in the 2007 UN Global Compact Annual Review, 71% of 
the firms surveyed answered that their CSP policies and practices are developed and 
managed by the CEO (United Nations, 2007). 
Considering that retiring CEOs may have incentives to reduce expenditure in 
long-term investment items and improve accounting-based profit, they may also reduce 
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expenditure in social responsibility–related areas, which can have a substantial impact on 
accounting-based profit figures. Assuming that the firm’s corporate social performance is 
a close function of its social responsibility–related expenditure, I expect that the 
reduction in social responsibility– related expenditure made by the retiring CEOs will 
lead to a drop in CSP. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1. CEO retirement will have a negative impact on CSP. 
Another possibility is that CEO retirement may have a positive impact on CSP. 
Several previous studies have proposed the hypothesis of ‘CEO legacy’ (yet without 
empirical evidence) (Burton & Beckman 2007, Freeman 2004). According to this 
hypothesis, retiring CEO may wish to leave a positive legacy, which may include the 
image as a socially-responsible CEO. If so, retiring CEOs may increase expenditure in 
social responsibility and CEO retirement will have a positive impact on CSP, as opposed 
to the prediction of Hypothesis 1. While this is a possible scenario, I expect that this is a 
less likely relationship for three reasons.  
First, even if the CEO approaching retirement substantially increases expenditure 
in CSP, doing so is less likely to earn the CEO a reputation as a socially-responsible CEO, 
because it takes a substantial amount of time of demonstrating consistency in behavior to 
build a reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Gray and Balmer, 1998; Herbig, 
Milewicz, and Golden, 1994). Therefore, for the CEOs who want to leave a lasting image 
of themselves as a socially-responsible CEO, the best bet would be to start to invest in 
social issues in a consistent manner well ahead of his or her departure from the firm. In 
other words, there is a time compression diseconomy in building a reputation (Dierickx 
 69 
 
and Cool, 1989): Sudden increase in investment in social issues will not effectively build 
the reputation as a socially-responsible CEO.  
Second, often, it is not the CEO who gets the credit when the firm acts in a 
socially responsible manner. It is true that CEOs play a major role in CSP-related firm 
decisions (Embley, 1993; Kochan, 2002; Orlitzky and Swanson, 2002). However, 
evidence suggests that stakeholders do not usually attribute a firm’s CSP-related 
strengths or weaknesses to its CEO. For example, firms that are considered socially 
responsible (e.g., Johnson & Johnson) have been given credits for nurturing an 
organizational culture or system (e.g., Credo) that promotes social responsibility. 
Similarly, people tend to remember the names of firms that were involved in negative 
CSP-related accidents (e.g., Nike, Exxon) rather than the names of CEOs who served 
during the negative accidents. Given that it is often the company name rather than the 
CEO’s name that is remembered, CEOs may not have a strong incentive to increase 
expenditure in CSP, even if they want their name to be remembered.  
Third, the vast majority of previous studies that examined the relationship 
between CEO retirement and firm expenditure have supported the negative relationship 
(e.g., Cheng, 2004; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1982). I reviewed the relevant literature on the 
subject and did not find any study that reported a positive relationship between CEO 
retirement and firm expenditures in long-term investment. Previous studies on the CEO 
retirement and firm expenditure (e.g., R&D, advertising) have reported either a negative 
relationship or neutral relationship. Although the expenditure in CSP has not been 
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considered in any of previous studies, considering that expenditure in CSP has similar 
characteristics with previously studied firm expenditures in that it is long-term oriented 
expenditure, it is more reasonable to expect a similar (negative) pattern in the CEO 
retirement and CSP-related investment.  
2.4. Compensation maximization as a motivation for the horizon problem 
The preceding description of the horizon problem and the CEO motivation behind it 
suggests that if a larger portion of CEO compensation is dependent on profit-based 
compensation (bonus plan), CEOs may withhold even larger expenditures from the long-
term investment, aggravating the horizon problem. Therefore, according to this logic, if 
profit-based compensation takes up a larger portion of CEOs’ total compensation, retiring 
CEOs will have an incentive to further reduce expenditure in social responsibility–related 
areas, leading to a sharper drop in CSP.  
Based on the untested assumption that this compensation maximization is the 
primary motivation behind the horizon problem, Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine 
occurrence of the horizon problem using a sample of CEOs, all of whom receive bonus 
plans. Although they find that CEOs in their sample indeed reduce expenditure in R&D 
at retirement, this research design falls short of being able to say anything meaningful 
about the true CEO motivation. In order for the compensation maximization motivation 
to hold, it is necessary to compare whether the horizon problem occurs in a controlled 
group where CEOs do not receive bonus plans. If CEOs who do not receive bonus plans 
show a similar behavior of long-term investment reduction near retirement, compensation 
maximization cannot be validated. As such, it is possible that Dechow and Sloan’s 
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sampling strategy overlooks a possible correlation between bonus plan and other possibly 
unmeasured characteristics of CEOs in their sample. That is, this sampling strategy is 
vulnerable to the omitted variable bias. If CEOs in the sample have other motivations 
behind the horizon problem that are unmeasured and omitted in the empirical 
specification, the drop in long-term investment could have been caused by the reasons 
other than compensation maximization.  
However, if the horizon problem is indeed caused by the compensation 
maximization motivation, we may be able to observe a finer-grained relationship between 
bonus plans and the horizon problem. In an attempt to examine the validity of 
compensation maximization as a primary motivation for the horizon problem, I 
hypothesize that the larger the size of CEO compensation based on a profit-based bonus 
plan, the more a retiring CEO will reduce expenditure for social responsibility–related 
areas, leading to a sharper drop in CSP.  
Hypothesis 2. The negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP will intensify if 
profit-based compensation takes a large portion of the total compensation of the 
CEO. 
If compensation maximization is the primary motivation behind the CEO horizon 
problem, a logical solution to the CEO horizon problem would be to tie CEO wealth to 
firm performance after retirement (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Smith and Watts, 1982). If a 
substantial part of their compensation is determined by long-term (post-retirement) firm 
performance, retiring CEOs may be reluctant to reduce expenditure in the long-term 
investment, which may damage the performance of the firm after their retirement, and 
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ultimately their compensation. Therefore, the larger the portion of stock-based 
compensation in the total compensation, the less likely retiring CEOs are to reduce 
expenditure in long-term investments, because doing so puts a large portion of their 
wealth at risk.  
In support of this argument, previous studies on the horizon problem find that 
granting stock-based compensation mitigates the impact of CEO retirement on the 
reduction in R&D investment (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; 
Smith and Watts, 1982; Yermack, 1995). Given that stock options and restricted stock 
grants are the long-term compensation mechanisms that can effectively tie CEO wealth to 
post-retirement firm performance (Hall, 2000; Hall and Murphy, 2003), I expect that if 
those stock-based compensations take up a larger portion of a CEO’s total compensation, 
the retiring CEO will have a disincentive to reduce expenditure in social responsibility–
related areas. Therefore, when stock-based compensation takes a larger portion of CEO 
total compensation, the negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP will become weaker.  
Hypothesis 3. The negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP will weaken if 
stock-based compensation takes a large portion of the total compensation of the 
CEO. 
2.5. Post-retirement career continuation as a motivation for the horizon problem 
While compensation maximization is a possible cause of the horizon problem, we cannot 
rule out other causes altogether. Another possibility behind the horizon problem that has 
been given scant attention is that retiring CEOs who are concerned about their chances of 
continuing to work after retirement may reduce the long-term investment to boost 
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accounting-based profit figures. It is known that strong accounting-based profit figures 
near retirement greatly improve the likelihood of CEOs working post-retirement 
(Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999).  
Although it may sound somewhat contradictory that retiring CEOs care about 
continuing their careers, an impressive body of human resource and psychology studies 
shows that retirees care greatly about continuing to work after retirement (Adams and 
Rau, 2004; England and Misumi, 1986; Feldman, 1994; Gill, 1999; Harpaz, 2002; Kim 
and Feldman, 2000; Morse and Weiss, 1955). For example, only 11% of US workers 
fully withdraw from the workforce after retirement (Doeringer, 1990). In another study, 
82% of US workers over the age of 65 surveyed responded that they would continue to 
work after retirement even without any financial reward (Morse and Weiss, 1955). The 
literature identifies several reasons why people are eager to remain in the workforce after 
retirement. Working gives retired people meaning in their life and a sense of self-worth, 
and satisfies the need for social contact and other important psychological social needs 
(Atchley, 1989; Gill, 1999; Harpaz, 2002; Morse and Weiss, 1955). Therefore, not 
surprisingly, “many managers remain active during retirement, through serving on 
corporate and community boards, entering politics, acting as consultants, and so on” 
(Brickley et al., 1999: 342).  
Among several options of post-retirement careers for CEOs, serving as a director 
of corporate board seems to be the most popular option for retiring CEOs. In addition to 
the continued high income stream, serving as a corporate director provides many 
attractive nonfinancial rewards to retired CEOs, such as influence, networking, status, 
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and involvement in the corporate world (Harford, 2003; Mace, 1986). The continuity 
theory suggests that retirees try to sustain structure in their daily lives by participating in 
the activities that are the most similar to those they performed before retirement (Atchley, 
1989; Kim and Feldman, 2000). For retired CEOs, serving as director of a corporate 
board may be the most similar to their previous jobs and therefore provide a similar 
structure and continuity. In support of the prediction from the continuity theory, a survey 
result shows that 88% of retired CEOs hold at least one board seat, 42% hold three or 
more seats, and 28% hold four or more (Brickley et al., 1999).  
However, if accounting-based profit figures do not affect the likelihood of their 
working after retirement, retiring CEOs have little incentive to manipulate firm profit, 
even if they are eager to continue to work after retirement. Quite interestingly, strong 
accounting-based profit figures near retirement have been found to significantly improve 
the retired CEO’s chance of working after retirement, particularly the chance of serving 
as a board of director of other companies (Brickley et al., 1999; Kaplan and Reishus, 
1990). This finding suggests that CEOs who want to increase their chances of serving on 
outside corporate boards after retirement have incentives to boost accounting-based profit 
figures near retirement. Therefore, it is also likely that the retiring CEO’s concern for 
post-retirement career continuation will lead to the horizon problem.  
Assuming that CEOs are concerned about their chances of working after 
retirement at least to some extent, I expect that the concern will be greater among CEOs 
retiring at relatively younger ages, because they have more years to remain in the active 
workforce (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Kim and Feldman, 2000). In contrast, older 
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CEOs may have less expectation of and interest in continuing to work after retirement. 
For example, the older retirees are the most likely to have health problems that make 
continued participation in the workforce more difficult (Anderson and Burkhauser, 1985; 
Colsher, Dorfman, and Wallace, 1988). Therefore, if the CEO horizon problem is 
attributable to the post-retirement career continuation concern, I expect that CEOs 
retiring at a younger age will be more strongly motivated to reduce expenditure in CSP 
and have incentive to improve accounting-based profit.  
Hypothesis 4. The negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP will intensify if the 
retiring CEO retires at a younger age. 
While retiring CEOs may be concerned about their chances of continuing to work 
after retirement, if they know ahead of time that they will serve on their own board after 
retirement, they may have little incentive to manipulate accounting-based profit figures to 
increase their chances of working after retirement. In most cases when CEOs remain on 
their own corporate board, they are informed well ahead of their retirement that they will 
be retained (Vancil, 1987). Such CEOs may have little incentive to manipulate 
accounting-based profit figures at the expense of long-term strategic investments, as 
opposed to those CEOs who will seek external post-retirement work opportunities.  
Also, for CEOs who remain members of their firm’s board, reducing investment 
in CSP may not be a wise decision for their own future. If damage in firm reputation as a 
result of a decline in CSP (e.g. an environmental disaster, a labor problem) is attributable 
to the reduction in investment during the tenure of the retired CEO who now serves on 
the board, shareholders and the board may find that CEO accountable. If firm reputation 
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and financial performance decline as a result of a decline in investment in CSP during the 
CEO’s final years, it is quite obvious who is to blame.  
The scenario of how the retention of retiring CEOs may prevent the horizon 
problem has a close analogy in the concept of the repeated game. If a participant is 
expecting the end in a game, it will act opportunistically to maximize its payoff, as the 
end is nearing. However, if the participant is expecting the game to continue, it will 
refrain from acting opportunistically and care about other parties’ interests (Axelrod, 
1984). Therefore, retention of the CEO on the board can be understood as extension of 
game between the CEO and the firm. In summary, if concern for post-retirement career 
continuation drives the reduction in CSP-related investment during a CEO’s final years, I 
expect that retaining the retiring CEO on the board of directors will positively moderate 
the negative relationship between CEO retirement and decline in CSP.  
Hypothesis 5. The negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP will weaken if the 
retiring CEO remains as a board member after departing from the CEO post. 
 
 
Figure 3. Summary of Research Hypotheses 
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3. Data and Method 
3.1. Data Sources 
The study sample starts with the 1,000 largest US firms (in terms of market 
capitalization), for two reasons. First, I focus on large firms since I assume that the 
expenditure in social responsibility–related areas should be substantial enough to 
motivate CEOs to manipulate it. Previous studies show that large firms spend more 
money in social responsibility–related areas (McGuire et al., 2003; McGuire et al., 1988; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Second, I choose US firms 
because of their significance in the global economy and the availability of social 
performance data. The social performance data for the sample firms is collected from the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) Social Ratings database (Chatterji et al., 2008a; 
Waddock, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997). To construct other explanatory and control 
variables, I collect financial data from the Compustat North America database and CEO-
related variables from the Compustat Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database 
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR database for 
company filings (www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). Since the ExecuComp database provides 
CEO-related data only from 1993 to 2006, the sample period is limited accordingly. After 
the three databases are matched, the effective sample size is reduced to 583 firms. The 
effective sample size in multivariate analysis is 3681 observations.  
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable 
 78 
 
Corporate social performance (CSP). Following the common practice in the literature 
(Chatterji et al., 2008b; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I define the CSP of the firm as the sum 
of all strength items minus the sum of all concern items.7 Considering all dimensions of 
CSP reported in the KLD database improves the construct validity of the social 
performance measure, since CSP is a multidimensional concept (Brammer et al., 2006; 
Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Rowley and Berman, 
2000). Rowley and Berman (2000) criticize the validity and reliability of studies that used 
single or selective dimension(s) of KLD ratings and urge simultaneous consideration of 
various dimensions of CSP. Griffin and Mahon (1997: 25) also claim that studies using 
selective dimensions of CSP ratings do not capture firms’ social performance, as they 
“inadequately reflect the breadth of the construct.” A large value of this variable suggests 
that the firm is generally rated highly across various areas of social performance. Based 
on the assumption that CSP rating is a lagged function of firm expenditure in social 
responsibility–related areas, I measure CSP ratings at year t+1. In effect, I assume that 
CSP at year t+1 is the outcome of firm expenditure in social responsibility–related areas 
during year t.  
Explanatory variables 
CEO retirement. CEO retirement is a dichotomous variable indicating the year the CEO 
of the firm stepped down from the position as a result of retirement. If the CEO steps 
                                                            
7 I also used a modified index calculated in the following way: seven qualitative issue areas–corporate governance, community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, product quality and safety, and human rights–receive a weight of 1, while involvement in 
alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear, and tobacco categories receive a weight of 0.5. This weighting scheme is closer to what 
Waddock and Graves (1997) used after consulting an expert panel. This modified index puts more weight on the effort and attitude of 
the company toward social performance, rather than the products they provide. The result remained unchanged. 
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down at year t, the variable is marked 1 and otherwise 0. Among several possible reasons 
for CEO departure, I focus only on cases explicitly identified as “retired” and exclude 
cases identified as “resigned” or “deceased”. I exclude resignation and death cases from 
my sample for several reasons. First, the horizon problem has been conceptually 
theorized in the context of CEO retirement (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and 
Zimmerman, 1993; Smith and Watts, 1982). Second, including resignation cases can 
aggravate the endogeneity problem (Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Weisbach, 1995). 
For example, if a disaster in CSP is a legitimate cause for a CEO’s resignation, it is 
possible that the findings merely reflect the endogeneity of management change, whereby 
poor CSP potentially led an active board to replace a CEO, and CSP simultaneously 
dropped. Also, poor financial performance is likely to result in both the resignation of 
CEO and a decline in long-term investments such as CSP (Murphy and Zimmerman, 
1993). Third, in the case of involuntary resignation (being fired), it is unrealistic to 
assume that CEOs could have anticipated the timing of their departure and had enough 
time beforehand to manipulate long-term investments.8 A CEO who is fired will most 
likely be asked to leave with short notice. Although it is possible that some CEOs 
resigning voluntarily may anticipate the timing of their departure and manipulate long-
term investment beforehand, because I could not acquire detailed information about the 
exact reason for resignation, I take a safe approach by excluding all resignation cases. 
Still, considering the fact that firms are usually euphemistic about the reasons for CEO 
                                                            
8To determine whether the CEO horizon problem can be observed in cases of CEO departure other than retirement, I ran the full 
model (Model 6, Table 15) using the samples of (1) resignation only and (2) resignation and death observations, where none of my 
hypotheses was supported. This result lends some support to the idea that resigning CEOs may not have time to manipulate investment 
in CSP before their departure.  
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departure (Boeker, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988), I expect that most 
cases reported as resignations are involuntary. In addition, I exclude cases of CEO 
departure by death because it is unlikely that CEOs anticipate their timing of death. In 
contrast, in the case of retirement, whether voluntary (early retirement) or involuntary 
(legal retirement age), CEOs can decide on or anticipate the exact timing of their 
departure well ahead of time. Lastly, it is reported that retirement constitutes the majority 
of CEO departures (Brickley, 2003; Engel, Hayes, and Wang, 2003; Sabac, 2008). This 
pattern is observed in my sample as well. In my sample, the number of resignations and 
deaths is relatively small (resign: 244 observations, 42 CEOs, death: 43 observations, 8 
CEOs) and excluding them has little impact on the results.9  
Retention on the board after departure. This dichotomous variable denotes whether the 
retiring CEO is serving as a board member of the firm two years after having stepped 
down from the CEO position. I measure in this way to make sure that the retention is not 
counted as a result of possible recording errors in the ExecuComp database. Examination 
of 10-Ks and other corporate annual reports shows that sometimes the ExecuComp 
database erroneously reports that a CEO has remained in the firm as a director. 
Measuring CEO retention after two years of retirement can minimize the impact of 
possible measurement errors in the ExecuComp database. Measuring retention at year 
t+2 also follows the conventional approach in the literature (Brickley et al., 1999).  
CEO age. CEO age is measured as the age of CEO as of year t.  
                                                            
9 I ran regressions using a sample that includes resignation and death cases. While the significance of some control variables declined 
slightly, the result remained unchanged.   
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Ratio of profit-based compensation. The ratio of profit-based compensation is measured 
as the ratio of bonus in the total compensation of the CEO. According to the ExecuComp 
database, total compensation comprises fixed salary, bonus, total value of stock options 
granted, total value of restricted stocks granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other 
compensation. The ratio of profit-based compensation is measured at year t. 
Ratio of stock-based compensation. The ratio of stock-based compensation is measured 
as the ratio of the value of stock options evaluated using the modified Black-Scholes 
method (Black and Scholes, 1973; Kerr and Kren, 1992) plus the value of restricted stock 
granted to the CEO in his or her total compensation. The value of restricted stock is 
determined as of the date of the grant. The ratio of stock-based compensation is measured 
at year t 
Control variables 
Following previous studies, I control for several variables that may influence CSP. All 
control variables are lagged by one year relative to the dependent variable and measured 
at year t. Previous studies report that firm size and firm profitability may affect CSP 
(McGuire et al., 2003; McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock 
and Graves, 1997). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of the dollar value of total 
assets (in $ millions), and profitability is measured as return-on-asset.10 In addition to the 
possible effect on CSP, profitability may explain the retirement of the CEO. That is, poor 
financial performance may trigger retirement. Therefore, by controlling for firm 
profitability, I provide a partial remedy for a spurious relationship between CEO 
                                                            
10 Firm size measured as the number of employees and firm profitability measured as return-on-equity were used alternatively. The 
result remained unchanged.   
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retirement and CSP drop, both of which can be caused by a drop in firm performance. To 
control for the possibility that availability of financial slack resources affects CSP, I 
include controls for financial leverage and free cash flow (in $ millions) (McKendall et 
al., 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Since the existence of intangible assets (e.g., 
technological capability, brand strength) may also affect CSP (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2000, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I include market-to-book ratio, which reflects 
the value of intangible assets of the firm (Barth and Kasznik, 1999; Dechow, Hutton, 
Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995). Market-to-
book ratio is used as a measure of intangible assets over other measures such as R&D and 
advertising expenditure because as many as 80% of observations in my sample are 
missing R&D and advertising expenditure information. Using R&D and advertising 
expenditure decreases my sample size drastically (from 3681 to 774), resulting in a 
significant loss of information. All remaining inter-temporal trends and interfirm 
heterogeneity are controlled for with firm fixed effects and year dummy indicators. I 
estimate the following model to get the regression result in Table 15: 
CSPit+1= β1CEO retirementit + β2CEO retirementit*bonus/total compensationit + 
β3CEO retirementit*stock-based compensation/total compensationit + β4CEO 
retirementit*CEO ageit + β5CEO retirementit*CEO retention on the boardit+2 + γ Zit 
+ δ Dit + εit 
where Zit is the vector of firm-level characteristics that affect CSP, Dit is the vector of 
firm and year dummies, and εit is the error term. Zit includes free cash flow, profitability, 
financial leverage, value of intangible assets, CEO age, and firm size.  
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4. Results 
Table 13 provides descriptive statistics of the sample data. As my models include several 
interaction terms of explanatory variables, I use centered variables before generating all 
multiplicative terms to reduce the impact of multicollinearity on my results (Aiken and 
West, 1991; Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). Furthermore, I conduct additional checks 
to examine the impact of multicollinearity. Specifically, I build hierarchically nested 
models (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000) as well as compute variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for individual variables in the models. For the full model that includes all 
interaction terms (Model 6, Table 15), the maximum VIF was 2.36 for CEO age, which is 
substantially lower than the rule-of-thumb cut-point of 10 (Kennedy, 2002). Therefore I 
conclude that multicollinearity is not a serious threat in my regression models. The 
descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 are values before centering. 
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Table 13. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations for Sampled Firms (1993-2006) 
Variable N Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1.CSP 3681 -0.0594 2.7119           
2.CEO retirement  3681  0.1284 0.3345 -0.0041          
3.CEO retention on the board  3681  0.2425 0.4287 -0.0035  0.2656*         
4.CEO age  3681  56.610 6.6766 -0.0683*  0.2964*  0.1824*        
5.Firm size  3681 8.4399 1.4928  -0.1042*  0.0687* -0.0496*  0.0737*       
6.Firm profitability  3681  5.9378 7.4323  0.1187*  0.0023  0.0254  0.0519* -0.1413*      
7.Financial leverage  3681  0.0368 0.1401  0.0008  0.098 -0.0201  0.0040  0.3225* -0.1491*    
8.Free cash flow  3681  0.0001 0.0013  0.0582*  0.0407*  0.0018  0.0346*  0.1599*  0.2610* -0.2910*   
9.Intangible assets  3681  1.6000 1.7003  0.1864* -0.0088  0.0436* -0.0871* -0.2127*  0.5004* -0.1787*  0.1718*  
10.% Profit-based compensation 3681  0.2278 0.1760 -0.0085  0.0475*  0.0166  0.0735*  0.0668*  0.1617*  0.0268*  0.0825* -0.0625*  
11.% Stock-based compensation 3681  0.4996 0.2839 -0.0213 -0.0421* -0.0923* -0.1007*  0.2064* -0.0172*  0.0109 0.0019   0.1414* -0.6127* 
 
 Significance level: * p < .05 
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The main treatment effect in the suggested models is retirement of the CEO. 
However, since this is not a randomly assigned experiment, CEO retirement can be 
endogenous. To correct for a possible endogeneity problem associated with the CEO 
retirement decision, I deploy the Heckman correction method (Hamilton and Nickerson, 
2003; Heckman, 1979; Shaver, 1998). In the first-stage probit model (Table 14), I 
estimate the probability of CEO retirement. The predicted probability of CEO retirement 
is used to generate the inverse Mills ratio to be included in the second-stage model. 
Following the literature, I include several explanatory variables as predictors of CEO 
retirement in the first-stage probit model. In the literature, firm size (Fredrickson et al., 
1988; Grusky, 1961, 1963, 1964; Kriesberg, 1962; Trow, 1960), firm profitability and 
cash flow (Allen, Panian, and Lotz, 1979b; Brickley, 2003; Eitzen and Yetman, 1972; 
McEachern, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977; Tushman, Virany, and Romanelli, 1985), 
financial leverage (Helmich, 1978; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973), characteristics of 
compensation (Fredrickson et al., 1988; Yermack, 1995; Zajac, 1990), and executive age 
(Brickley, 2003; Murphy, 1999; Yermack, 1995) are considered to have either direct or 
indirect influence on executive retirement. In keeping with the previous studies, the result 
of the first-stage model shows that firm size, firm profitability, and CEO age are relevant 
predictors of CEO retirement in the sample data. 11 
                                                            
11 I also used propensity score correction using a logit model in the first-stage. The result of the second-stage regression 
remained the same.  
 86 
 
Table 14. First-Stage Probit Estimates of CEO Retirement 
Dependent Variable  CEO 
Retirement t+1 
Firm size t  0.0464* 
(0.0202) 
Firm profitability t -0.0076† 
(0.0040) 
Financial leverage t  0.1559 
(0.1858) 
Free cash flow t  9.4680 
(20.653) 
% Profit-based compensation t -0.0074
(0.1976) 
% Stock-based compensation t  0.0711 
(0.1293) 
CEO age t  0.0728*** 
(0.0043) 
Year dummies Included 
N Firm-years 4177 
N Firms 602 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1308 
 
                         Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 15. Fixed Effects Estimation Result with Self-selection Correction 
 
Dependent Variable: CSP t+1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -1.8055 
(1.7110) 
-1.8006 
(1.7140) 
-1.7848 
(0.7163) 
-1.7717 
(1.7163) 
-1.7341 
(1.6977) 
-1.7076 
(1.7020) 
Firm size t  0.1279 
(0.1009) 
 0.1277 
(0.1010) 
 0.1261 
(0.1010) 
 0.1158 
(0.1009) 
 0.1158 
(0.1007) 
 0.1137 
(0.1008) 
Firm profitability t  0.0080 
(0.0053) 
 0.0081 
(0.0053) 
 0.0081 
(0.0053) 
 0.0077 
(0.0053) 
 0.0075 
(0.0052) 
 0.0076 
(0.0053) 
Financial leverage t  1.3532** 
(0.4324) 
 1.3588** 
(0.4292) 
 1.3602** 
(0.4284) 
 1.3447** 
(0.4365) 
 1.3587** 
(0.4368) 
 1.3653** 
(0.4330) 
Free cash flow t  115.33† 
(68.975) 
 114.48† 
(69.178) 
 113.74† 
(69.234) 
 117.49† 
(67.349) 
 120.08† 
(66.850) 
 118.47† 
(67.079) 
Intangible assets t -0.0320 
(0.0226) 
-0.0324 
(0.0226) 
-0.0327 
(0.0226) 
-0.0317 
(0.0225) 
-0.0308 
(0.0226) 
-0.0315 
(0.0226) 
% Profit-based compensation t -0.7700** 
(0.2744) 
-0.7832** 
(0.2759) 
-0.7808** 
(0.2760) 
-0.7881** 
(0.2740) 
-0.7944** 
(0.2737) 
-0.8000** 
(0.2757) 
% Stock-based compensation t -0.5089** 
(0.1757) 
-0.5129** 
(0.1763) 
-0.5116** 
(0.1766) 
-0.5215** 
(0.1758) 
-0.5174** 
(0.1760) 
-0.5179** 
(0.1796) 
CEO age t -0.0048 
(0.0111) 
-0.0047 
(0.0111) 
-0.0044 
(0.0112) 
-0.0027 
(0.0111) 
-0.0006 
(0.0111) 
-0.0001 
(0.0112) 
Retention on the board  
after retirement t+2 
 0.2173 
(0.1863) 
 0.2152 
(0.1865) 
 0.2125 
(0.1868) 
 0.2452 
(0.1881) 
 0.1904 
(0.1902) 
 0.1826 
(0.1911) 
CEO retirement t -0.0943 
(0.0909) 
-0.0978 
(0.0914) 
-0.0979 
(0.0914) 
-0.2504* 
(0.1024) 
-0.3687** 
(0.1254) 
-0.3715** 
(0.1250) 
CEO retirement t x % profit-based 
compensation t   
  0.2698 
(0.4386) 
 0.4563 
(0.5384) 
   0.4565 
(0.5408) 
CEO retirement t x % stock-based 
compensation t   
   0.1923 (0.3326) 
 
 
 0.2760 
(0.3367) 
CEO retirement t x CEO age t        0.0321
* 
(0.0144) 
 0.0321* 
(0.0143) 
 0.0314* 
(0.0143) 
CEO retirement t x retention on the 
board after retirement t+2 
     0.3957* 
(0.1648) 
 0.4083* 
(0.1662) 
Inverse Mills ratio (λ)  0.1174 
(0.4394) 
 0.1133
(0.7308) 
  0.1115 
(0.4398) 
-0.0866 
(0.4474) 
-0.0848 
(0.4466) 
-0.0857 
(0.4472) 
Firm-fixed effects & year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-years 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 3681 
N Firms 583 583 583 583 583 583 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7543 0.7543 0.7542 0.7547 0.7551 0.7551 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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In the second-stage model (Table 15), I use firm and year fixed effects estimation. 
The result of the Hausman test strongly indicates that the fixed-effects model is 
preferable to the random-effects model (chi-square=49.89, p-value=0.0000). A 
likelihood-ratio test shows that year dummies, though collectively significant (chi-
square=118.65, p-value=0.0000), are not individually significant. Since no year dummy 
is individually significant, I do not report coefficients of year dummies. Across all 
second-stage models (Table 15), I allow heteroskedasticity in the error term, and 
calculate Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at each firm level in the 
estimation. Also, I account for possible within-firm autocorrelation by using clustered 
error.   
Furthermore, the model can be exposed to several endogeneity issues. First, the 
reverse causality problem can bias the estimation. While I presume a causal direction 
from CEO departure to change in CSP, it is also possible that change in CSP, particularly 
a significant drop in CSP, can lead to the forced retirement of the CEO. In order to 
examine the possible reverse causality, I regress the retirement of CEO at year t+1 on 
CSP ratings and other variables that may influence retirement of the CEO at year t  
(Danneels, 2008; Staw, Barsade, and Koput, 1997). The result of this test shows that a 
drop in CSP does not lead to CEO retirement in a statistically significant manner, 
providing no support for reverse (Granger) causality. Therefore, the panel data support 
that the direction of causality of the lagged effects runs from CEO retirement to CSP.  
Second, it is possible that firms included in the KLD database may be self-
selected. Firms that are strong in CSP will disclose information about their social 
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performance, and therefore firms in the KLD database could be those that are strongly 
biased toward positive ratings. However, the CSP ratings of KLD firms provide 
substantial cross-section variation among firms and its distribution shows a shape very 
close to the normal distribution, which mitigates the self-selection concern.  
The results of Model 4 through Model 6 support Hypothesis 1, which states that 
CEO retirement will have a negative impact on CSP. Models 2 and 3 test the validity of 
compensation maximization as a motivation for the CEO horizon problem and stock-
based compensation as a solution. The coefficients of both interaction terms are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the horizon problem in the context of CSP is not 
driven by the compensation maximization motivation and thus may not be solved by 
granting stock-based compensation. Alternatively, Models 4 and 5 test the validity of 
post-retirement career continuation as a motivation for the horizon problem and the 
retention of the CEO as a director as a solution to the problem. The coefficient of the 
interaction term of CEO retirement and CEO age is positive and significant (β=0.0321, p-
value=0.025), suggesting that CEOs retiring at younger ages are likely to reduce 
expenditure in social responsibility–related investment by a greater amount. In 
accordance with post-retirement career continuation as a motivation for the horizon 
problem, retention of CEO as a director seems to be an effective means to mitigate the 
horizon problem in the context of CSP. The coefficient of the interaction term of CEO 
retirement and CEO retention is positive and significant (β=0.3957, p-value=0.016), 
suggesting that if a retiring CEO is retained in the firm as a director of the board, the 
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negative impact of CEO retirement on CSP is mitigated. The results of Models 4 and 5 do 
not change in Model 6, where all explanatory variables are included. 
The results suggest that the drop in CSP at CEO retirement can be attributed to 
the CEO’s desire to continue to work after retirement and thus can be mitigated if the 
CEO is retained in the board after retirement. To test this possibility, I examined the 
interaction effect of CEO age on the relationship between retirement and CSP. As 
explained, the logic was that if CEO’s desire to continue to work explains a drop in CSP, 
CEOs retiring at younger age, who likely have more interest and energy to work, may 
reduce CSP investment by greater amount. However, a possible problem in this logic is 
that some CEOs who retire at ‘younger age’ may do so because they just don’t want to 
work anymore. For example, if a CEO retires at the age of fifty even if he/she could serve 
as a CEO for ten more years or so, it is less convincing to argue that he/she is interested 
in working. Therefore, if the results were driven by those CEOs who retire very young to 
enjoy life with no interest in working, the argument of the paper may not hold. To check 
this, I removed observations of CEOs who retired before sixty (199 obs) and ran the full 
model again. The results show that all hypotheses (H1, H4, and H5) were supported at the 
same p-value level. Therefore, I ruled out the possibility that the results were driven by 
CEOs who retire very young and may have no intention to work after retirement. Figure 4 
shows the distribution of CEO age at retirement in the sample. Average CEO age at 
retirement is 61.8 years. Minimum CEO age at retirement is 47 and maximum CEO age 
at retirement is 77.   
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Figure 4. CEO Age at Retirement in the Sample Data 
 
Another possible criticism is that the negative relationship between CEO 
retirement and CSP could have been driven by CEOs who served as CEOs for a relatively 
short period. Vancil (1987) reported that many CEOs are fired during the first three years 
on the job. If CEOs serve only for a relatively short amount of time, those CEOs may not 
have a real substantial influence on long-term investment items. Therefore, to check this, 
I removed observations of CEOs who served five years or less (115 obs) and ran the full 
model again. The results remained the same and all hypotheses (H1, H4, and H5) were 
supported at the same p-value level. Therefore, I ruled out the possibility that the results 
were driven by CEOs who serve for a relatively short period, who may not have exerted a 
meaningful influence on long-term investment items. Figure 5 shows the distribution of 
CEO tenure length in the sample. Average CEO tenure is 14.46 years. Minimum CEO 
tenure length is 1 year and maximum CEO tenure length is 57 years.     
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Figure 5. CEO Tenure in the Sample Data 
 
 Regarding control variables, financial leverage and free cash flow are found to 
have positive impacts on CSP, suggesting that the existence of financial slack can have a 
positive influence on the social performance of the firm. However, the coefficients of 
CEO compensation variables are not in accordance with the findings of previous studies 
(Deckop et al., 2006; Mahoney and Thron, 2006; McGuire et al., 2003). While previous 
studies report a positive relationship between stock-based compensation and CSP, my 
result suggests that stock-based compensation has a negative impact on CSP.   
4.1. Additional analysis on the relationship between CEO retirement and CSP 
I constructed two partial measure of CSP. First measure comprises community, 
governance, environment, and product categories (4 items). Second measure comprises 
diversity, employee, and human rights (3 items). I did not run two-stage model for this 
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additional analysis because the result of Table 15 suggests that self-selection is not an 
issue in my data. Then, I replicated the regressions reported in Table 3. This additional 
analysis is summarized in Table 16. The result indicates that for the 4-items CSP measure, 
the same relationship reported in Table 15 is observed. However, when the 3-items CSP 
measure was used, no variables were statistically significant.   
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Table 16. Relationship between CEO Retirement and subsets of CSP categories 
 
Dependent Variable t+1 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept  1.9899** 
(0.6069) 
-1.5827** 
(0.5600) 
Firm size t -0.2637 
(0.0747) 
 0.2436** 
(0.0691) 
Firm profitability t  0.0012 
(0.0028) 
 0.0012 
(0.0034) 
Financial leverage t  0.9294***
(0.2449) 
 0.4181 
(0.3037) 
Free cash flow t  22.187 
(37.900) 
 101.54** 
(35.115) 
Intangible assets t -0.0284* 
(0.0115) 
-0.0182 
(0.0150) 
% Profit-based compensation t -0.2929 
(0.1822) 
-0.3474* 
(0.1694) 
% Stock-based compensation t -0.2547* 
(0.1180) 
-0.1988† 
(0.1132) 
CEO age t  0.0115 
(0.0077) 
-0.0151* 
(0.0071) 
Retention on the board  
after retirement t+2 
-0.1583 
(0.1303) 
 0.3335* 
(0.1402) 
CEO retirement t -0.2875***
(0.0848) 
-0.1286 
(0.0862) 
CEO retirement t x % profit-based 
compensation t   
-0.0166 
(0.3646) 
-0.1872 
(0.3420) 
CEO retirement t x % stock-based 
compensation t   
 0.0964 
(0.2299) 
-0.0730 
(0.2183) 
CEO retirement t x CEO age t    0.0263** 
(0.0091) 
 0.0107 
(0.0090) 
CEO retirement t x retention on the 
board after retirement t+2 
 0.2953** 
(0.1142) 
 0.1045 
(0.1095) 
Firm-fixed effects & year dummies Included Included 
N Firm-years 3681 3681 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7338 0.7263 
 
  
                                   Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
Model 1: Four KLD categories (community, governance, environment, & product) 
Model 2: Three KLD categories (diversity, employee, human right) 
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5. Conclusion and Discussion 
Many CEOs openly acknowledge that strong corporate social performance is an 
important investment leading to sustainable competitive advantage of the firm. However, 
the findings of this study suggest that CEOs may become less enthusiastic about the 
social performance of their firms when they are about to leave. If reputation as a socially 
responsible firm is a fragile resource that can be easily destroyed by inconsistency in firm 
efforts (Barnett, 2007), shareholders may heed the continuity of investment in social 
responsibility–related areas, particularly during CEO succession periods. In this paper, I 
examine the possible occurrence of the horizon problem in a new context of CSP and 
evaluate the behavioral motivation behind the horizon problem. While previous studies 
assume that CEO compensation maximization is a primary motivation for the horizon 
problem, my results suggest that compensation maximization does not explain the 
horizon problem in the CSP context. On the contrary, the retiring CEO’s concern for 
career continuation seems to offer a better explanation. Furthermore, the result suggests 
that retention of retiring CEOs may work as an effective means to curb the horizon 
problem in the context of CSP. 
 While shareholders may attempt to eliminate myopic and opportunistic 
managerial behavior by providing stock-based compensation to executives, my results 
suggest that long-term incentive mechanisms may not always be effective. Recently 
Matta and Beamish (2008) reported that equity holdings and in-the-money stock options 
aggravate the risk aversion of retiring CEOs in the context of international M&A. This 
study also finds that stock-based compensation does not curb the horizon problem in the 
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context of CSP. A possible explanation may involve the nature of CSP-related 
investments. R&D investment, which has been the traditional context of the horizon 
problem in the literature, has a relatively well defined impact on long-term financial 
performance. But the impact of CSP on financial performance is still not clearly 
understood (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Although CEOs publicly 
attest to the importance of CSP, if they in fact consider the impact of reduction in CSP-
related investment on the long-term financial performance to be highly uncertain, they 
may be more willing to reduce the investment in CSP, even if a significant amount of 
their compensation is tied to long-term firm performance. In that case, providing stock-
based compensation may not effectively control the retiring CEO’s behavior on CSP-
related investment. 
Another possible motivation behind the CEO horizon problem discussed in the 
literature but not discussed in this study is “legacy conservation” (Matta and Beamish, 
2008). According to this hypothesis, retiring CEOs are concerned about preserving their 
reputation and legacy and therefore refrain from choices that may damage their 
achievements as CEOs. In the context of CSP, this legacy conservation argument 
suggests that retiring CEOs may be concerned about protecting their image and 
reputation as socially responsible CEOs. Therefore, if legacy conservation is the primary 
motivation in CSP context, we may observe consistency or even improvement in social 
performance near CEO retirement because retiring CEOs would not want to ruin their 
legacy or reputation as socially responsible. However, my data does not support this 
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legacy conservation hypothesis in the CSP context. This suggests that legacy 
conservation may not be the main concern of CEOs when it comes to CSP.   
A possible alternative explanation for the negative relationship between CEO 
retirement and CSP is that during times of CEO change, the CSP of firms may drop as a 
result of relative inattention to social responsibility–related issues from the CEOs, the top 
management team, and the board of directors. It is well known that firms consume 
substantially more managerial attention and organizational resources during CEO 
succession than at other times (Brady and Helmich, 1984; Grusky, 1963; Lorsch and 
Khurana, 1999; Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 2000; Vancil, 1987). Therefore, it is 
possible that firms just cannot afford to spend resources on social responsibility–related 
issues during periods of CEO change, and that CSP drops as a result. However, although 
it is a possible alternative explanation, this scenario seems to be less likely considering 
that the negative relationship between CEO departure and CSP is not supported in the 
samples where CEO departure is caused by resignation or death. If the drop in CSP is 
caused by inattention to social responsibility–related issues during the chaos and trials of 
CEO change, it should be worse or at least as bad if a CEO resigns or dies, both of which 
pose more challenging transitions than retirement.   
Lastly, the paper speaks to the need to maintain an independent function or 
personnel in charge of CSP. The fact that decision making in CSP is greatly influenced 
by CEOs in many firms (e.g., Embley, 1993; Kochan, 2002; Orlitzky et al., 2003) implies 
that CSP programs of those firms are vulnerable to inconsistencies and changes, 
particularly during times of CEO succession. However, if building a reputation through 
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CSP requires consistency most of all, the effectiveness of CEO-controlled CSP programs 
may not be ideal. Also, leaving CSP-related investment decisions to the CEO or other 
individual executives is not desirable in terms of accumulation of expertise and know-
how. A group of people or system that collectively manages CSP-related investment will 
suffer much less from attrition of relevant expertise and know-how (Nelson and Winter, 
1982).    
This study has several limitations. First, I was not able to examine the direct link 
between CEO retirement and expenditure in CSP because of unavailable data. Instead, I 
rely on CSP ratings of the firm, based on an assumption that CSP rating is a direct 
outcome of CSP-related expenditure. However, as is pointed out in several critical 
reviews of CSP research,  currently available CSP ratings may not be ideal (Chatterji and 
Levine, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2006). While KLD’s CSP rating is the most influential 
and frequently used measure of CSP in the literature (Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Rowley 
and Berman, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997), the KLD rating has its own problems. 
For example, critics suggest that the KLD rating uses largely qualitative and subjective 
measures, which make it difficult to produce comparable and reliable metrics. However, 
the KLD rating relies less than other measures on survey response, which has a very low 
response rate, and also has made more effort to improve the quality of information 
collected on firms (Chatterji and Levine, 2006). While the KLD rating may not be a 
perfect measure of CSP, it is probably the best of those currently available (Chatterji et 
al., 2008b; Sharfman, 1996; Waddock, 2003; Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
 99 
 
Second, this paper focuses on CEOs without considering other senior executives. 
Previous studies noted that focusing only on CEOs may fail to provide a complete picture 
of decision making at the upper echelons (Gupta, 1988; Hambrick, 1994; Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). They argue that strategic decision making should be considered as a 
concerted outcome of agreement and compromise within the top management team. 
However, decision making on corporate social performance is mainly driven by the CEO 
and much less by other senior executives (Embley, 1993; Kochan, 2002; Orlitzky and 
Swanson, 2002; UN, 2007). Therefore, the current study’s focus on CEO retirement may 
be justified. How top management team composition and backgrounds may affect social 
responsibility–related decision making provides an interesting research question for 
future researchers.  
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Essay Three. How do corporate diversification strategies shape subsequent 
corporate social performance of the firm? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the strategy literature, antecedents of corporate diversification have been one of the 
most widely discussed topics (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 
1989). In contrast, research on consequences of corporate diversification has focused 
almost exclusively on corporate financial performance (Chakrabarti, Singh, and 
Mahmood, 2007; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Palepu, 
1985; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). 
Corporate financial performance is the most important measure of how well a firm is 
doing, but in overlooking other important dimensions of firm performance it often fails to 
provide information on long-term viability (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Luo, 2006). For 
example, corporate social performance (CSP) can serve as a complementary measure of 
firm performance, particularly as a predictor of long-term firm performance and viability 
(Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Handy, 2002; Kacperczyk, 2009; Martin, 2002; Ogden and 
Watson, 1999). While CSP as a useful predictor of long-term firm performance is gaining 
increasing empirical support (Kacperczyk, 2009; Ogden and Watson, 1999), strategy 
scholars have not yet given much thought to how social performance of the firm can be 
connected to such topics as corporate diversification.  
McWilliams and Siegel (2001) proposed a positive relationship between a firm’s 
degree of overall diversification and its CSP. However, conceptual elaborations on and 
 101 
 
empirical tests of this proposition are found only for the case of international 
diversification (Christmann, 2004; Sharfman, Shaft, and Tihanyi, 2004). In an attempt to 
advance the inquiry on the relationship between corporate diversification and CSP, this 
paper examines the impact of unrelated, related, and international diversification on CSP. 
McWilliams and Siegel’s (2001) proposed relationship between overall diversification 
and CSP is based on the cost-sharing advantage of diversified firms. While the argument 
is sound and logical, if the impact of diversification on CSP is driven by the cost-sharing 
capacity of diversified firms, we may not see a meaningful difference in social 
performance between firms pursuing unrelated and related diversification. In this paper, I 
propose that there are important differences between unrelated and related diversification 
that can have differential effects on the subsequent social performance of firms. 
I propose that firms pursuing unrelated diversification strategies have strong 
incentives to achieve positive CSP. First, unrelated diversifiers usually face a wide range 
of varying demands from stakeholders in distant industries of their subsidiaries. In an 
attempt to respond to these varied demands, unrelated diversifiers attend to a wide range 
of social concerns, leading to their achieving positive CSP. Second, while effective 
resource transfer across subsidiaries is a key to the competitive advantage of the 
diversified firm, it is a highly challenging task for unrelated diversifiers. In an attempt to 
achieve competitive advantage through resource sharing across subsidiaries, unrelated 
diversifiers may seek ways to enhance the transferability of resources. When it comes to 
the brand, firms can enhance transferability by emphasizing the abstract association of 
the brand through demonstration of strong social performance. In contrast, related 
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diversification does not engender similar incentives to positive social performance. 
Therefore, related diversification will not lead to positive CSP. Lastly, firms pursuing 
international diversification are under strong pressure and monitoring from influential 
international stakeholders, which provide them with a strong incentive for positive social 
performance.  
Using a panel data set of 518 large US firms from 1993 to 2006, I find that 
unrelated diversification and international diversification positively affect CSP, while 
related diversification affects it negatively. The positive impact of unrelated 
diversification on CSP raises an interesting question about the value of unrelated 
diversification, which often has been criticized because of its negative impact on short-
term financial performance. If CSP can serve as a relevant predictor of long-term firm 
performance and viability (Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; Ogden and 
Watson, 1999), the positive impact of unrelated diversification on CSP speaks to a 
benefit of unrelated diversification that has been overlooked in the literature. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Relationship between unrelated diversification and stakeholder demands 
CSP measures the improvement in social condition by a firm’s voluntary actions and is a 
multidimensional concept that covers a range of social issues related to the firm’s 
operation (Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000). For 
example, a firm’s CSP is measured and aggregated across a number of areas such as 
environmental contribution, humanitarian contribution, workforce diversity, employee 
relations, corporate governance, and product safety (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
 103 
 
Because CSP is multidimensional, a firm’s achievement of positive CSP means that the 
firm is paying attention to diverse areas of social issues (Kacperczyk, 2009). 
 Previous studies on antecedents of CSP have identified a number of determinants 
of CSP, which include organizational slack (e.g., profitability) (McGuire et al., 2003; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Waddock and Graves, 1997), value of intangible resource 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000, 2001), managerial compensation (Deckop et al., 2006; 
Mahoney and Thron, 2006; McGuire et al., 2003), governance structure (e.g., board 
constitution) (Johnson and Greening, 1999), and managerial employment risk 
(Kacperczyk, 2009). The suggested relationship between those variables and CSP can be 
characterized as either a firm’s ability or motivation to invest in CSP. For example, 
organizational slack or profitability speaks to the ability of the firm to invest in CSP-
related issues. In contrast, other determinants speak to the motivation of the firm to invest 
in CSP-related issues. Managerial compensation, governance structure, employment risk, 
and value of intangible resource are predicted to determine the level of a firm’s 
investment in CSP, because those variables increase or decrease motivation (incentive) of 
managers to invest in CSP.  
 The suggested relationship between corporate diversification and CSP is also 
related to the motivation of the firm to invest in CSP-related issues. When firms pursue 
an unrelated diversification strategy, they enter industries that are very different from the 
ones they are currently in (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Markides and Williamson, 
1994) and as a result will face very different groups of stakeholders from those they are 
familiar with (Brammer et al., 2006; Porter, 1980, 1985). Moreover, stakeholders in 
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different industries demand that firms put different priorities on various categories of 
social issues, and firms respond accordingly (Brammer and Millington, 2008). For 
example, Russo and Fouts (1997b) show that importance of environmental issues 
significantly differs among firms in different industries. Also, Adams and Hardwick 
(1998) find that the importance of corporate charitable donations varies significantly 
across industries. Therefore, a firm simultaneously operating in unrelated industries will 
face a wider range of social issues with which stakeholders want that firm to engage. In 
short, increasing level of diversification gives incentives (motivation) to a firm to invest 
in more diverse social issues. 
Considering that failure to respond appropriately to stakeholder demands can 
threaten the firm’s survival (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995), 
firms have to respond to their stakeholders’ demands at least to some degree. Therefore, 
while coping with the demands of diverse stakeholder groups across unrelated industries 
and markets, firms pursuing the unrelated diversification strategy are likely to respond to 
a broader range of social concerns and show better social performance than related 
diversifiers. For example, the top management team of GE, a firm pursuing an extensive 
unrelated diversification strategy, admits that “there is a tendency by many to expect GE 
to be all things to all stakeholders” (GE, 2008: 11, emphasis added) and states that it 
strives to meet the demands of a wide range of stakeholders of GE’s unrelated 
subsidiaries. 
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2.2. Brand transferability and social performance 
Porter (1987) explains that resource sharing is the main source of competitive advantage 
for the diversified firm. However, for unrelated diversifiers, resource sharing is a much 
more challenging task because of the greater differences in their end-products (Chatterjee 
and Wernerfelt, 1991; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). This suggests that an unrelated 
diversifier seeking to share resources across its subsidiaries should spend extra effort to 
enhance those resources’ transferability. Although the main competitive advantage of 
unrelated diversifiers may lie elsewhere, such as an internal capital market (Anand and 
Jayanti, 2005), effective sharing of firm resources across subsidiaries certainly adds to 
their competitive advantage. For example, sharing the brand across subsidiaries can help 
firms reduce their advertising costs.  
Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) define the transferability of a resource as an 
ability of a resource to be used in more than one end-product. In the case of brand, 
transferability can be enhanced by emphasizing the abstract association ability of the 
brand (Johnson, 1984; Park, Milberg, and Lawson, 1991; Sujan and Dekleva, 1987). 
Abstract association of a brand is defined as imagery- or symbol-related association that 
invokes general ideas about the firm and not of any particular or concrete products 
(Hoeffler and Keller, 2002; Park et al., 1991). When a firm brand has a high level of 
abstract association, it can be more easily associated with a wide range of unrelated 
products that the firm provides (Johnson, 1984; Park et al., 1991; Sujan and Dekleva, 
1987). Reddy, Holak, and Bhat (1994: 246) explain, “A symbolic brand’s more abstract 
image suggests that it provides broader appeal, which can be extended to a wider variety 
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of new products.” This suggests that an unrelated diversifier can extend its brand across 
unrelated product offerings more easily when it maintains a highly abstract brand. 
A firm’s commitment to social issues and demonstration of positive social 
performance generate a strongly positive yet highly abstract brand image (Drumwright, 
1996; File and Prince, 1998; Hoeffler and Keller, 2002; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and 
Braig, 2004). First, communicating a firm’s commitment to social issues improves the 
abstract association of a brand, which is focused on the general image of a firm, but does 
not affect specific product-related perceptions (Hoeffler and Keller, 2002). Second, 
positive social performance by the firm engenders a strong positive image of the brand by 
enhancing the credibility and moral integrity associated with the brand (Brown and Dacin, 
1997; Lichtenstein et al., 2004; McGuire et al., 1988).  
This argument suggests that unrelated diversifiers can benefit by building a brand 
with a positive abstract association through the demonstration of positive social 
performance. Therefore, I expect that unrelated diversifiers will spend more resources in 
social responsibility–related areas and achieve positive social performance. Considering 
that an unrelated diversifier will be exposed to a wide range of stakeholder demands and 
positive social performance will help it apply the brand more easily across its unrelated 
products, I expect that the unrelated diversification strategy will lead to positive CSP. 
Hypothesis 1. An unrelated diversification strategy will have a positive impact on 
the subsequent corporate social performance of the firm.  
In contrast to unrelated diversifiers, related diversifiers tend to face similar 
stakeholders as they diversify into new industries. For example, when Coca-Cola entered 
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the bottled water industry, they faced environmental activist groups that oversee the use 
of water sources, which it had already dealt with in the carbonated beverage industry (e.g., 
Food & Water Watch). Also, regulatory bodies apply similar regulations and rules across 
related industries. Therefore, related diversifiers will tend to focus on a relatively limited 
range of social concerns. In addition, related diversifiers have little incentive to build an 
abstract brand image, because a brand that is narrowly defined in a specific area applies 
well across their closely related product offerings (Johnson, 1984; Park et al., 1991; 
Sujan and Dekleva, 1987).  
Since related diversifiers do not have clear incentives to achieve positive social 
performance, a related diversification strategy will not lead to positive CSP. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that related diversifiers will show a negative CSP. If 
related diversifiers respond well to a narrow range of social issues pertaining to their 
related subsidiaries, they will be able to avoid earning a negative CSP. Therefore, it is 
expected that related diversification will have either a negative or neutral relationship 
with subsequent CSP. Hence, I propose a set of alternative hypotheses on the relationship 
between related diversification and CSP.  
Hypothesis 2a. A related diversification strategy will have a negative impact on 
the subsequent corporate social performance of the firm. 
Hypothesis 2b. A related diversification strategy will have no impact on the 
subsequent corporate social performance of the firm.  
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2.3. International diversification and corporate social performance 
Firms going international are exposed to more diverse and influential stakeholders (e.g., 
foreign customers, international activist groups, and international media) and thus need to 
pay more careful attention to their social performance (Christmann, 2004; Sharfman et al., 
2004; Strike, Gao, and Bansal, 2006). For example, firms with strong international 
presence become a popular target of international activist groups; “An ever-expanding 
army of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) stands ready to do battle with 
multinational companies at the slightest sign of misbehavior” (Economist, 2008). The 
case of Nestle provides a good example. While Nestle is using only 0.0008% of global 
water sources, it is the most frequently targeted firm of international environmentalist 
groups that address water waste issues. In fact, the inefficiency of agricultural irrigation, 
which uses 70% of the world’s water supply, is a far more pressing issue, but one with no 
equally convenient target (Porter and Kramer, 2006).  
As firms pursuing international diversification are likely to be exposed to more 
diverse as well as more influential corporate monitoring bodies (e.g., high-profile NGOs, 
international media), behaving in a socially responsible manner is not an option but an 
imperative for them. If socially irresponsible behavior in any overseas operations is 
detected by influential international monitoring bodies, worldwide operations of the firm 
will suffer financial loss and damage to brand image, which often take a substantial time 
and resources to recover from. Therefore, firms pursuing an international diversification 
strategy have strong incentives to pay more attention to corporate social performance 
than domestic firms do. Hence,  
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Hypothesis 3. An international diversification strategy will have a positive impact 
on the subsequent corporate social performance of the firm.  
 
 
Figure 6. Summary of Research Hypotheses 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data Sources 
The sample for this study starts from 1,000 largest US firms in terms of market 
capitalization. I choose large firms for my sample because large firms are more likely to 
pursue diversification, both product-wise and geographically (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; 
Ingham and Thompson, 1995; Markides and Williamson, 1996). Also, their strategic 
behaviors and performance are critical for the global economy (Perrow, 1986; Wang and 
Zajac, 2007). The social performance data for the sample firms is collected from the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) Social Ratings database, which is the most trusted 
source of CSP measure in academic research (Chatterji et al., 2008a; Waddock, 2003; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). To construct other explanatory and control variables, I 
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collect financial data from Compustat’s North America database and Compustat’s 
Executive Compensation (ExecuComp) database. Since the ExecuComp database 
provides data from 1993 to 2006, the sample period is limited accordingly. After the three 
databases are matched, the effective sample size is reduced to 518 firms. The effective 
sample size in analysis is 3290 observations.  
3.2. Variables 
Dependent variable 
Corporate social performance (CSP). Following the common practice in the literature 
(Chatterji et al., 2008a; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I define the CSP of the firm as the sum 
of all strength items minus the sum of all concern items.12 Considering all dimensions of 
CSP reported in the KLD database improves the construct validity of the social 
performance measure, since CSP is a multidimensional concept (Brammer et al., 2006; 
Carroll, 1979; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Rowley and Berman, 
2000). Scholars have criticized the validity and reliability of studies that used single or 
selective dimension(s) of KLD rating and urged for simultaneous consideration of 
various dimensions of CSP (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000). A 
large value for this variable suggests that the firm is generally rated highly across various 
social responsibility areas. CSP is measured at time t+1. 
Explanatory variables 
                                                            
12 I also used a modified index calculated in the following way: seven qualitative issue areas (i.e., corporate governance, community, 
diversity, employee relations, environment, product quality and safety, and human rights categories) receive a weight of 1, while 
involvement in alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear, and tobacco categories receives a weight of 0.5. This weighting scheme, 
closer to what Waddock and Graves (1997) used after consulting an expert panel, puts more weight on the effort and attitude of the 
company toward social performance, rather than the products they provide. The result remained unchanged. 
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Related/unrelated diversification. Since I hypothesize the different impact of related and 
unrelated diversification on subsequent CSP of the firm, I need separate measures of 
related and unrelated diversification. Only the entropy measure of diversification 
distinguishes between related and unrelated diversifications (Chatterjee and Blocher, 
1992; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Mosel, 1993; Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 
1985). Palepu (1985) explains that the entropy measure overcomes the limitation of the 
earlier diversification indices and allows the decomposition of a firm’s total diversity into 
two additive components: (1) an unrelated component that measures the extent to which a 
firm’s operational output is distributed in product across unrelated industry groups and (2) 
a related component that measures the distribution of the operational output among 
related products within the industry groups. The entropy measure of related 
diversification DR is defined as follows. First, let DRj be defined as the related 
diversification arising out of operating in several segments within an industry group j. 
DRj can be written as 
DR ∑=
ji
i
j
i
j
j pP
ε
)/1ln(  
where Pji is defined as the share of the segment i of group j in the total sales of the 
group. Since my sample firms operate in several industry groups, their total related 
diversification DR is a function of DRj, j=1,…,M. It is defined as  
  DR=∑
=
M
j 1
j
j P DR  
where Pj is the share of the jth group sales in the total sales of the firm. Note that 
DR is the weighted average of the related diversification within all the M groups. Each 
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group gets a weightage equal to its share, a measure of its importance in the total 
operations of the firm.  
Let DU be the unrelated diversification. This arises out of operating across several 
industry groups. Therefore, DU is defined as  
DU ∑
=
=
M
j
i
j
i
j pP
1
)/1ln(  
International diversification. International diversification refers to a firm’s expansion 
beyond its domestic market into other regions or countries (Ghoshal, 1987). I adopt the 
most commonly used measure of international diversification in the literature, the foreign 
sales ratio defined as a firm’s foreign sales divided by its total sales (Capar and Kotabe, 
2003; Geringer, Beamish, and da Costa, 1989; Geringer, Tallman, and Olsen, 2000; Grant, 
Jammine, and Thomas, 1988; Tallman and Li, 1996). All diversification measures are 
measured at time t. 
Control variables 
Following previous studies, I include controls for financial leverage and free cash flow 
(in $ millions) (McKendall et al., 1999; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). Since the 
existence of intangible assets (e.g., R&D capability, brand strength) may also affect CSP 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2000, 2001; Waddock and Graves, 1997), I include market-to-
book ratio, which measures the value of intangible assets (Barth and Kasznik, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 2001; Ikenberry et al., 1995). Market-to-book ratio is used rather than 
other measures such as R&D and advertising expenditure because up to 80% of my 
observations are missing that information. I also control for firm size and firm 
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profitability (McGuire et al., 2003; McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; 
Waddock and Graves, 1997). Firm size is measured as number of employees (in 
thousands) (Lee, Shenkar, and Li, 2008) and profitability is measured as return-on-equity 
(ROE). Lastly, because CEO compensation structure influences CSP (Deckop et al., 2006; 
Mahoney and Thron, 2006; McGuire et al., 2003), I include ratios of bonus and stock-
based compensation in total CEO compensation. All control variables are measured at 
time t. I estimate the following model to get the regression result in Table 2: 
CSPit+1= β1unrelated diversificationit + β2related diversificationit + β3international 
diversificationit + Zit γ + Dit δit + εit, 
where Zit is the vector of firm-level characteristics that affect CSP, Dit is the vector of 
firm and year dummies, and εit  is the error term. Zit includes free cash flow, profitability, 
financial leverage, value of intangible assets, firm size, and ratios of bonus and stock-
based compensation in total CEO compensation. 
4. Analysis 
Table 17 provides descriptive statistics for the sample data. Correlations are relatively 
low, with a few exceptions.  
I also check the correlation between both related and unrelated diversification and 
advertising expenditure, using observations that have advertising expenditure information 
(n=1290). In hypothesis 1, I argue that unrelated diversifiers have an incentive to achieve 
positive CSP, which will enable them to build an abstract yet positive brand and to apply 
it across their unrelated products. This argument is based on an implicit assumption that 
brand is a highly important firm resource for unrelated diversifiers. The presence of a 
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strong positive correlation between unrelated diversification and advertising expenditure 
will lend some underpinnings to the assumption. The correlation coefficient between 
unrelated diversification and advertising expenditure (ρ=0.2614, p-value<0.001) is more 
than double the one between related diversification and advertising expenditure 
(ρ=0.1237, p-value<0.001). This strong positive correlation suggests that brand is a more 
important resource for unrelated diversifiers than for related diversifiers. 
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Table 17. Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations for Sampled Firms (1993-2006) 
Variable N Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12 
1.Corporate social performance  3290 0.0571 2.6684           
2.Unrelated diversification  3290 0.2533 0.3681 -0.2009*          
3.Related diversification  3290 0.2680 0.3884 -0.0646* 0.0902*         
4.International diversification   3290 0.0229 0.0826 -0.0489* 0.0578* -0.0070        
5.Firm size  3290 31.001 50.737  0.0018 0.2325* 0.0557* -0.0064       
6.Firm profitability   3290 17.470 103.24 -0.0208 0.0182 0.0154 -0.0124 0.0090    
7.Financial leverage   3290 0.2724 0.5352 -0.1372* 0.0899* 0.0640* -0.0245 0.0229 -0.0528*   
8.Free cash flow  3290 192.32 965.95 0.0785* 0.0518* -0.0114 -0.0282 0.2660* 0.0726* -0.1076*
9.Intangible assets  3290 1.7990 1.9300 0.1749* -0.2186* -0.1504* 0.0170 -0.0879* 0.0895* -0.3011* 0.2322*   
10.% Earning-based compensation 3290 0.2279 0.1791 0.0153 0.0704* 0.0169 0.0039 0.0239 0.0592* 0.0139 0.0954* -0.0571*  
11.% Stock-based compensation   3290 0.4915 0.2891 -0.0405* -0.0372* 0.0232 -0.0195 0.0690* -0.0112 -0.0202 0.0068 0.1341* -0.6489*
 
            Significance level: * p < .05
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A possible problem in my dataset is that firms included in the KLD database may 
be self-selected. Firms that are strong in CSP will disclose information about their social 
performance, and therefore firms in the KLD database could be those that are strongly 
biased toward positive ratings. However, the CSP ratings of KLD firms provide 
substantial cross-section variation among firms and its distribution shows a shape very 
close to the normal distribution, which mitigates the self-selection concern.  
To control for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity, I use firm fixed-effects 
estimation. The result of the Hausman test strongly indicates that the fixed-effects model 
is preferable to the random-effects model (chi-square=101.80, p-value=0.0000). I also 
include year dummies to control for temporal heterogeneity. A likelihood-ratio test shows 
that year dummies are strongly significant, both collectively and individually (chi-
square=147.46, p-value=0.0000).  
5. Results 
Model 2 shows that unrelated diversification positively affects subsequent CSP of the 
firm in a statistically significant manner (β=0.3656, p-value=0.027). In contrast, related 
diversification does not positively affect subsequent CSP. In Model 3, the relationship 
between related diversification and CSP is negative and statistically significant (β=-
0.3684, p-value=0.004). Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. Lastly, in keeping with 
the findings of previous studies, international diversification (β=1.3017, p-value=0.003, 
Model 4) has a positive and statistically significant impact on subsequent CSP. The full 
model (Model 5), which includes all three types of diversification, shows that all three 
hypotheses remain supported.  
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Table 18. Firm and Year Fixed Effects Estimation Result 
 
Dependent Variable: CSP t+1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept   0.4461** 
(0.1552) 
  0.3485* 
(0.1612) 
  0.4904** 
(0.1557) 
 0.3933* 
(0.1560) 
  0.3470* 
(0.1627) 
Firm size t  -0.0108***
(0.0018) 
 -0.0114***
(0.0018) 
 -0.0108***
(0.0018) 
 -0.0110*** 
(0.0018) 
 -0.0115***
(0.0018) 
Firm profitability t  -0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005* 
(0.0002) 
Financial leverage t  -0.0863 
(0.0684) 
 -0.0818 
(0.0684) 
 -0.0864 
(0.0683) 
 -0.0907 
(0.0683) 
 -0.0869 
(0.0682) 
Free cash flow t  0.0003*** 
(0.00004) 
 0.0003*** 
(0.00004) 
 0.0003*** 
(0.00004)
 0.0003*** 
(0.00004) 
 0.0002*** 
(0.00004) 
Intangible assets t -0.0561* 
(0.0212) 
-0.0553* 
(0.0212) 
-0.0556* 
(0.0228) 
-0.0586* 
(0.0229) 
-0.0573* 
(0.0228) 
% Earning-based compensation t -0.2194 
(0.2699) 
-0.2304 
(0.2697) 
-0.2126 
(0.2695) 
-0.1935 
(0.2696) 
-0.1963 
(0.2692) 
% Stock-based compensation t -0.4004* 
(0.1726) 
-0.4048* 
(0.1725) 
-0.3973* 
(0.1724) 
-0.3956* 
(0.1724) 
-0.3964* 
(0.1720) 
Unrelated diversification t 
 
 0.3656* 
(0.1651)   
 0.3326* 
(0.1650) 
Related diversification t    -0.3684**
(0.1269) 
 -0.3617** 
(0.1269) 
International diversification t       1.3017** 
(0.4371) 
 1.3249** 
(0.4364) 
Firm-fixed effects & year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-years 3290 3290 3290 3290 3290 
N Firms 518 518 518 518 518 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7428 0.7432 0.7435 0.7435 0.7445 
 
        Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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I hypothesize that unrelated diversification and international diversification will 
lead to positive social performance. Therefore, it is possible that firms pursuing unrelated 
diversification and international diversification at the same time may show even stronger 
CSP. To check the possible interaction effects between different diversification strategies, 
I add two multiplicative terms between international diversification and related/unrelated 
diversification. However, the result of this additional test shows that neither 
multiplicative term is statistically significant. The direction and significance of other 
explanatory variables remain unchanged when the two multiplicative terms are added.  
Lastly, while I propose a causal direction from different diversification strategies 
to subsequent CSP, it is also probable that positive CSP will build intangible assets, such 
as reputation and brand, that will affect the type of diversification the firm will pursue. 
Therefore, to check this possible reverse causal direction, I regress the three 
diversification strategies at time t+1 on CSP at time t (Danneels, 2008; Staw et al., 1997). 
The result of the additional test shows that CSP has no statistically significant impact at 
the conventional level (p-value<0.05) on any subsequent diversification strategies, 
providing no support for reverse (Granger) causality (see Table 19).  
The incremental R2 of models including explanatory variables are relatively small. 
To check whether diversification variables and interaction variables add to the 
explanatory power of the model in a statistically significant manner, I conducted 
likelihood ratio tests. First, likelihood ratio tests show that the fit of the models that 
additionally included each diversification variable increased in a statistically significant 
manner (unrelated diversification: likelihood ratio χ2=13.49, p=0.0002, related 
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diversification: likelihood ratio χ2=7.77, p=0.0053, international diversification: 
likelihood ratio χ2=8.94, p=0.0028). Also, when I added all three diversification variables 
to the base model, the fit of the model improved in a statistically significant manner 
(likelihood ratio χ2=29.80, p=0.0000). The likelihood ratio tests show that despite the 
small incremental R2, diversification variables do improve the explanatory power of the 
model in a statistically meaningful manner. 
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Table 19. Reverse Causality Test Result 
 
Dependent Variable t+1 Unrelated 
Diversification 
Related  
Diversification 
International 
Diversification  
Intercept   0.2446*** 
(0.0387) 
  0.1205** 
 (0.0459) 
 0.0350*** 
(0.0076) 
Firm size t   0.0013† 
(0.0007) 
 -0.0003 
 (0.0006) 
 0.0002* 
(0.0008) 
Firm profitability t   0.00001 
(0.00001) 
 -0.00001 
 (0.00001) 
 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Financial leverage t  -0.0279** 
(0.0107) 
 -0.0068 
 (0.0116) 
 0.0040 
(0.0030) 
Free cash flow t  0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Intangible assets t -0.0020 
(0.0039) 
-0.0054 
 (0.0052) 
 0.0012 
(0.0011) 
% Earning-based compensation t  0.0793† 
(0.0412) 
  0.0387 
 (0.0602) 
-0.0086 
(0.0161) 
% Stock-based compensation t  0.0246 
(0.0241) 
  0.0083 
 (0.0384) 
 0.0021 
(0.0102) 
CSP t    0.0051 
(0.0044) 
 -0.0120† 
 (0.0065) 
 0.0011 
(0.0010) 
Firm-Fixed effects & year dummies Included Included Included 
N Firm-years 2687 2687 2687 
N Firms 500 500 500 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8293 0.7631 0.4667 
  
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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6. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study advances research on corporate diversification and corporate social 
performance by revealing the ramifications of different diversification strategies on 
subsequent CSP of the firm. Prior research on this subject has only considered the impact 
of international diversification of the firm on CSP (Bouquet and Deutsch, 2007; 
Christmann, 2004; Sharfman et al., 2004). Considering that the difference between 
related and unrelated diversification has been central to the corporate diversification and 
strategy literature, the lack of attention to the relationship between related/unrelated 
diversification and CSP is surprising.  
In this paper, I propose that unrelated diversifiers have incentives to demonstrate 
good social performance, while related diversifiers do not. First, presence in unrelated 
industries and markets increases exposure to a wide range of stakeholder demands and 
diverse social concerns. While responding to diverse social issues, unrelated diversifiers 
will achieve positive social performance. Second, strong social performance contributes 
to enhanced brand transferability across the products of unrelated subsidiaries. Therefore, 
unrelated diversifiers with good social performance will be in a better position to 
leverage their corporate brands. Related diversification does not provide similar 
incentives.  
In proposing the possible relationship between unrelated diversification and 
subsequent CSP, I argue that unrelated diversifiers have to address to a wider range of 
stakeholder demands, which will result in positive social performance. According to the 
stakeholder theory, failure to respond to stakeholder demands will lead to poor financial 
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performance and even threaten the survival of the firm (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, 
unrelated diversifiers will have to spend more organizational resources and managerial 
attention than related diversifiers on attending to stakeholder demands. The phenomenon 
of “diversification discount” (Anand and Jayanti, 2005; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and 
Stulz, 1994) may be partially attributable to this extra burden on unrelated diversifiers to 
meet a broader range of stakeholder demands. Highly diversified firms not only suffer 
from lack of coherence in terms of underlying resources (Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1988), but also have to deal with a wide range of stakeholder demands that can put them 
at a further competitive disadvantage. While it is not clear how much financial burden 
stakeholders demands may actually place on firms pursuing unrelated diversification, the 
possible relationship between stakeholder demands and the diversification discount may 
deserve more scholarly attention. 
The results also raise an interesting question related to the debate about the 
diversification discount, which views unrelated diversification as an inefficient and 
inferior diversification strategy. The diversification discount argument is based on the 
observation of the relationship between diversification and (short-term) financial 
performance measures (Ansoff, 1965; Bettis, 1981; Lecraw, 1984; Markides and 
Williamson, 1994; Palepu, 1985; Palich et al., 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Singh and 
Montgomery, 1987). If CSP can serve as a meaningful predictor of long-term firm 
viability (Chatterji and Levine, 2006; Handy, 2002; Kacperczyk, 2009; Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; Martin, 2002; Ogden and Watson, 1999), then the positive impact of 
unrelated diversification on CSP suggests that an unrelated diversification strategy may 
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contribute to long-term firm viability via its positive impact on CSP. Considering that 
accounting-based performance measures and stock prices often fail to predict long-term 
firm performance and viability, consideration of corporate social performance as a 
complementary measure of firm performance may enrich our understanding of the 
questions we ask in strategy research.   
Lastly, the findings provoke another interesting debate on the value of unrelated 
diversification. If unrelated diversification demands that firms attend to a broader range 
of stakeholders, from the social welfare perspective, unrelated diversification may do a 
larger good for society. This idea resonates with the work of Khanna and Palepu (1997), 
who vindicate the value of unrelated diversification in the emerging economy. In an 
environment where proper institutional support is missing, unrelated diversification can 
contribute to the prosperity not only of the firms but also of the larger society, given that 
the firms pursuing unrelated diversification will attend to the demands of a wider range of 
stakeholders. For example, the rapid social as well as economic development of South 
Korea in the early ’80s and India in the late ’90s is largely attributable to the growth of 
local firms pursuing the unrelated diversification strategy. If we accept the idea that 
unrelated diversifiers may do more social good than related diversifiers, the image of 
unrelated diversifiers as wasteful dinosaurs (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) may deserve a 
reevaluation.  
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7. Conclusion of the dissertation and directions for future research 
This dissertation attempts to provide a more balanced view on corporate social 
performance (CSP) by examining both the antecedents and consequences of CSP. Based 
on partial evidence that CSP contributes to the financial performance of a firm, I proceed 
to examine the impact of previously overlooked factors on CSP. In this dissertation, I 
addressed three questions related to CSP. First, I examined whether CSP has a positive 
influence on the financial performance of a firm and compared the CSP-financial 
performance relationship between the short and long term (Essay 1, Part I). Second, I 
examined the measurement validity of a popular measure of the empirical CSP literature 
(Essay 1, Part II), which was also used in this dissertation. Third, I examined how 
corporate factors at different levels (CEO retirement, corporate diversification) affect 
CSP of the firm (Essays 2 & 3).  
The findings of the first essay suggest that consideration of relevant contexts, 
such as temporal difference in financial performance and change in stakeholder 
perceptions toward CSP, can help researchers uncover fine-grained relationships between 
CSP and financial performance. The lack of consideration of such contexts in previous 
studies has added confusion to the CSP-financial performance relationship (Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003). Therefore, I encourage future researchers to consider more contexts that 
can moderate or mediate the CSP-financial performance relationship. Such efforts will 
further our understanding of the benefits and costs of CSP. In addition, the findings of the 
first essay lend some support to using the KLD database as a measure of CSP in the 
empirical CSP research. Therefore, this essay lays a foundation to the other two essays in 
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the dissertation, as well as to the entire empirical body of CSP research. Examining the 
measurement validity of the KLD database has been called for by many previous 
researchers; yet, a response to this call has been limited (Chatterji et al. 2009; Sharfman, 
1996).  
In the second and third essays, I turned to understanding the antecedents of CSP. 
Specifically, I examined how CEO retirement and corporate diversification may affect 
CSP. In the second essay, I found that a CEO’s personal interest-seeking surrounding his 
retirement may negatively affect the CSP of the firm. This finding suggests that the CEO 
succession process may have a harmful effect on a firm’s resource accumulation. 
However, considering that CEO succession is an inevitable event, shareholders need a 
remedy for the negative effect of CEO succession on CSP, such as retention of the 
retiring CEO on the board of directors. Therefore, the findings of the second essay have 
implications for the CSP and corporate governance literature. First, this study is a rare 
attempt to study the role of CEOs in CSP. Second, this study provides a new empirical 
context to study opportunistic CEO behavior and motivation surrounding CEO retirement. 
In the third essay, I uncovered a differential effect of unrelated and related 
diversification on CSP. I found that the level of unrelated diversification is positively 
related to CSP, while the level of related diversification is not. The corporate 
diversification literature has focused on the financial performance implications of 
diversification, while ignoring its social implications. The positive relationship between 
unrelated diversification and CSP suggests that this may be one of the overlooked 
benefits of unrelated diversification, given that CSP can contribute to financial 
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performance. Even if CSP does not contribute to financial performance, the positive 
relationship between unrelated diversification and CSP suggests that from a social 
welfare perspective, unrelated diversification has some merit. 
This dissertation speaks to several theoretical and empirical issues in the literature. 
First, CSP is a complex resource that contributes to firm performance through interaction 
with stakeholders. However, empirical CSP studies often overlook this basic idea and do 
not take the role of stakeholders seriously in investigating the benefits and costs of CSP. 
In this dissertation, I examined the role of stakeholders by comparing the CSP-financial 
performance relationship between two different periods (before and after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act). Another closely related research opportunity is to compare regional or 
international differences in the CSP-financial performance relationship. Due to various 
reasons, such as economic development and cultural background, different countries 
(regions) may put differing importance on CSP. Therefore, this research question can 
pose valuable managerial implications to multinational firms and their managers. 
However, I must admit that there is a critical empirical challenge in obtaining a 
generalizable measure of CSP across different countries. As of now, there is no 
generalizable measure of CSP for firms from different countries. 
Second, among many factors that determine CSP, managerial factors deserve 
more scholarly attention. Scholars have paid much attention to firm-level variables such 
as slack resources, based on an assumption that profitable firms can afford to invest in 
CSP. While firm characteristics such as slack resources may explain a firm’s investment 
in CSP, this is only half of the story. That is, firms rich in resources or those that have 
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certain characteristics may not automatically invest in CSP. Such heterogeneity in CSP 
investment can be explained by investigating the role of managers in CSP investment. 
Particularly, considering that top managers, such as CEOs, are the main drivers of CSP-
related decision-making, we can further our understanding of the heterogeneity in CSP by 
examining executive-level managerial factors. While I examined the role of CEO 
(retirement) in this dissertation, it is possible that other executives may exert similar 
influence on CSP-related decisions. For example, firms recently started to appoint 
executives dedicated to dealing with CSP-related issues. If these “CSP executives” are 
truly in charge of making corporate-wide CSP-related decisions, much of the 
heterogeneity in CSP attributed to managerial factors can be explained. Therefore, this 
provides a good research question for future studies. However, an empirical challenge is 
that we do not have clear criteria to identify the existence of such executives. Not only do 
these executives not have a clear or consistent title, but their influence and status within 
the top management team also greatly varies. Such a lack of comparability in CSP 
executives across firms poses a substantial challenge to this research opportunity.  
Lastly, corporate or firm strategies other than corporate diversification will be 
related to CSP. For example, strategic alliances may be another candidate of such 
corporate- or firm-level variables. Researchers found that firms observe each other to 
mimic or adjust actions. The social network literature has argued that both formal and 
informal linkages between firms play an important role for such mimetic isomorphism. In 
the case of CSP, we may predict that firms connected to other firms with strong CSP may 
invest more in CSP, or firms with strong CSP may be drawn to each other. In line with 
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this argument, Sullivan et al. (2007) found that firms committing unethical behaviors are 
ostracized by their partners in the alliance network. Another possible inter-firm 
connection that may affect CSP is director interlocking among firms. Given that directors 
are close advisors to top managers, the director interlock network may affect the CSP of 
the firm even more strongly than the strategic alliance network. 
As discussed above, the research questions addressed in this dissertation invoke a 
number of related research questions concerning CSP. A brief discussion of possible 
research opportunities suggests that there are many questions that remain unsolved in the 
field of CSP. I believe that such a plethora of research opportunities can be attributed to 
the lack of attempts to apply traditional strategy topics to the subject of CSP. A recent 
review of the CSP literature shows that researchers often approach the subject of CSP 
from an ethics or stakeholder theory perspective (Margolis and Walsh, 2003), thereby not 
paying enough attention to strategic management theories or frameworks. As exemplified 
in this dissertation, the ideas and topics of strategic management have good potential for 
application to the subject of CSP. Also, an extension of strategy research questions to 
CSP will enrich our understanding in both disciplines. Therefore, I invite future 
researchers to apply more strategy topics and frameworks in order to better understand 
the CSP of firms. I believe that this dissertation provides an example of research that 
connects the bridge between strategic management and CSP.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of Strength and Concern Items in the KLD Social Ratings Database 
Category Strength Concern 
Community Charitable giving 
Innovative giving 
Non-US charitable giving 
Support for housing 
Support for education 
Volunteer programs 
Other strengths 
Investment controversies 
Negative economic impact 
Tax disputes 
Other concern 
 
Corporate  
governance 
Limited compensation to top management 
Ownership strength 
Transparency strength 
Political accountability strength 
Other strength 
High compensation to top management 
Ownership concern 
Accounting concern 
Transparency concern 
Political accountability concern 
Other concern 
Diversity  CEO 
Promotion 
Board of directors 
Work/life benefits 
Women & minority contracting 
Employment of the disabled 
Gay & lesbian policies 
Other strength 
Controversies 
Non-representation 
Other concern 
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Category Strength Concern 
Employee 
relations 
Union relations 
No-layoff policy 
Cash profit sharing 
Employee involvement 
Retirement benefits strength 
Health and safety strength 
Other strength 
Union relations concern 
Health and safety concern 
Workforce reductions 
Retirement benefits concern 
Other concern 
Environment  Beneficial products and services 
Pollution prevention 
Recycling  
Clean energy  
Communications of environmental performance 
Property, plant, and equipment  
Other strength 
Hazardous waste 
Regulatory problems 
Ozone depleting chemicals 
Substantial emissions 
Agricultural chemicals 
Climate change 
Other concern 
Human rights Indigenous peoples relations strength 
Labor rights strength 
Other strength 
Indigenous peoples relations concern 
Labor rights concern 
Other concern 
Products  Quality superiority 
R&D/Innovation 
Benefits to economically disadvantaged 
Other strength 
Product safety concern 
Marketing/Contracting concern 
Antitrust 
Other concern 
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Category Strength Concern 
Alcohol  Licensing, manufacturing, retailing of alcohol and 
ownership relation to an alcohol company 
Gambling  Licensing, manufacturing, supporting of gambling 
products and services and ownership relation to a 
gambling company 
Tobacco   Licensing, manufacturing, retailing of tobacco 
products and ownership relation to a tobacco 
company 
Firearms  Manufacturing and retailing of firearms and 
ownership relation to a firearms company 
Military  Manufacturing of weapons and weapon systems, 
ownership relation to a military company 
Nuclear  Construction of nuclear power plants, supplying 
nuclear power fuel, parts, and services, and 
ownership relation to a nuclear company 
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Appendix 2. Selected previous studies on consequences of CSP (CSP-FP relationship) 
Authors Methodology Focus on CSR/CSP Key findings 
Abowd et al. (1990) Event study Human resource 
decisions 
No consistent pattern of 
increased or decreased 
stock price 
Worrell et al. (1991) Event study Layoff programmes Investors react negatively 
to layoff announcements, 
especially when they are 
due to financial distress 
Wright and Ferris 
(1997) 
Event study Divestment from 
South Africa 
Divestment had a negative 
effect on shareholder value 
Negative relationship 
between CSR and FP 
Aupperle et al. 
(1985) 
Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a neutral 
relationship between CSP 
and FP 
Russo and Fouts 
(1997) 
Regression Environmental 
performance 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
environmental performance 
and FP 
Waddock and 
Graves (1997) 
Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a positive 
relationship between CSP 
and FP 
McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) 
Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a neutral 
relationship between CSP 
and FP 
Hillman and Keim 
(2001) 
Regression ‘Social issues’ CSP 
and ‘stakeholder 
management’ CSP 
‘Stakeholder management’ 
CSP is positively correlated 
with shareholder wealth 
creation, while ‘social 
issues’ CSP is not 
Godfrey et al. 
(2009) 
Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
Strong CSP protects 
shareholder value from 
future negative CSR-
related events 
Choi and Wang 
(2009) 
Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
Strong CSP contributes to 
persistence of superior FP 
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Appendix 3. Selected previous studies on antecedents of CSP 
Authors Methodology Focus on CSR/CSP Key findings 
Johnson and 
Greening (1999) 
Regression ‘People’ dimension 
of CSP and ‘product 
quality’ dimension 
of CSP 
There is significant 
relationships between 
executive salary, stock 
ownership, BOD 
composition and CSP 
McWilliams and 
Siegel (2000) 
Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
R&D investment is 
positively related with CSP 
McGuire et al. 
(2003) 
Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a neutral 
relationship between CEO 
stock options and CSP 
Christman (2004) Regression Environmental 
policy 
standardization level 
Multinational firms are 
more likely to have a 
strong environmental 
policy 
Bansal (2004) Regression Environmental 
performance 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
international experience 
and environmental 
performance 
Coombs and Giley 
(2005) 
Regression  ‘stakeholder 
management’ CSP 
Strong CSP is negatively 
associated with CEO 
salaries 
Brammer et al. 
(2006) 
Regression Corporate 
philanthropy 
contribution 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
international presence and 
corporate philanthropy 
Deckop et al. (2006) Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a negative 
relationship between CEO 
stock options and CSP 
Mahoney and Thron 
(2006) 
Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a negative 
relationship between CEO 
stock options and CSP 
Strike et al. (2006) Regression An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
There is a positive/negative 
relationship between 
international diversification 
and CSP 
David et al. (2007) Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
Shareholder activism 
reduces CSP 
Kacperczyk (2009) Regression  An overall firm-
level index of CSP 
Managerial employment 
protection increases CSP 
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Appendix 4. Previous studies on the KLD measure validation 
Authors Methodology Detailed approach Key findings 
Sharfman (1996) Correlation 
analysis 
Compared KLD 
ratings with 
Fortune’s reputation 
score 
KLD ratings are 
significantly positively 
related with Fortune’s 
reputation score 
Chatterji et al. 
(2009) 
Regression Examined KLD 
environmental 
ratings’ ability to 
summarize past & 
predict future social 
performance 
KLD ratings effectively 
summarize past 
environmental performance 
and predict future 
environmental performance 
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Appendix 5. Relationship between individual categories of the KLD Social Ratings and market value 
Fixed Effects Estimation Results (2003-2006) 
Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -19588
*** 
(9413.7) 
-20280* 
(9430.6) 
-21019* 
(9456.5) 
-21083* 
(9462.3) 
-20068* 
(9505.4) 
-20719* 
(9436.7) 
-21081* 
(9457.0) 
Firm Size t 
3429.8*** 
(1070.8) 
3385.1** 
(1074.7) 
3590.8*** 
(1075.5) 
3579.3*** 
(1076.5) 
3460.6*** 
(1081.8) 
3520.5*** 
(1073.8) 
3570.0*** 
(1077.5) 
Free cash flow t 
3.2249*** 
(0.2281) 
3.3002*** 
(0.2290) 
3.2579*** 
(0.2291) 
3.2551*** 
(0.2293) 
3.2514*** 
(0.2291) 
3.2077*** 
(0.2296) 
3.2601*** 
(0.2296) 
Debt ratio  t 
-1465.0 
(1743.6) 
-1524.8 
(1747.6) 
-1449.6 
(1753.0) 
-1467.8 
(1752.7) 
-1479.9 
(1751.9) 
-1600.2 
(1750.0) 
-1481.4 
(1753.0) 
CSP t 
-2155.5*** 
(556.51) 
-1004.9** 
(344.60) 
-154.73 
(323.37) 
49.303 
(310.36) 
-452.03 
(429.60) 
-2006.4* 
(840.60) 
-124.40 
(495.60) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9675 0.9674 0.9672 0.9672 0.9672 0.9673 0.9672 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 136 
 
Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 18499 (13958) 
18701 
(13902) 
18434 
(13913) 
18616 
(13907) 
22749 
(13859) 
17776 
(13875) 
18400 
(13883) 
Firm Size t 
-870.60*** 
(1597.6) 
-924.29 
(1594.0) 
-854.41 
(1591.4) 
-884.20 
(1592.4) 
-1403.6 
(1588.2) 
-810.06 
(1588.6) 
-913.76 
(1590.6) 
Free cash flow t 
4.3306*** 
(0.3385) 
4.3435*** 
(0.3389) 
4.3319*** 
(0.3386) 
4.3232*** 
(0.3387) 
4.3607*** 
(0.3364) 
4.2984*** 
(0.3384) 
4.3393*** 
(0.3383) 
Debt ratio  t 
-568.63 
(2392.0) 
-601.18 
(2390.9) 
-575.18 
(2391.4) 
-538.19 
(2392.2) 
-756.33 
(2376.1) 
-654.08 
(2387.8) 
-693.80 
(2391.0) 
CSP t 
-109.33 
(697.16) 
-326.83 
(440.27) 
-82.004 
(410.32) 
206.52 
(398.57) 
-2059.3*** 
(575.55) 
-1835.4† 
(1025.6) 
-836.89 
(647.44) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 1494 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9686 0.9686 0.9686 0.9686 0.9690 0.9687 0.9686 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -2504.8 (25790) 
-5334.2 
(26040) 
-3543.8 
(25951) 
1524.6 
(25932) 
3351.5 
(25924) 
-1323.3 
(26177) 
-825.80 
(26017) 
Firm Size t 
2542.2 
(3071.5) 
2995.5 
(3107.2) 
2624.4 
(3088.8) 
2103.7 
(3088.4) 
1851.8 
(3088.7) 
2441.5 
(3114.0) 
2356.6 
(3101.0) 
Free cash flow t 
0.6453 
(0.6188) 
0.8545 
(0.6156) 
0.8134 
(0.6173) 
0.8028 
(0.6157) 
0.7975 
(0.6142) 
0.8915 
(0.6166) 
0.8513 
(0.6196) 
Debt ratio  t 
-3556.4 
(3918.5) 
-4014.9 
(3944.2) 
-3775.3 
(3938.7) 
-3159.6 
(3941.8) 
-3914.4 
(3925.7) 
-3701.3 
(3947.7) 
-3765.1 
(3946.9) 
CSP t 
3104.4** 
(1167.0) 
1227.8 
(846.96) 
953.95 
(652.21) 
1305.6† 
(671.50) 
-2582.2* 
(1105.5) 
245.53 
(1824.7) 
-828.92 
(1382.1) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 988 988 988 988 988 988 988 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9687 0.9684 0.9684 0.9685 0.9686 0.9682 0.9682 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Fixed Effects Estimation Results (1992-2002) 
Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -49624
*** 
(7801.7) 
-48669*** 
(7802.9) 
-51610*** 
(7768.6) 
-49905*** 
(7804.5) 
-49914*** 
(7795.2) 
-50261*** 
(10125) 
-49736*** 
(7790.9) 
Firm Size t 
6917.5*** 
(934.95) 
6746.6** 
(936.53) 
7019.3*** 
(929.61) 
6957.5*** 
(933.81) 
6978.1*** 
(933.82) 
7109.6*** 
(1297.4) 
6923.2*** 
(933.19) 
Free cash flow t 
10.848*** 
(0.3826) 
10.846*** 
(0.3817) 
10.644*** 
(0.3827) 
10.864*** 
(0.3821) 
10.879*** 
(0.3822) 
6.3141*** 
(0.4627) 
10.816*** 
(0.3825) 
Debt ratio  t 
-8987.4** 
(3146.1) 
-8952.6** 
(3141.5) 
-9681.6** 
(3134.2) 
-8883.8** 
(3152.1) 
-8947.9** 
(3144.5) 
-6191.7† 
(3644.5) 
-8936.5** 
(3142.5) 
CSP t 
537.06 
(681.85) 
-1718.5* 
(689.22) 
2401.9*** 
(468.12) 
55.746 
(526.27) 
690.24 
(673.87) 
-2322.4 
(1543.7) 
-1381.7* 
(667.79) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3461 3461 3461 3461 3461 2736 3461 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8066 0.8070 0.98083 0.8066 0.8066 0.8476 0.8068 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an explanatory variable, 
the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -32055
*** 
(8020.9) 
-30267*** 
(8005.3) 
-33826*** 
(8001.7) 
-32604*** 
(8025.2) 
-32533*** 
(8014.2) 
-2687.0 
(9582.1) 
-32340*** 
(8013.6) 
Firm Size t 
4782.6*** 
(961.05) 
4462.67***
(960.70) 
4890.8*** 
(957.37) 
4848.5*** 
(960.06) 
4879.4*** 
(959.95) 
2309.5† 
(1213.7) 
4818.1*** 
(959.71) 
Free cash flow t 
6.9086*** 
(0.3929) 
6.9038*** 
(0.3912) 
6.7573*** 
(0.3938) 
6.9323*** 
(0.3925) 
6.9577*** 
(0.3925) 
0.5046 
(0.4324) 
6.8969*** 
(0.3930) 
Debt ratio  t 
-7598.2* 
(3238.2) 
-7524.7* 
(707.71) 
-8088.3* 
(3231.7) 
-7358.6* 
(541.49) 
-7512.02* 
(3236.1) 
-2391.6 
(3411.3) 
-7491.09* 
(3235.8) 
CSP t 
861.41 
(701.22) 
-3117.2*** 
(707.71) 
1958.3*** 
(482.58) 
253.65 
(541.49) 
1050.1 
(696.35) 
-1474.0 
(1443.5) 
-1114.0 
(685.29) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3447 3447 3447 3447 3447 2722 3447 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8177 0.8188 0.8187 0.8176 0.8178 0.8800 0.8178 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Dependent Variable:  Market Value t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -2484 (7848.9) 
-11411 
(7848.9) 
-13537† 
(7847.3) 
-13096† 
(7854.1) 
-12923† 
(7846.2) 
36882*** 
(8835.2) 
-12824 
(7845.2) 
Firm Size t 
3226.8*** 
(939.67) 
3033.8*** 
(941.17) 
3311.7*** 
(938.20) 
3297.6*** 
(938.84) 
3308.6*** 
(939.06) 
-2471.6* 
(1131.3) 
3275.9*** 
(938.76) 
Free cash flow t 
3.8691*** 
(0.3839) 
3.8781*** 
(0.3828) 
3.8095*** 
(0.3855) 
3.8945*** 
(0.3834) 
3.9099*** 
(0.3836) 
-2.5560*** 
(0.4027) 
3.8736*** 
(0.3840) 
Debt ratio  t 
-6205.6† 
(3176.3) 
-6098.6† 
(3170.5) 
-6384.7* 
(3177.1) 
-5918.1† 
(3182.9) 
-6082.9† 
(3175.5) 
877.21 
(3195.6) 
-6075.5† 
(3174.9) 
CSP t 
954.79 
(687.00) 
-2110.9** 
(695.51) 
982.91* 
(473.56) 
334.72 
(530.49) 
506.45 
(682.93) 
-1168.1 
(1351.2) 
-738.25 
(671.40) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3428 3428 3428 3428 3428 2703 3428 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8399 0.8403 0.8400 0.8398 0.8398 0.9021 0.8398 
 
   
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Appendix 6. Relationship between individual categories of the KLD Social Ratings and Tobin’s Q 
Fixed Effects Estimation Results (2003-2006) 
Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -6.4885
*** 
(0.5297) 
6.4763*** 
(0.5292) 
6.4851*** 
(0.5289) 
6.4313*** 
(0.5289) 
6.5240*** 
(0.5308) 
6.4592*** 
(0.5290) 
6.4592*** 
(0.5290) 
Firm Size t 
-0.5075*** 
(0.0634) 
-0.5077*** 
(0.0634) 
-0.5054*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.5016*** 
(0.0633) 
-0.5129*** 
(0.0636) 
-0.5049*** 
(0.0634) 
-0.5050*** 
(0.0634) 
Free cash flow t 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
0.00002† 
(0.0001) 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
0.00002† 
(0.00001) 
Debt ratio  t 
-0.3368** 
(0.1278) 
-0.3396** 
(0.1278) 
-0.3321** 
(0.1278) 
-0.3408** 
(0.1277) 
-0.3403** 
(0.1277) 
-0.3404** 
(0.1279) 
-0.3399** 
(0.1279) 
CSP t 
-0.0329 
(0.0317) 
-0.0190 
(0.0196) 
-0.0278 
(0.0186) 
-0.0251 
(0.0176) 
-0.0349 
(0.0248) 
-0.0206 
(0.0485) 
-0.0115 
(0.0282) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 1980 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8855 0.8855 0.8856 0.8856 0.8856 0.8855 0.8855 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Dependent Variable:   Tobin’s Q t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 4.1246
*** 
(0.8346) 
4.0275*** 
(0.8306) 
3.9169*** 
(0.8285) 
3.8566*** 
(0.8284) 
3.9648*** 
(0.8284) 
3.8231*** 
(0.8302) 
3.8265*** 
(0.8291) 
Firm Size t 
-0.2425** 
(0.0870) 
-0.2313** 
(0.0867) 
-0.2296** 
(0.0868) 
-0.2209** 
(0.0867) 
-0.2362** 
(0.0869) 
-0.2214* 
(0.0867) 
-0.2214* 
(0.0867) 
Free cash flow t 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
0.00002 
(0.00001) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.0160 
(0.1513) 
0.0069 
(0.1513) 
0.0058 
(0.1515) 
0.0043 
(0.1517) 
-0.0028 
(0.1514) 
0.0031 
(0.1516) 
-0.0001 
(0.1517) 
CSP t 
-0.0802** 
(0.0355) 
-0.0472* 
(0.0229) 
-0.0314 
(0.0216) 
-0.0032 
(0.0206) 
-0.0593* 
(0.0298) 
-0.0329 
(0.0543) 
-0.0261 
(0.0340) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 1459 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8988 0.8987 0.8985 0.8983 0.8987 0.8983 0.8983 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Dependent Variable:   Tobin’s Q t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.2071 (1.2839) 
0.2698 
(1.2857) 
0.2156 
(1.2857) 
0.2558 
(1.2823) 
0.4255 
(1.2878) 
0.3249 
(1.2861) 
0.1579 
(1.2869) 
Firm Size t 
0.2108 
(0.1511) 
0.2013 
(0.1516) 
0.2101 
(0.1512) 
0.2057 
(0.1509) 
0.1836 
(0.1517) 
0.1990 
(0.1513) 
0.2179 
(0.1517) 
Free cash flow t 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00002 
(0.00002) 
Debt ratio  t 
-0.1776 
(0.2252) 
-0.1726 
(0.2252) 
-0.1779 
(0.2252) 
-0.1595 
(0.2253) 
-0.1828 
(0.2246) 
-0.1670 
(0.2251) 
-0.1777 
(0.2251) 
CSP t 
0.0195 
(0.0540) 
-0.0303 
(0.0420) 
-0.0012 
(0.0299) 
0.0392 
(0.0310) 
-0.0843 
(0.0537) 
0.0978 
(0.0868) 
0.0387 
(0.0664) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 951 951 951 951 951 951 951 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.9088 0.9089 0.9088 0.9091 0.9093 0.9091 0.9089 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Fixed Effects Estimation Results (1992-2002) 
Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 6.8629
*** 
(0.4356) 
6.9646*** 
(0.4362) 
6.8243*** 
(0.4350) 
6.8397*** 
(0.4355) 
-6.8378*** 
(0.4353) 
10.395*** 
(0.6346) 
 6.8451*** 
(0.4348) 
Firm Size t 
-0.6277*** 
(0.0571) 
-0.6400*** 
(0.0572) 
-0.6214*** 
(0.0570) 
-0.6229*** 
(0.0570) 
-0.6211*** 
(0.0571) 
-0.9982*** 
(0.0801) 
-0.6245*** 
(0.0570) 
Free cash flow t 
0.00009***
(0.00002) 
0.00009***
(0.00002) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00009***
(0.00002) 
0.00009*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00005* 
(0.00002) 
0.00009*** 
(0.00002) 
Debt ratio  t 
-0.0419 
(0.1918) 
-0.0398 
(0.1913) 
-0.0486 
(0.1916) 
-0.0301 
(0.1918) 
-0.0350 
(0.1916) 
0.1790 
(0.2295) 
-0.0247 
(0.1914) 
CSP t 
0.0539 
(0.0406) 
-0.1351 
(0.0413) 
0.0698** 
(0.0281) 
0.0019 
(0.0314) 
0.0518 
(0.0409) 
0.1212 
(0.0967) 
0.1123** 
(0.0407) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3347 3347 3347 3347 3347 2681 3347 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7021 0.7505 0.7031 0.7019 0.7021 0.7179 0.7028 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
 145 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 7.4164
*** 
(0.4226) 
7.4941*** 
(0.4233) 
7.4044*** 
(0.4223) 
7.3968*** 
(0.4223) 
7.4058*** 
(0.4222) 
11.043*** 
(0.6197) 
7.4083*** 
(0.4217) 
Firm Size t 
-0.7272*** 
(0.0555) 
-0.7372*** 
(0.0555) 
-0.7246*** 
(0.0554) 
-0.7246*** 
(0.0553) 
-0.7231*** 
(0.0553) 
-1.0804*** 
(0.0780) 
-0.7259*** 
(0.0553) 
Free cash flow t 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
  -0.00006* 
(0.00002) 
   -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.5077** 
(0.1846) 
0.5068** 
(0.1843) 
0.5106** 
(0.1846) 
0.5227** 
(0.1849) 
0.5061** 
(0.1845) 
1.0391*** 
(0.2226) 
0.5142** 
(0.1843) 
CSP t 
0.0281 
(0.0400) 
-0.1039* 
(0.0407) 
0.0021 
(0.0278) 
0.0313 
(0.0305) 
0.0537 
(0.0403) 
0.1510 
(0.0933) 
0.1164** 
(0.0394) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3317 3317 3317 3317 3317 2654 3317 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.7073 0.7079 0.7072 0.7074 0.7074 0.7234 0.7082 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 7.8430
*** 
(0.4303) 
7.8488*** 
(0.4319) 
7.8688*** 
(0.4298) 
7.8466*** 
(0.4301) 
7.8528*** 
(0.4302) 
10.421*** 
(0.6248) 
7.8535*** 
(0.4296) 
Firm Size t 
-0.7573*** 
(0.0564) 
-0.7592*** 
(0.0566) 
-0.7615*** 
(0.0563) 
-0.7602*** 
(0.0563) 
-0.7591*** 
(0.0563) 
-0.9890*** 
(0.0789) 
-0.7606*** 
(0.0563) 
Free cash flow t 
 -0.00005**
(0.00002) 
 -0.00005**
(0.00002) 
 -0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
 -0.00006**
(0.00002) 
 -0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.00002) 
 -0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.7412*** 
(0.1856) 
0.7366*** 
(0.1855) 
0.7548*** 
(0.1855) 
0.7496*** 
(0.1858) 
0.7345*** 
(0.1855) 
1.2580*** 
(0.2201) 
0.7385*** 
(0.1853) 
CSP t 
-0.0367 
(0.0402) 
0.0047 
(0.0415) 
-0.0675* 
(0.0282) 
0.0378 
(0.0310) 
0.0228 
(0.0408) 
0.1292 
(0.0943) 
0.1123** 
(0.0398) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3295 3295 3295 3295 3295 2639 3295 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.6952 0.6951 0.6957 0.6952 0.6951 0.6931 0.6959 
 
   
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
 147 
 
Appendix 7. Relationship between individual categories of the KLD Social Ratings and ROA 
Fixed Effects Estimation Results (2003-2006) 
Dependent Variable:  ROA t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.4420
*** 
(0.0680) 
0.4371*** 
(0.0679) 
0.4443*** 
(0.0678) 
0.4462*** 
(0.0679) 
0.4432*** 
(0.0682) 
0.4424*** 
(0.0679) 
0.4427*** 
(0.0679) 
Firm Size t 
-0.0458*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0450*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0456*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0463*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0460*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0459*** 
(0.0081) 
-0.0459*** 
(0.0081) 
Free cash flow t 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.0046 
(0.0132) 
0.0048 
(0.0132) 
0.0053 
(0.0132) 
0.0049 
(0.0132) 
0.0046 
(0.0132) 
0.0043 
(0.0132) 
0.0045 
(0.0132) 
CSP t 
-0.0004 
(0.0042) 
0.0039 
(0.0026) 
-0.0051* 
(0.0024) 
0.0034 
(0.0023) 
-0.0007 
(0.0032) 
-0.0051 
(0.0063) 
-0.0012 
(0.0037) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5662 0.5668 0.5675 0.5668 0.5662 0.5663 0.5662 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Dependent Variable:   ROA t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.3390
** 
(0.1033) 
0.3451** 
(0.1029) 
0.3457** 
(0.1030) 
0.3444** 
(0.1029) 
0.3536** 
(0.1032) 
0.3426** 
(0.1027) 
0.3473** 
(0.1027) 
Firm Size t 
-0.0321** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0326** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0328** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0327** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0338** 
(0.0118) 
-0.0326** 
(0.0117) 
-0.0334** 
(0.0117) 
Free cash flow t 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.0589** 
(0.0177) 
0.0593** 
(0.0177) 
0.0592** 
(0.0177) 
0.0590** 
(0.0177) 
0.0590** 
(0.0177) 
0.0587** 
(0.0177) 
0.0584** 
(0.0177) 
CSP t 
0.0038 
(0.0051) 
0.0009 
(0.0032) 
0.0003 
(0.0030) 
-0.0011 
(0.0029) 
-0.0033 
(0.0042) 
-0.0125† 
(0.0075) 
-0.0062 
(0.0048) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5840 0.5838 0.5837 0.5838 0.5840 0.5849 0.5845 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Dependent Variable:   ROA  t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept -0.0703 (0.1951) 
-0.0702 
(0.1962) 
-0.0676 
(0.1954) 
-0.0869 
(0.1954) 
-0.0570 
(0.1958) 
-0.0922 
(0.1966) 
-0.0909 
(0.1951) 
Firm Size t 
0.0193 
(0.0232) 
0.0192 
(0.0234) 
0.0191 
(0.0232) 
0.0212 
(0.0232) 
0.0175 
(0.0233) 
0.0216 
(0.0234) 
0.0221 
(0.0232) 
Free cash flow t 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001**
(0.0000) 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001** 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.00001* 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
-0.0324 
(0.0296) 
-0.0318 
(0.0297) 
-0.0318 
(0.0296) 
-0.0344 
(0.0297) 
-0.0326 
(0.0296) 
-0.0324 
(0.0296) 
-0.0309 
(0.0296) 
CSP t 
-0.0082 
(0.0088) 
-0.0006 
(0.0063) 
-0.0025 
(0.0049) 
-0.0057 
(0.0050) 
-0.0077 
(0.0083) 
-0.0112 
(0.0137) 
0.0165 
(0.0103) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 991 991 991 991 991 991 991 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5564 0.5556 0.5558 0.5568 0.5564 0.5562 0.5579 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Fixed Effects Estimation Results (1992-2002) 
Dependent Variable:  ROA t+1        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.3720
*** 
(0.0301) 
0.3738*** 
(0.0302) 
0.3718*** 
(0.0301) 
0.3726*** 
(0.0301) 
0.3724*** 
(0.0301) 
0.4827*** 
(0.0421) 
0.3716*** 
(0.0301) 
Firm Size t 
-0.0402*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0405*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0402*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0402*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0404*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0528*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0401*** 
(0.0036) 
Free cash flow t 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
-0.0103 
(0.0121) 
-0.0103 
(0.0121) 
-0.0104 
(0.0121) 
-0.0106 
(0.0121) 
-0.0099 
(0.0121) 
0.0023 
(0.0151) 
-0.0102 
(0.0121) 
CSP t 
0.0001 
(0.0026) 
-0.0025 
(0.0026) 
0.0003 
(0.0018) 
-0.0008 
(0.0020) 
-0.0062 
(0.0026) 
-0.0104 
(0.0064) 
0.0040 
(0.0025) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3463 3463 3463 3463 3463 2738 3463 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5241 0.5243 0.5241 0.5242 0.5251 0.5196 0.5245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Dependent Variable:  ROA t+2        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.3809
*** 
(0.0305) 
0.3822*** 
(0.0305) 
0.3810*** 
(0.0305) 
0.3843*** 
(0.0304) 
0.3816*** 
(0.0304) 
0.4486*** 
(0.0425) 
0.3804*** 
(0.0304) 
Firm Size t 
-0.0420*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0422*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0420*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0421*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0422*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0476*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0418*** 
(0.0036) 
Free cash flow t 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.0011 
(0.0123) 
0.0010 
(0.0122) 
0.0011 
(0.0123) 
-0.0008 
(0.0123) 
0.0014 
(0.0122) 
0.0107 
(0.0151) 
0.0013 
(0.0122) 
CSP t 
-0.0003 
(0.0026) 
-0.0016 
(0.0026) 
0.00005 
(0.0018) 
-0.0048* 
(0.0020) 
-0.0056* 
(0.0026) 
-0.0013 
(0.0064) 
0.0080** 
(0.0026) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3448 3448 3448 3448 3448 2723 3448 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4941 0.4941 0.4941 0.4950 0.4949 0.4959 0.4957 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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Dependent Variable:  ROA t+3        
Independent variable (CSP t) Community Governance Diversity Employee Environment Human right Product 
Intercept 0.2250
*** 
(0.0301) 
0.2281*** 
(0.0301) 
0.2272*** 
(0.0301) 
0.2306*** 
(0.0300) 
0.2268*** 
(0.0300) 
0.2386*** 
(0.0393) 
0.2257*** 
(0.0300) 
Firm Size t 
-0.0215*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0221*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0218*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0219*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0219*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0221*** 
(0.0050) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0035) 
Free cash flow t 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Debt ratio  t 
0.0152 
(0.0121) 
0.0147 
(0.0121) 
0.0153 
(0.0121) 
0.0121 
(0.0121) 
0.0151 
(0.0121) 
0.0276† 
(0.0142) 
0.0149 
(0.0121) 
CSP t 
-0.0029 
(0.0026) 
-0.0027 
(0.0026) 
-0.0015 
(0.0018) 
-0.0065** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0060* 
(0.0026) 
-0.0004 
(0.0060) 
    0.0069** 
(0.0025) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N Firm-Years 3428 3428 3428 3428 3428 2703 3428 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4695 0.4695 0.4694 0.4712 0.4703 0.4949 0.4707 
 
   
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Notes: KLD did not report Human Right strength/concerns before 1995. As a result, when Human Right ratings were used as an 
explanatory variable, the number of observations is smaller during the pre-2003 period.   
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